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Abstract
The intersection between virtue and care ethics is underexplored in contemporary moral
philosophy. This thesis approaches care ethics from a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical
perspective, comparing the two frameworks and drawing on recent work on care to develop a
theory thereof. It is split into seven substantive chapters serving three major argumentative
purposes, namely the establishment of significant intertheoretical agreement, the compilation
and analysis of extant and new distinctions between the two theories, and the synthesis of care
ethical insights with neo-Aristotelianism to generate a virtue ethical theory of care. In the first
two chapters, I outline virtue ethics and care ethics, and argue for considerable agreement over
central premises. Chapter 2 summarises the foundational commitments of care ethics, focusing
particularly on their relational ontology and its links to the other ethical claims care ethicists
universally ascribe to, namely particularism, partialism, the moral salience of emotions, and
the rejection of hard public/private distinctions. Chapter 3 lays out the central concepts in neoAristotelian virtue ethics, including eudaimonism, virtue, and character traits, and drawing a
number of comparisons between virtue and care ethics specifically with regard to relational
ontology and the meta-ethical commitments it underpins. In addition to doing the necessary
expository work for the remainder of the thesis, Chapters 2 and 3 also argue that care ethics
and virtue ethics have much more in common than is typically acknowledged – the first major
contribution of this thesis to the literature.
Chapters 2 and 3 to provide at least a prima facie justification for pursuit of the questions
I confront in the remainder of the thesis. In Chapter 4, I ask what differentiates these two ethical
theories. I survey some of the differences which philosophers in either camp have identified
and offer some of my own. I suggest that several of those differences either rest on
misunderstandings of one ethic or the other, or that in erecting a divide between virtue and care
ethics they also disunify ethics of care. I do, however, identify two differences which seem
defensible. Specifically, they are that virtue ethics seems to lack an account of care, which I
define minimally as a response or responsiveness to need, and that virtue and care ethics
organise their meta-ethical and normative concepts differently. This chapter thus presents a
second contribution to the literature: a study of the differences between virtue ethics and care
ethics. It also serves to set the trajectory for the remaining chapters, where I respond to the
claim that virtue ethics lack an account of care.

I spend the remainder of the thesis constructing what I take to be a satisfying foundation
for a virtue ethical theory of care. In Chapter 5, I offer three initially viable means of
incorporating care into virtue ethics, all of which treat care as a virtue. These are the analogical
approach, according to which care is analogous to an existing virtue; the additive approach,
according to which care is a novel virtue; and the bundling approach, according to which care
is a bundle of virtues. I also offer and evaluate reasons to reject the claim that care is a virtue,
concluding that the claim is indeed a viable one so long as the concept of care is sufficiently
thick, and I contend that analogical approaches, and particularly analogies with charity,
outperform the others. Chapter 5 therefore serves two ends. First, it proffers a novel metaanalysis of concepts of care as a virtue, and thus makes a third contribution to the literature. In
doing so, it makes an inroad into the second: the development of a neo-Aristotelian theory of
care.
Chapter 6 continues this project. I attempt to show how care can be construed as an acttype and a practice. I argue in this chapter that practices are a subcategory of actions, and that
care qualifies as an Anscombean act-type which aims at the meeting of needs relating to the
care-recipient’s flourishing. I go on to consider the implications of this account for ethics which
deploy care as a moral concept, maintaining that it not only offers a better account of
consequences than theories of care which include success criteria, but also that it affords us
interesting insights into the distinction between ‘caring about’ and ‘caring for’ which allow us
to make sense of certain tenets of neo-Aristotelianism. This represents a contribution to both
discourses, since neither care nor virtue ethicists working at the intersection of their respective
normative theories have delved very deeply into the philosophy of action.
Chapter 7 discusses caring relations, suggesting that a virtue ethical theory of caring
relations can lean on the work care ethicists have done, and adding some necessary refinements,
such as a distinction between ideal and non-ideal caring relations, and a theory of caring
relations as reasons for action. This final chapter also draws these three concepts of care
together by arguing that virtuous caregivers who are invested in the flourishing of those for
whom they care are also sensitive to the relations those care-recipients bear to their institutional
environment. I argue that because they are caring participants in caring relations, virtuous
agents are characteristically motivated by states of need and dependency to engage in certain
sorts of conventionally political practices. In other words, the virtue or virtues of caring
characteristically manifest in certain sorts of political or social practices, relating specifically
to those areas of moral life. This allows us to build upon recent work in feminist virtue ethics
of the sort offered by Tessman and Friedman. I also offer a novel analysis of migration,

suggesting that the account of care presenting here is analytically useful both when it comes to
historical cases of migration such as the underground railroads and escapes from Nazi-occupied
Europe, but also for contemporary issues such as the migrations occurring in the Southern
United States and in much of Europe. I thus conclude not only that virtue ethicists ought to
incorporate care into their normative framework, and that the theory of care presented here is
a coherent one, but that this leads us naturally into applied topics such as virtue politics. I
conclude the thesis by considering some its implications and by identifying some further
avenues for research.
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sine qua non
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I
Introduction
We went in then and found Socrates just released from his fetters and Xanthippe –
you know her – with his little son in her arms, sitting beside him. Now when
Xanthippe saw us, she cried out and said the kind of thing that women always do
say: “Oh Socrates, this is the last time now that your friends will speak to you or
you to them.” And Socrates glanced at Crito and said, “Crito, let somebody take her
home.”1
Since halfway through the 20th century, feminist philosophers have vigorously disputed the
dismissal of women as overemotional, irrational, and inferior. In the preceding centuries, it had
been a commonplace amongst philosophers and non-philosophers alike that women were
subservient and inferior by nature, more liable to be “capsized on the reef of romantic love”2
or “anxiously intent on the care of the finery that she carries with her”3 than to reason and
understand. This is no longer an intellectually respectable view. Feminist philosophers have
shown that women’s moral experience ought to be taken seriously by moral philosophers – that
stories like Xanthippe’s in the Phaedo are a source of moral insights rather than a cautionary
tale or a comedic preface to serious philosophical dialogue. Inspired by historical figures
including Christine de Pizan, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, and Mary Wollstonecraft, by
literature and art like Charlotte Gilman’s Herland, and by work in adjacent fields such as moral
psychology and political science, contemporary feminists have done much to rehabilitate
ethics, producing such milestones such as Mary Daly’s Gyn/ecology: The Metaethics of
Radical Feminism,4 Marilyn French’s Beyond Power: On Women, Men, and Morals,5 Sara
Ruddick’s Maternal Thinking,6 and Eva Kittay’s Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality,
and Dependence.7

1

Plato, Phaedo, ed. C.J. Rowe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 60a.
Johann Erhard, “To Kant,” January 17, 1793.
3
Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Women, ed. Sylvana Tomaselli (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 136. Note that Wollstonecraft does not herself endorse this view.
4
(Toronto: Women’s Press, 1978).
5
(New York: Ballantine, 1985).
6
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1995).
7
(New York: Routledge, 1999).
2
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One moment in feminist moral philosophy with which Socrates’ treatment of Xanthippe
is especially resonant is the emergence of care ethics as a viable normative ethic in the 1980s.
In 1982 Carol Gilligan published In a Different Voice,8 and shortly thereafter Nel Noddings
published her Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education.9 Together, these
works precipitated a torrent of literature on the subject of care, relation, dependency, and the
moral experiences of women. Rejecting the ethical theories which had dominated moral
philosophy in the preceding centuries, these thinkers argued that proper acknowledgement of
women’s experiences meant an earnest and sympathetic study of relation, emotion, and other
neglected or disparaged topics in ethics. Care ethicists claimed that an ethic which gave
emphasis to these areas of moral life was at least as viable as, and indeed a necessary corrective
for, ‘masculine’ philosophies of the past. Contrary to what mainstream philosophers had
maintained, “looking at men as if they had just emerged from the earth like mushrooms and
grown up without any obligation to each other”10 was a deeply misguided way to begin moral
and political philosophy. Ethics like (rudimentary forms of) utilitarianism, premised on the
thought that every person in one’s moral purview was to “count for one, nobody for more than
one”11 yielded an objectionable view not at all reflective of moral life and ideals. And
attempting to distil an account of the moral life from something like the Categorical Imperative,
laden as it was with all of Kant’s emphasis on self-legislation and rational agency, was neither
reflective of women’s moral practices nor a particularly convincing account of morality. A
satisfying moral theory, sufficiently attentive to women’s moral experience, would be radically
different from the consequentialist and deontological ethics of the recent past.
Care ethics was not the only normative theory to take root in the shadow of mid-20th
century consequentialism and deontology, however. Indeed, by the time the disparate works
addressing care had coalesced into a distinct subfield of moral philosophy, ethics of virtue had
already seen several iterations and received uptake from a number of prominent philosophers.
In 1958, Elizabeth Anscombe had published “Modern Moral Philosophy,”12 sparking renewed
interest in ancient theories of virtue and character and opening the floodgates for such
influential works as Pieper’s The Four Cardinal Virtues,13 Geach’s The Virtues,14 Foot’s

8

3rd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
I shall use the second edition (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2013) here.
10
Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, eds. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), VIII.1.
11
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 5.36.23-24.
12
Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958).
13
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966).
14
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
9
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Virtues and Vices,15 McDowell’s “Virtue and Reason,”16 MacIntyre’s After Virtue,17 and Crisp
and Slote’s Virtue Ethics.18 Virtue ethics was then, as it is now, predominantly Aristotelian,
but the virtue ethical renaissance also reinvigorated the study of Platonic, Stoic, Thomistic,
Humean, and Nietzschean accounts of virtue too. By the turn of the century both care ethics
and virtue ethics had garnered a significant following, and both are now widely recognised as
genuine alternatives to other normative ethics.
A further similarity between the two normative theories is that their sights were for a
long time (rightly) set on their chief competitors. In the last two decades much ink has been
spilled explaining why, exactly, virtue and care ethics are or are not reducible to
consequentialism or deontology,19 and exploring the ways in which they are supposed to
outperform them (with some success – utilitarians and Kantians have proven receptive to many
of their concerns).20 But for the most part, care ethics and virtue ethics have developed in
isolation from one another. The concept of virtue has not gone unnoticed by care ethicists,21
but deep engagements with virtue ethics are rare. And aside from a few neglected and relatively
homogeneous journal articles and books, Aristotelians have still to address the subject of care
as a moral concept and as an approach to moral philosophy. There consequently remains much
confusion regarding how these two ethics do and ought to intersect.22 Whatever the reasons for
this lack of intertheoretical discourse, it is timely now that neither camp is on the back foot to
consider in detail the relation between these two ethics. Here I take up a handful of these
relational questions, approaching them as one generally persuaded by Aristotelian virtue ethics
and the work of thinkers like Foot, Hursthouse, Annas, and Kraut, by their eudaimonistic metaethics, and by their theories of character and right/good action, but who also wonders whether
there is something to be gleaned from deeper incursions into care ethics.

15

Originally published in 1978, though I shall use the 2002 edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
The Monist 62, no. 3 (1979).
17
3rd ed. (New York: Bloomsbury, 2011).
18
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
19
See, for instance, Part I of Hursthouse’s On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
20
See, e.g., Driver, Julia, Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), passim but especially
Chapter 4 and O’Neill, Onora, Towards Justice and Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
Chapter 5.
21
See Chapter 5 for further discussion of this.
22
It is noteworthy that sentimentalist virtue ethicists, Slote in particular, have done more than most to bridge the
gap between care and virtue ethics, but my approach here is Aristotelian.
16
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1.

Why Should Virtue Ethicists Care About Care Ethics?

Similar projects could no doubt be developed by virtue ethicists to mine deontology or
utilitarianism for further insights. And without arguing for it, I think there is value in such
projects. There remains much to be said about the place of moral rules and prohibitions in
virtue ethics, what deliberative role consequences and states of affairs play in the virtuous
agent’s mind, and other topics at those junctures.23 Why, then, should virtue ethicists care
specifically about care ethics? Several reasons suggest themselves. Perhaps the simplest is just
that this is an interesting and largely unexplored subject. As we have noted, relatively little
comparative work exists in this area, and much of what has been said is homogeneous or
disappointingly sparse. There are thus a number of difficult questions still to be resolved in this
area. Among the more fascinating is a set of taxonomic questions. Is care ethics a strand of
virtue ethics or vice versa? Are care and virtue ethics more closely related to one another than
to consequentialism and deontology? What are we to make of attempts by members of one
group to distance themselves from the other? There are many concerns to be raised here about
our methods of classifying moral theories, relevant not only within the confines of introductory
moral philosophy classes but also to the way (particular groups of) moral philosophers see
themselves and their enterprise.
A further reason why virtue ethicists ought to be interested in care ethics is the possibility
of finding some feature of care ethics which virtue ethicists have an interest in borrowing or
adapting. Virtue ethicists have benefited greatly from reading thinkers in other traditions,24 and
there is no reason to suppose at the outset that they would not do so from a thorough study of
care. Indeed, I shall claim at several points throughout this thesis that virtue ethicists benefit
from thinking about care as care ethicists have framed it – not only does it offer a virtue which
virtue ethicists may wish to add to their repertoire, it also encourages virtue ethicists to revisit
concepts like action and practice, and to rethink concepts like relation. And even if these claims
do not wash, there is at the very least some value in concluding that there is nothing of value
to be gleaned from care ethics, since that gives virtue ethicists a clearer idea of the trajectory
their philosophising ought to take. Mining care ethics for insights need not open up new topics
for discussion in order to be worthwhile.
See, e.g. Reid, Jeremy, “Virtue, Rule-Following, and Absolute Prohibitions,” Journal of the American
Philosophical Association 5, no. 1 (2019). As Hursthouse and Pettigrove point out, “any plausible normative
ethical theory will have something to say about [consequences, rules, and virtues]” (“Virtue Ethics,” The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, updated December 8, 2016. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/).
24
Foot, for instance, owes significant philosophical debts to Kant, despite her major disagreements with him.
23
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It seems to me that virtue ethicists ought also to be interested in care ethics for its
eagerness to address political issues, and its powerful criticisms of existing political practices.
In the introduction to their Virtue Ethics,25 Roger Crisp and Michael Slote looked forward to a
time when an Oxford Readings in Virtue Politics could be published. Many slots in such a
volume could by now be filled. Figures such as Martha Nussbaum and Lisa Tessman have risen
to prominence for acute political commentary proceeding from virtue ethical premises.26 But
discussions of cognitive and biological sciences have, on the whole, eclipsed detailed political
discussions. What room there is for virtue ethicists to interact with neighbouring disciplines
has most often been spent discussing psychology, biology, or anthropology, attempting, for
instance, to dispel worries that arose in the wake of the Milgram experiments or the apparent
conflict with Darwinism and evolutionary theory. Anscombe may have been right to suggest
that we halt moral philosophy “until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which
we are conspicuously lacking,”27 and indeed proved prescient; attacks on the concept of
character and other key features of virtue theory, levelled, for instance, by situationists, have
made attention to scientific issues, particularly the sorts of conceptual analysis Anscombe had
in mind, essential.28 But there is by now enough momentum behind neo-Aristotelian ethical
naturalism and virtue psychology to turn and pay certain underappreciated ethico-political
issues the heed they deserve.
To some extent this represents a return to virtue’s roots. There is a strong historical
precedent for virtue politics. Aristotle himself never intended for his ethics to be divorced from
his approach to leadership, distributive justice, warfare, and other political issues. Nor can they
be – as Malcolm Schofield has eloquently put it, “for Aristotle there is just one sphere – politics
– conceived in ethical terms.”29 But as an offshoot of feminist thought, and a response, in part,
to the imbalance between the ‘masculine’ and the ‘feminine’ in politics and philosophy, the
ethics of care is saturated with exactly the sort of ethico-political commentary and critique

25

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Consider, for instance, Martha Nussbaum’s and Lisa Tessman’s extended corpora, Franco Trivigno’s “A Virtue
Ethical Case for Pacifism,” in Virtues in Action, ed. Michael Austin (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013),
Rosalind Hursthouse’s “After Hume’s Justice,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1990), and Karen
Stohr’s “Feminist Virtue Ethics,” in The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics, eds. Lorraine Besser-Jones and
Michael Slote (New York: Routledge, 2015).
27
“Modern Moral Philosophy,” 26.
28
See, e.g., Robert Louden’s “On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics,” American Philosophical Quarterly 21, no. 3
(1984), and Section VIII of Christian Miller et al. (eds.), Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology,
and Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
29
“Aristotle’s Political Ethics,” in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Richard Kraut
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 305. See also Julia Annas’ “Aristotle on Human Nature and Political Virtue,” The
Review of Metaphysics 49, no. 4 (1996), and Hursthouse’s “After Hume’s Justice,” passim.
26
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Aristotelians ought to pay mind to.30 The care ethical attack on the public/private distinction,
to take a clear example, echoes numerous comments made by Aristotle throughout the
Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics31 and raises weighty questions about the value of
‘feminine’ means of reasoning and of having someone to “speak for the household”32 in the
‘political’ arena. So it looks like Aristotelian virtue theory and care ethics would make for
natural bedfellows insofar as they share an interest in political ethics.
A related issue has to do with virtue’s association with various sorts of conservatism. It
has often been thought that virtue ethics resists a particular sort of moral and political progress.
As Annas explains, critics who object to virtue ethics on this basis typically concede that:
we may get as far as criticizing, from an internal point of view, the notion of fairness
we have been brought up with, but this will not take us to a point where we will be
able to criticize the social and cultural contexts themselves within which we have
learned fairness.33
The concern, in other words, is that the virtues perpetuate the cultural contexts within which
they emerge. Acquiring the virtues represents a process of instilling particular moral horizons
beyond which virtuous agents cannot see. Virtuous agents in slave-owning societies, for
instance, lack the capacities and inclinations to question slave ownership, thus acting not as
catalysts for change, but as preservers of a morally repugnant societal structure. More modern
critics will likely note also that virtue ethicists have frequently taken more conservative stances
on issues such as contraception and same-sex relationships.34
Though several notable virtue ethicists have done much to slough off associations with
conservatism,35 these connotations persist, and virtue ethics still has a (markedly diminished)
public relations problem amongst progressives as a result. Of course, some may not find this
problematic. Whether or not dissociation from conservatism is desirable turns on what one
makes of conservatism, and this is another tangential matter which I shall not attend to in any

Consider, for example, Sigal Ben-Porath’s “Care Ethics and Dependence – Rethinking Jus Post Bellum.”
Hypatia 23, no. 2 (2008), Eva Kittay’s “Dependency, Difference, and the Global Ethic of Longterm Care,” The
Journal of Political Philosophy 13, no. 4 (2005), and Joan Tronto’s “Creating Caring Institutions: Politics,
Plurality, and Purpose,” Ethics and Social Welfare 4, no. 2 (2010).
31
In The Politics and the Constitution of Athens, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996)
32
Virginia Held, Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society, and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press 1993), 48.
33
Intelligent Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 53.
34
Consider, for instance, Anscombe’s “Contraception and Chastity,” The Human World, 9 (1972): 41–51, and the
work of natural law theorists such as John Finnis and John Haldane.
35
Annas, Nussbaum, and Hursthouse all speak favourably of particular sorts of progressivism.
30
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great detail here.36 But no virtue ethicist of any sort ought to unquestioningly accept the
assumption that virtue ethics is politically or socially conservative, or that it is therefore
opposed to the broader care ethical project, by default. Nor indeed should we think the study
of care matters more for those who wish to shed virtue’s association with conservatism, and
less for those who wish to retain it. It matters for all virtue ethicists because it raises moral and
political questions whose conclusions should not be treated as foregone.

2.

Who Counts as a Care/Virtue Ethicist?

Before continuing, a methodological note. Ethicists can, of course, be grouped in a number of
ways, and whether or not a thinker qualifies as a virtue ethicist, a care ethicist, or an ethicist of
some other stripe will depend largely on the criteria one uses to classify them. There are
numerous criteria available, and indeed they make a significant difference to the set of thinkers
we might draw on for a project such as this. Hume’s views, for instance, have been notoriously
difficult to classify. He has been labelled a virtue ethicist, a utilitarian, and could indeed be
plausibly called a care ethicist given his influence on particular strains thereof.37 Though this
project is ultimately one of testing and at times dismantling philosophical boundaries, we begin
here with a comparative project which requires us to select some means of identifying
proponents of our two ethical theories. On what basis, then, should we call a philosopher a
‘care ethicist’ and a ‘virtue ethicist?’
Several potential bases come to mind. On one hand, one might defer to commentators in
either camp. No philosopher strikes out on their own completely heedless of what their peers
have said. So one might compile a list of philosophers acknowledged by the others as a member
of the care or virtue ethical community, and treat that list as authoritative. Yet there are a couple
of problems with such a strategy. One is that there is no agreement over who is a care or virtue
ethicist and who is not. Philosophers in these traditions disagree over who belongs to each
camp. Furthermore, there may be some who clearly ought to qualify, but who do not make the
cut here. This is most clearly the case when it comes to upcoming generations of virtue and
care ethicists, who have yet to see much or any acknowledgement from their peers. And finally,
there are questions as to where one should start. If I am to take someone’s word for who
qualifies as a virtue ethicist and who does not, on what basis do I make a selection? Most

36

Though I spend time on this Chapters 4 and 7.
His influence is clear in both Michael Slote’s The Ethics of Care and Empathy (New York: Routledge, 2007),
and Joan Tronto’s Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York: Routledge, 1993).
37
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philosophers will accept that Alasdair MacIntyre is a virtue ethicist, and one could scour his
writings for names to add to a list of virtue ethicists, but why should we assume that MacIntyre
is a virtue ethicist in the first place? Either we have applied some other criterion in deciding
that MacIntyre is a good starting point, in which case we have two criteria and no reason as yet
to think that the one which led us to MacIntyre should be applicable solely to MacIntyre, or we
have applied the same criterion to some other philosopher(s) and come upon MacIntyre’s work,
in which case we begin to regress.
An alternative is to include all those who view themselves as virtue or care ethicists. This
solves some difficulties. It seems to avoid both horns of the dilemma posed above, since it
neither calls for a different criterion to begin the set nor leads to a regress. But it raises others.
For example, one could claim to be a care or virtue ethicist without having very much at all in
common with the thinkers with whom they identify. If we take at face value any claim to
membership, then there are no standards to ensure that members share any philosophical
commitments whatsoever. What’s more, some philosophers may fail to identify (either
intentionally or unintentionally) with either group, but have a great deal in common with one
or the other. So in adopting this methodological approach we may well include some who ought
to be excluded from, or exclude some who ought to be included in, either camp. Of course,
those who have engaged with proponents of either ethic are not likely to align with one or the
other haphazardly. But there is no reason to suppose that thinkers who do not call themselves
virtue or care ethicists are ipso facto excluded. Indeed, many of the earliest proponents of any
given ethic will likely refer to themselves using an entirely different terminology, if they use
one at all. As an interesting example, we might note that the noun ‘consequentialism’ was
reputedly coined by Elizabeth Anscombe.38 Whether or not this claim is true, when we feed it
into this taxonomic method we must conclude that anyone prior to Anscombe cannot be called
a consequentialist. But this, of course, is absurd. Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick, the three most
influential figures in the tradition, all wrote well before Anscombe did. So this methodology,
like the last, seems likely to exclude those who ought not to be excluded. Furthermore, in
juxtaposing these flaws we unearth another. It may be the case that this approach excludes
some who have more in common with members of either grouping than those who lay claim
to membership. If we exclude from the set of consequentialists Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick,

Candace Vogler, “Anscombe, GEM,” in The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Hugh LaFollette
(Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).
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but include anyone who identifies as a consequentialist, we wind up with a genealogy which
fails to chart philosophical differences and instead charts linguistic differences.
Our intuitions about what the previous two approaches get wrong point toward a different
approach altogether. I have objected to these approaches for failure to track the right sort of
difference, and those who find those objections persuasive likely have some intuition that the
correct categorical methodology is one which sorts philosophers according to their
philosophical positions or conclusions. The obvious strategy, then, is to do that, to figure out
which philosophical positions we want this distinction to track and use those to sort ethicists
into one camp or the other. This option shares none of the problems faced by the other two
methods but faces its own. Which criteria are we to use, and why? We cannot use virtue
ethicists’ standards to identify virtue ethicists without apparent circularity, nor can we ask nonvirtue ethicists who have sourced their standards from virtue ethicists. And the matter is further
complicated because philosophers in both camps lean heavily on philosophers in other fields
and traditions for support. Thus, in discussing the features of care ethics in Chapter 2, I will
occasionally draw on philosophers who could not plausibly be identified as care ethicists, but
who have advanced and defended philosophical theses which care ethicists have wedded
themselves to. Most available criteria (with some possible exceptions, such as those imposing
certain constraints an ethic’s theory of right action)39 are therefore likely to be overpermissive,
admitting far more philosophers than we would like.
Though I want to be forthcoming about methodological issues such as these from the
outset, I should also like to set them beyond this thesis’ scope. Spatial constraints preclude a
full justification for this. Suffice it to say that I shall rely for the most part on philosophers who
would satisfy any reasonable criterion for admission into either category. There is no sensible
standard which will exclude Rosalind Hursthouse and Julia Annas from the set of virtue
ethicists, nor is there one which will exclude Virginia Held and Joan Tronto from the set of
care ethicists. Where new philosophers enter a particular discourse, it will usually be the case
both that they bear significant philosophical similarities to those thinkers whose entry we have
guaranteed, and also that the authors themselves are cognizant of these similarities and label
themselves accordingly, so once again, several potential standards will likely be satisfied. This
does not disarm such problems entirely, but it will, I hope, be reason enough to suspend that
discussion and move on to another interesting frontier.

39

See Chapter 4 for further discussion.
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3.

A Thesis Outlined

This thesis is split into seven substantive chapters. In the first two chapters, I lay the
groundwork for the remainder of the thesis by outlining both normative theories and arguing
for considerable agreement over central premises. Chapter 2 summarises the foundational
commitments of care ethics, focusing particularly on their relational ontology and its links to
the other ethical claims care ethicists universally ascribe to, namely particularism, partialism,
the moral salience of emotions, and the rejection of hard public/private distinctions. Chapter 3
traces the contours of Aristotelian virtue ethics, laying out central concepts including
eudaimonism, virtue, and character traits, and drawing a number of comparisons between virtue
and care ethics specifically with regard to relational ontology and the meta-ethical
commitments it underpins. I thus argue, over the course of Chapters 2 and 3, that care ethics
and virtue ethics have much more in common than is typically acknowledged. This is done in
admittedly broad strokes, but I take Chapters 2 and 3 to provide at least a prima facie
justification for pursuit of the questions I confront in the remainder of the thesis. If care ethicists
and virtue ethicists are agreed on a wide array of questions in normative and meta-ethics, then
we can reasonably ask what, if anything, differentiates them, why those differences exist, and
whether they ought to exist.
In Chapter 4, I answer the first question by considering some theoretical differences
which have appeared in the literature and offering some of my own. Chapters 2 and 3 may
establish a general agreement between the two theories on central philosophical issues, but I
argue in this chapter that we ought not to overstate those similarities such that the two theories
become indistinguishable. I begin by surveying some of the differences philosophers in either
camp have identified and offering others which have not yet been tendered but strike me as
reasonable. I suggest that several of those differences either rest on misunderstandings of one
ethic or the other, or that in erecting a divide between virtue and care ethics they also disunify
ethics of care. I do, however, identify two defensible differences. The first is that virtue ethics
seems to lack an account of care, which I define minimally as a response or responsiveness to
need. Care ethicists sometimes argue that virtue ethics lacks anything comparable to this kind
of care, and that the two ethics are therefore meaningfully different. The second is that care
and virtue ethics organise their meta-ethical and normative concepts differently, focusing
specifically on their respective approaches to and theories of right action. I spend the remainder
of the thesis responding to the first claim and constructing what I take to be a satisfying
foundation for a theory of care.
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In Chapter 5, I offer three means of incorporating care into virtue ethics, all of which
treat care as a virtue. These are the analogical approach, according to which care is analogous
to an existing virtue; the additive approach, according to which care is a novel virtue; and the
bundling approach, according to which care is a bundle of virtues. Ethicists who speak of care
in terms of the virtues invariably fall into one or another of these camps. The few virtue ethicists
who address this subject fall exclusively into the first and second, and care ethicists have shown
some predilection for the third, but neither camp has distinguished the different means of doing
so. In the second half of this chapter, I offer and evaluate reasons to reject the claim that care
is a virtue, concluding that the claim is indeed a viable one so long as the concept of care is
sufficiently thick. Not all notions of care can qualify as an Aristotelian virtue or character trait,
but some can. Thus, this chapter serves two ends. First, it shows that virtue ethics has access to
several different accounts of care which all satisfy the minimal standards set by care ethicists
like Held, and second, in showing why this is so, it presents a novel meta-analysis of concepts
of care as a virtue.
In Chapter 6, I attempt to show how care can be construed as an act-type and a practice.
Mainstream care ethics permits accounts of care as a virtue, but it does not limit itself to them.
Indeed, the chief operative concept in many accounts of care is that of an action or practice.
Taking that emphasis on the notions of action and practice seriously, I argue in this chapter that
practices are a subcategory of actions, and that care qualifies as an Anscombean act-type, from
which we can construct a skeletal theory of caring practices as ongoing, socially organised
activities. I also maintain that this is a desirable addition to both frameworks. Conceiving of
care both as a character trait or traits and as an act-type allows virtue and care ethicists to make
more nuanced, commonsensical judgements about what it means to care. Such multifaceted
understandings of care map also better onto the moral judgements we make about uncaring
actions and draw both virtue and care ethicists closer to a comprehensive picture of care without
violating either ethic’s commitment to ‘particularism.’ This represents a contribution to both
discourses, since neither care nor virtue ethicists working at the intersection of their respective
normative theories have delved very deeply into this branch of the philosophy of action.
In Chapter 7, I turn to discuss caring relations, suggesting that a virtue ethical theory of
caring relations can lean heavily on the work care ethicists have done, and adding some
necessary refinements, such as a distinction between ideal and non-ideal caring relations, and
a theory of caring relations as reasons for action. This final chapter also draws these three
concepts of care together by arguing that virtuous caregivers who are invested in the flourishing
of those for whom they care are also sensitive to the relations those care-recipients bear to the
11

institutional environment. I argue that because they are caring participants in caring relations,
virtuous agents are characteristically motivated by states of need and dependency to engage in
certain sorts of conventionally political practices. In other words, the virtue or virtues of caring
characteristically manifest in certain sorts of political or social practices, relating specifically
to those areas of moral life. While I do not claim that virtuous agents will aim at one sort of
need or dependency or one sort of political or social practice specifically, I do maintain that
they will give weight to caring relations and activities, and that from this it follows that they
exhibit a specific set of political or social motivations and priorities. This allows us to build
upon recent work in feminist virtue ethics of the sort offered by Tessman and Friedman. I apply
these concepts by offering a comparative analysis of historical and contemporary cases of
migration, which I argue can be understood as instances of care. I thus conclude not only that
virtue ethicists ought to incorporate care into their normative framework, and that the theory
of care presented here is a coherent one, but that this leads us naturally into virtue politics.
I finish by considering some of this thesis’ implications and by identifying some further
avenues for research. I hope by the close to have made a handful of contributions to the
literature in this area. The first is a deeper analysis, spanning Chapters 2-4, of the similarities
and differences between virtue ethics and care ethics than any that have appeared in the
literature to date. The second is to have laid the foundations, in Chapters 5-7, for a neoAristotelian theory of care. A third is to have made some inroad into the application of this
theory of care in Chapter 7. These contributions are provisional. No chapter is, in my view, a
complete discussion of its subject, nor do I think any of the arguments I present are so
watertight as to be unassailable, so it is perhaps most fitting to describe this thesis as a project
of raising unanswered questions, not one of providing answers.
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II
The Ethics of Care
This chapter lays out the central elements of mainstream care ethics. Though, in order to be
charitable, some comparisons must be drawn between competing claims within care ethics, and
I endeavour to present the strongest possible version of care ethics, my goal here is not
primarily to evaluate care ethics as a normative theory. My aim is simply to provide a snapshot
of what care ethicists themselves have taken to be the core features of their normative
framework. I begin in Section 1 with care ethical accounts of ontology. Though there are a
variety of care ethical ontologies, I suggest that the primary account is one of human nature.
According to this view, human beings are relational in several senses, but foremost among
these is their dependence upon one another to meet certain needs. Section 2 then goes on to
connect these ontological claims to ethics, showing how care ethicists derive their central moral
commitments from these ontological claims. I devote a subsection each to moral particularism,
partialism, and the dissolution of the public/private distinction. Section 3 then clears up some
initial worries about care ethics as it is presented here and the uses to which I shall put this
account, namely that care ethics’ is too narrow in scope for an ethical theory, that care ethics’
claims are not novel, and that we have not offered a full definition of care by this point. After
seeing to these concerns, we are ready to begin comparing care ethics and virtue ethics.
An undertaking such as this is bound also to overlook a number of important minutiae
which differentiate particular strands of care ethics. Some care ethicists, such as Tong and
Gilligan, distinguish between feminine and feminist ethics, for example. In Feminine and
Feminist Ethics, Tong writes that:
Held’s, Ruddick’s, and Whitbeck’s respective works [on maternal approaches to
ethics] are feminine insofar as they celebrate the psychological traits and moral
virtues that society associates with women who mother. Yet, to the degree that their
articles and book criticise “feminine” traits and virtues as possibly contributing to
women’s oppression, they are feminist.40

(Belmont: Wadsworth, 1993), 159. Gilligan’s “Hearing the Difference: Theorizing Connection” (Hypatia 10,
no. 2 (1995)) draws a similar distinction, though the contrast is, to my mind, much clearer in Tong’s work.
40
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Feminine care ethics and feminist care ethics may thus be separable. These differences are not
inconsequential, but they lie at what I take to be the periphery of care theory. 41 Those claims
at the conceptual core attract greater attention and consensus, and it is these to which I shall
attend here.

1.

Ontology, Relation, and Dependency

In this section I begin unpacking the ontology undergirding care ethics. Subsection 1.1.
explores the ontological starting point for care ethics, suggesting that relational ontology care
ethicists use to ground their moral judgements is a theory of human nature. Subsection 1.2.
then goes on to detail the sorts of relations care ethicists use as the basis for their normative
framework, namely dependency relations. This gives rise to questions about the precise
relationship between dependency relations and ethics, which I address in Section 2.

1.1. Ontology and Relation
It is helpful to begin by examining what care ethicists mean by ‘ontology.’ Most generally,
ontology might be characterised as the study of what exists or what there is.42 But though care
ethical ontology typically fits this definition, there are several distinct care ethical projects
underneath this heading corresponding to various subtypes of ontology. Some understand their
ontological project as one of defining an individual’s identity. Tong characterises this view as
follows:
people come to understand their selves through others, not against them. We are
historical creatures, shaped by our relationships with our current parents, siblings,
friends, and colleagues.43
This is not an unpopular approach to ontology for care ethicists (and many communitarians
have also expressed sympathy for this view),44 though it is one which has proven controversial.

41

Though care ethicists do not make this distinction, I want to draw a distinction here between care ethics/care
ethicists and care theory/care theorists. Anybody who has a notion of care qualifies as a care theorist, so this label
includes thinkers like Annette Baier. Anybody who buys into the care ethical framework as a whole I call a care
ethicist.
42
Hofweber, Thomas. “Logic and Ontology,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, updated Wednesday
October 11, 2017. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/.
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Feminine and Feminist Ethics, 51 (here Tong is characterising Whitbeck’s account).
44
See, for example, Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey’s The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the
Liberal-communitarian Debate (Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), 53-60, and Marilyn Friedman’s
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Noddings, a prominent advocate of this view, goes so far as to claim that any organism is just
the sum total of various encounters, tendering this (Hegelian) formula for the ‘self:’
SR = {(O1, W1), (O2, W2), (O3, W3), …}

Where SR is the relational self, On represents a person at some particular time, and Wn stands
for some particular object with which the organism has a significant encounter. Noddings’
claim is a relatively strong one, and has a number of detractors.45 In Philosophy and Feminist
Thinking, Jean Grimshaw rejects this kind of total dissolution of self and other, writing that:
If I see myself as “indistinct” from you, or you as not having your own being that
is not merged with mine, then I cannot preserve a real sense of your well-being as
opposed to mine. Care and understanding require the sort of distance that is needed
in order not to see the other as a projection of the self, or self as a continuation of
other.46
Noddings’ concept of the self is not obviously false if we interpret it charitably and include,
for instance, our own thoughts and reflections in the set of things we encounter, but it is a claim
which care ethicists on the whole have neither committed to nor dismissed.
An alternative which care ethicists have typically bought into, and which by and large
forms the basis of their ethic, is to understand the ontological project as coming to understand
the sort of thing a human being is – a kind of philosophical anthropology.47 According to this
understanding of ontology human beings are creatures of a particular kind, and on the care

discussion of community and communitarianism in Chapter 9 of What Are Friends For? (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1993).
45
Though it also has its defenders. See, e.g., Virginia Held’s “Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1990).
46
(Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1986), 183. Meyers, unlike Noddings, is willing to accept that the
self is not entirely defined by its relations, though she accepts that relations do play a large part in its construction.
“The feminist relational self,” she writes,
is the interpersonally bonded self […] As relational selves […] people share in one another’s joys
and sorrows, give and receive care, and generally profit from the many rewards and cope with the
many aggravations of friendship, family membership, religious or ethnic affiliation, and the like.
These relationships are sources of moral identity, for people become committed to their intimates
and to others whom they care about, and these commitments become central moral concerns
(“Narrative and Moral Life,” in Setting the Moral Compass: Essays by Women Philosophers, ed.
Cheshire Calhoun (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 292).
A similar debate has appeared in recent work on the philosophy of love. Some philosophers of love believe that
love involves a ‘union’ between two people – the formation of a ‘we.’ But other philosophers of love object to
this view because it appears to do away with both self-sacrifice and selfishness. See, for example, Soble’s “Union,
Autonomy, and Concern,” in Love Analyzed, ed. Roger Lamb (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), and Blum’s
Friendship, Altruism, and Morality (London: Routledge, 1980) passim but especially Chapter 4.
47
Borgerson, Janet, “Feminist Ethical Ontology,” Feminist Theory 2, no. 2 (2001).
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ethical account, whatever else we might be, we are social or relational creatures. This still
leaves a great deal of scope for disagreement, of course, and care ethicists present different
accounts of this relational ontology. On the one hand, to say that human beings are social
creatures might be to say that they are necessarily social creatures. According to such a view,
there is no point at which we are free of relation – there will always be parents, siblings, friends,
colleagues, classmates, compatriots, and so on, because these are relations which we, as
members of a social species who cannot survive or flourish alone, inevitably belong to.48 Held,
for instance, reminds us that a human being is “an ‘encumbered self,’ who is always already
embedded in relations with flesh-and-blood others,”49 and Tronto tells us that the care
perspective leads us to a concept of human nature according to which human beings “must
always be understood in a condition of interdependence”50 (which is to say, in a kind of
relation). Human beings are, according to this sort of ontology, relational in the sense that they
are always and necessarily immersed in relations.
By contrast, one might think that human nature is relational in that human beings always
or reliably emerge from or return to states of relation (what one might call a ‘weaker’ relational
ontology). According to this view, human beings need not always be positioned in relation, but
they begin in that position and always/reliably return to it after periods of unrelatedness.
Marilyn Friedman defends one version of this view:
according to the relational approach, persons are fundamentally social beings who
develop the competency of autonomy […] We are each reared in a social context
of some sort, typically although not always that of a family, itself located in wider
social networks such as community and nation. Nearly all of us remain, throughout
our lives, involved in social relationships and communities, at least some of which
partly define our identities and ground our highest values.51
This is a more modest claim than that defended by Held and Tronto, and it appears at first gloss
to be the more defensible in light of those rare cases where we discover someone who has spent
long periods in total isolation. Take, for instance, the case of Victor of Aveyron, an 18th/19th
century boy discovered in the wild, unable to speak, after being abandoned at a young age by

See Friedman’s “Autonomy, Social Disruption, and Women,” in Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on
Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 40–41.
48
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The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, Global (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 47.
Moral Boundaries, 162 (my emphasis).
51
Autonomy, Gender, Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 104 (my emphasis).
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his parents.52 In cases such as this, we appear to find counterexamples to the claim that we are
necessarily related but which are easily explainable by a weaker relational ontology.
There are three points to make on the stronger thesis’ behalf here. First, the veracity of
this and similar stories has been in question for some time now.53 Tales such as these are often
based at best on unreliable or embellished anecdotal evidence. A child who is socially
underdeveloped or suffers from undiagnosed social disabilities may once have been thought
‘feral’ for lack of modern physiology and psychology. And other signs of their isolation could
just as easily be evidence of abuse. Second, even if we grant Victor of Averyon’s story, it need
not be the case that relations are static. It may be the case that human beings are always related
without always participating in the same relations. Victor’s parents may have severed their
relation with him, but in doing so they also engendered relations between Victor and the world
around him – those things in his environment which he ate, or used for shelter, or took joy in.
These cases seem also rather to highlight the breadth of the stronger care ethical concept of
relation than to count against it. It still seems possible, in cases such as this, to point to extant
relations. In Victor’s scenario, it was not the case that his parents ended their relation with him,
as though their abandonment also ended their parenthood. Rather, on this concept of relations,
it makes more sense to diagnose their abandonment as a kind of dereliction of duty. It is not
especially jarring, after all, to say that they remained his parents after they abandoned him, or
that he depended on or needed them to meet his needs despite their prolonged failure to do so,
and we might take as evidence of this the fact that we are inclined, in such cases, to seek out
the estranged parents. So cases of isolation seem instead to illustrate the expansive
understandings of relation which care ethicists have in mind.
One might also interpret that claim that human beings are fundamentally related or social
as a teleological claim about the end or purpose of human life or some element thereof, and
indeed cases such as Victor of Aveyron’s might seem to point us in such a direction. To adopt
this view of human nature is to see participation in relations as a fulfilment of one’s telos (‘end’
or ‘purpose’) or teloi, but not necessarily to see it as an essential feature of a human being.
Groenhout endorses such a picture, maintaining that:
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This case is well documented. See, e.g. Harlan Lane’s The Wild Boy of Aveyron (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1979).
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Take for instance the case of Misha Defonseca, whose supposedly autobiographical work, Misha: A Mémoire
of the Holocaust Years (Bluebell: Mount Ivy Press, 1997), detailed her escape from cruel adoptive parents,
subsequent adoption by a pack of wolves, and eventual reintegration into society. Though it took a decade, Misha
was ultimately revealed to be fictional.
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processes and organisms have an internal or inbuilt ideal of functioning, and that
the proper functioning of a process or the good of an organism can be partly
determined by seeing whether it attains or approximates that ideal.54
This view of relational ontology is also popular amongst care ethicists,55 but it is not
inconsistent with the claims laid out above. Indeed, Groenhout goes on to argue (rightly, I think)
that Noddings and Held both endorse a teleological picture of human nature in explicating their
respective ontologies.56 So it seems to be the case that when care ethicists predicate relationality
of human beings, they mean that human beings are always in relation and that to be related is
in to go some way towards fulfilling one’s telos/teloi.
As noted above, care ethicists also typically contrast their ontological views with
‘autarkic,’ ‘individualistic,’ or ‘atomistic’ understandings of human nature, which, they argue,
dominated moral philosophy for much of its history and ground the work of philosophers like
Hobbes, Kant, and Mill. According to this view, human beings are not essentially social
creatures; they are, rather, “unencumbered, abstract, [and] rational”57 creatures who might
choose to enter into (contractual) relations but do not do so necessarily, and they are extricable
from these relations once entered into. This conception of human nature, according to care
ethicists, begins and ends with the rational, independent, adult human male, and in their eyes
this is problematic. Held criticizes Kantian and Rawlsian concepts of human nature for
“[distorting] the reality of what interdependent, relational, caring, actual human beings
embedded in historical contexts are and seek, or ought to seek.”58 Yet while this view of human
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Connected Lives: Human Nature and an Ethics of Care (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 7.
Collins endorses this alongside her discussions of relational identity and relational autonomy in The Core of
Care Ethics (New York: Palgrave, 2015), at 92, writing that “for most of us, having certain kinds of relations with
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See Connected Lives, Chapter 1.
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Held, The Ethics of Care, 14.
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nature is by far the most popular foil for care ethicists, it is not the only one. Diemut Bubeck,
for example, argues that we ought to reject ontological conceptions of humanity as homo
economicus, and instead ought to reconceive human beings as ‘persona carens.’59 Bubeck
views modern economic understandings of human beings as discrete, self-interested, rational
actors as misguided, and argues instead that we are the sorts of creatures who are interrelated
and emotional. In both cases, then, care ethicists perceive a need to revise dominant ontologies
to account for the fundamental role relation must play in human nature.

1.2. Dependency

Nobody will deny that relations admit of a great deal of variety, nor indeed will anybody deny
that many of these kinds of relation are morally inconsequential. For care ethicists, the most
morally significant relation is one of dependency. Margaret Walker tells us, in her “Seeing
Power in Morality: A Proposal for Feminist Naturalism in Ethics,” that:
One profound contribution of feminist ethics has been its insistence that moral
theories address immaturity, vulnerability, disability, dependency, and incapacity
as inevitable, central, and normal in human life. The model of an association of
equals does not seem capable of including all of us and will not give the needed
guidance, as Eva Kittay puts it, “on our unequal vulnerability in dependency, on
our moral power to respond to others in need, and on the primacy of human relations
to happiness and wellbeing.” In pursuing an encompassing moral universalism […]
we cannot ignore theoretically what we cannot dispense with humanly: many
“powers over” are indispensable “powers for,” that is, on behalf of, the infant, the
immature, the frail, the ill; the occasionally, developmentally, or permanently

deeply rooted conception which every individual now has of himself as a social being, [which] tends
to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there should be harmony between his feelings and
aims and those of his fellow creatures (Utilitarianism, 3.11.11-14).
And while Hobbes assumes in his theory of the State of Nature that human beings are self-interested and
antagonistic, this is not inconsistent with the claim that we depend on one another in a variety of ways – indeed,
this is precisely why we transition from the State of Nature to political community, and why Hobbes is so eager
to stress that we maintain healthy relations with gratitude (Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2019), XV). So though care ethicists have usually treated their ethic as a departure from, and
juxtaposed that ethic against, Hobbesian or Kantian ethics, it is by no means clear that these frameworks are
actually at odds (though it does not follow from this that care ethics is redundant). A similar point can also be
made here in defence of Rawls’ work, since Rawls pre-empts many critiques along these lines in Part III of A
Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), but note Charles Taylor’s critique of some
versions of Rawlsian liberalism in “Atomism” (in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)).
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dependent; the mildly or severely incapacitated. These are not different (kinds of)
people. They are all of us at some times – and necessarily.60
It is a central care ethical claim that human beings (and other morally significant things besides,
such as the environment and non-human animals) participate in relations of dependency, where
we depend upon one another to provide some good or meet some need which we cannot
supply/meet ourselves.61
Emphasis on parenthood and upbringing is thematic in care ethics. Ruddick’s writings,
for instance, often draw upon and emphasise motherhood and its values, Kittay’s her
experiences as the mother of a person with mental and physical disabilities, Noddings’ her
continuing interest in (moral) education, and so on. For care ethicists, the fact that we are
carried to from conception to term by someone, that we all have parents who we depend upon
for their formative contributions to who and what we become, and that we acquire a complex
web of intimate relations long before we reach adulthood, are common denominators shared
by (nearly) all human beings.62 Infants are not born with the ability to feed, clothe, or protect
themselves, and without these things they perish, so no child who lives through their first years
will have done so independently, nor indeed will anyone who lives a minimally decent life
have done so without some sort of parenting and education.
To be sure, care ethicists do not focus exclusively on parenting and childhood. Kittay’s
corpus, for instance, includes poignant reflections on the nature of disability, age, and illness.
In a recent piece, she contends that:
not only are we beings with long periods of dependency at the start of our lives, but
we also are prone to disability, illness, and frailty; and after our productive or
reproductive capabilities ebb, we (alone among primates) can continue to live for a
long time.63
And when we succumb to that disability, illness, or frailty, we enter into what Kittay labels the
“dependency relation,” which she goes on to define as a:
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relation between one who gives care and one who is dependent upon caregivers for
her most basic life functions (“the charge”), a dependency that, while always
socially shaped, is grounded in the inevitable circumstances of the human animal.64
Unlike childhood, we do not grow out of frailty – it is a condition which looms over us in
some form or another for as long as we live. And indeed, a stronger version of this claim also
looks plausible. It is arguable that we are perpetually involved in relations of dependency. We
are, after all, always vulnerable to others, and are always dependent upon their conformity to
laws and social norms. The vast majority of us will also depend on family, friends, co-workers,
and partners when we become sick or sustain injury. We might add that almost all of us will
at times depend, say, on our loved ones for support when we are struggling, or for the food
we eat. What’s more, some will depend on the kindness of others simply to get by, in particular
the homeless and the severely disabled who live in continuous dependency. So dependency
and relationality are not mere symptoms of youth, shed as we mature, but are rather
inescapable features of human life.
Yet there are still other ways in which we depend on one another besides the reliance
upon a caregiver for the provision of necessities like food, shelter, medical care, and so forth.
Marilyn Friedman and Grace Clement, to take two interesting examples, have argued that we
depend upon one another for proper or full moral and philosophical development.65 Amidst her
critique of Rawlsian contractualism and Harean universalism, for instance, Friedman notes that:
no individual begins [normative reflection] ex nihilo; a background of interpersonal
experience, including dialogue with others about moral matters, is a practical
necessity in order for someone to have the ability to engage in isolated moral
thinking.66
And later on, pursuing a different line of argument, she comments also that:
The needs, wants, fears, experiences, projects, and dreams of our friends can frame
for us new standpoints from which we can explore the significance and worth of
moral values and standards. In friendship, our commitments to our friends, as such,
afford us access to whole ranges of experience beyond our own.67
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These kinds of development are not needs in the same sense that food and shelter are (we
typically do not die for lack of moral guidance), but it is clear that most of us do indeed depend
on one another to test our moral or critical thinking, to hone our understandings of the world
and the set of sociocultural norms we find ourselves embedded in, to offer us advice and
insights, to help us take notice of morally salient factors in deliberation, and, in the case of those
we take as exemplars, to provide us with an ideal to which we can aspire. It is, of course,
immensely difficult to catalogue the sundry ways in which we rely on one another for moral
development, and I shall not undertake such a gargantuan project here, 68 but I take it that the
notion that we do depend on one another for moral improvement is banal. So the dependency
relation seems to admit of a great deal more variety than Kittay’s account suggests.
Some care ethicists suggest that care is not self-perpetuating, but rather aims at the
minimisation of need or dependence.69 The purpose of parenting, to take a less controversial
example, is to ensure that one’s child is capable of surviving in the world without a parent –
the parent who coddles their child to the point of helplessness, however well-intentioned, is
quite clearly failing to discharge their parental duties.70 So too, we might think, with nurses
who perpetuate the neediness of their elderly dependents, or with partners who encourage their
significant other to become emotionally or financially dependent. The ultimate goal of care is
not to prolong or proliferate need or dependency, but rather to assist the cared-for in becoming
more self-sufficient. Simultaneously, however, dependency relations do not disappear
altogether as we become more independent. This is for a number of reasons. First,
independence ought not to be conflated with invulnerability. Creatures of flesh and blood like
ourselves are forever in a state of partial dependence. But we also believe that as a child
matures, the direction of dependence is reversed. In happier cases, parents who once cared for
a child grow old and come, themselves, to require a caregiver to tend to their needs. The
dependency relation evolves, but it persists. Nor for that matter do we ever cease to depend
on our loved ones’ happiness for our own. To love one’s children is to be invested in such a
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way that they are an important and present part of one’s life whether they achieve
‘independence’ or not.71 So it is perhaps truer to say that care aims at diminishing certain sorts
of dependence and (thereby) bringing about whichever others might be appropriate given the
circumstances. Dependency simpliciter is not regarded as a state to be avoided.

2.

Ethics

It is not immediately obvious what moral significance these ontological claims have. The mere
fact that two individuals bear a relation, even one of dependency, to one another is not
evidently ethically important or good. In this section I consider two moral dimensions of the
relational ontology laid out above. In each of the subsections I show how relational ontology
leads care ethicists to a distinct normative claim, the set of which is typically regarded as
definitive of care ethics.
Care ethicists have not usually afforded sheer relation any special value. As Collins
notes in The Core of Care Ethics, “relationships […] are not clearly valuable in themselves,”72
and as Pettersen points out in Comprehending Care: Problems and Possibilities in The Ethics
of Care, relations generally, and dependency relations specifically, can be “abusive, exploitive
and destructive.”73 Yet some relations are of value to care ethicists, and Collins accounts for
the link by arguing that “claims of relationship importance apply to those personal
relationships that have ‘value to’ their participants.”74 Collins accepts both a kind of
subjectivism and a kind of objectivism about the value of relationships.75 “The importance of
any relationship – personal or non-personal – is determined by that relationship’s value to the
individuals in that relationship,”76 where this can mean the value perceived in or attributed to
the relation either by its participants, or by an ‘objective’ measure such as, for instance, the
relation’s enabling a participant to meet nutritional needs (whether or not that participant
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regards that as valuable).77 So relation is not intrinsically good, but rather derives its goodness
from other goods, specifically its engendering some mental event or state, or supplying some
objective good.
One might think, given this, that a caring relation is one which satisfies this evaluative
standard in some sense. Though relations are, in themselves, neither good nor evil, “the term
‘Care Ethics’ refers to a body of work in moral theory that sees ‘care’ as the primary moral
good (and hence the promotion of care as the primary moral goal).”78 Care thus represents a
sort of excellence in moral relations – “the preferred way of relating to one another morally.”79
To say that a dependency relation is caring is to say that it is in some way good, such that it
makes sense to say that a (genuinely) caring relation is one which ought always to be promoted
and is always of either objective or subjective value to its participants. Care ethicists generally
have not used this terminology consistently, however. Held, for instance, refers to both morally
ideal and morally defective relations as ‘caring’ (an equivocation also appearing, we should
note, in common parlance). In The Ethics of Care, she writes that care ethics “[values]
especially caring relations.”80 But, simultaneously, “caring relations need to be subjected to
moral scrutiny and evaluated, not just observed and described,”81 and “any priority given to
caring relations presumes they are relations characterized by such values as trust and mutual
consideration and that they are, indeed, caring relations.”82 If both of these statements are true,
then Held appears to both accept and deny that a caring relation is, by definition, a good one,
since she appears to entertain on the one hand an evaluative concept and on the other a
descriptive one.
The contradictory predications of care can be explained, however, by suggesting that
Held’s first use of the term is shorthand for ‘ideally caring’ or something similar, in which case
Held and others are equivocating, but not in a way that belies philosophical inconsistencies.
This does not strike me as wholly implausible. Held might also mean, in the second passage,
that predications of care ought not to be taken at face value but must be verified because of the
likelihood of mistake. This also strikes me as a plausible interpretation of Held, and indeed as
a reasonable point generally, and Held’s claims could thus be read consistently with Lynch’s
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above. Here I shall also use care to refer to a variety of concepts. When referring to caring
relations, I shall use ‘care’ to denote an excellence unless otherwise indicated, since my
primary concern here is with care as a moral concept and an ethical ideal.83

2.1. Right Action and Particularism

Normative ethicists have often taken the provision of a theory of right action to be their chief
philosophical task. Bucking this trend, care ethicists on the whole have proven somewhat
hostile to the project of developing a theory of right action. As Noddings tells us in “Caring as
Relation and Virtue in Teaching:”
care theory is not greatly concerned with moral credit. It is concerned with the
enhancement of human life (especially moral life), and that is why it recognizes the
contribution of the cared-for.84
The emphasis, as Noddings suggests here, is not on right action but rather on the health of one’s
relations, and thinkers like Tronto have thus refused to “pronounce care as a first principle and
to deduce all other forms of virtue and of life from that principle.”85 But as its name suggests,
care ethics draws on a number of concepts at the level of normative ethics. Collins argues that
insofar as care ethics is a ‘relational ethics’ “it claims that obligations derive from relations
between persons,”86 and she is not alone in thinking this. Engster, in “Rethinking Care Theory:
The Practice of Caring and the Obligation to Care,” suggests that the duty to care can be
grounded in dependency,87 and though the two claims are not equal, Kittay and Clement
endorse a related claim that a duty or obligation to care can be grounded in vulnerability. 88
‘Obligations,’ in care ethics, are supposed to mean something rather different to what
deontologists have suggested, specifically because care ethicists are particularists.89 On the
whole, care ethicists are opposed not to moral rules as educative tools or rules of thumb, though
83
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they would likely expect the need for such rules to lessen as we mature (as Wittgenstein puts
it, one can “throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it”). 90 Rather, the majority of
care ethicists understand particularism in opposition to universalism, understood by care
ethicists as the idea that there exist universal moral rules which apply across all cases regardless
of contextual differences.
Friedman and Bolte offer a fairly standard attempt to define feminist particularism, of
which care ethical particularism is an instance or a variant, against conventional universalism
when they write that:
universal claims disregard human differences; yet in many moral situations,
particularly those involving oppression, those differences are crucial to
understanding the moral significance of what is happening and what ought to
happen.91
The thought at the heart of care ethical particularism is thus, as Fiona Robinson puts it, that
moral claims “cannot be judged or justified according to some transcendent or external
standpoint – rather, they are always context dependent and always subject to revision and
reconfirmation.”92 This leads Engster and Hamington to write, in Care Ethics and Political
Theory, that:
Unlike traditional abstract and universal Western theories of ethics, care ethics
values particularism. An authentically caring response is unique and individualized.
It requires understanding the particularities of the other’s experience, including
their history, relative power, relationships, and so forth.93
The definitions in play here are not strictly speaking identical, but there is a clear overarching
emphasis on contextual sensitivity in moral decision-making. Universal rules, it is usually
argued, are insensitive to considerations which ought to be morally relevant, and feminists
resist the tendency to condense and abstract moral problems in the way that universalists are
thought to do.94
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This is not, of course, the only argument levelled by care ethicists against ‘universalism.’
In The Ethics of Care, Robinson argues also that:
while the need for care is universal, a feminist ethics of care is not a universalistic
ethics in the traditional sense. It […] rejects the claim that the highest stage of moral
learning is characterized by disinterest and non-interference.95
Disanalogies from contextualism are, however, by far the most common in the literature.
Particularities of each individual scenario or problem are crucial to identifying right action, and
blanket rules such as ‘do not lie’ and ‘do not steal’ strip moral decision-making of the texture
and detail which to which we must pay attention if we are to respond rightly to an ethical issue.
Care ethicists call for particularism because their concept of relation demands contextual
sensitivity. No two relations are identical. Citing Reader, Tronto offers the following list of
relational particularities from which we derive responsibilities: “presence, biology, history,
practice, environment, shared projects, institutions, play, trade, conversation, and other ‘less
structured interactions.’”96 These parameters are not internally homogeneous either – each
relation has its own history, and this alters the responsibilities its participants bear towards one
another. Particularism thus emerges as an emphasis because the care ethical conception of
relationality aims explicitly to leave sufficient conceptual space for the variability of human
relations. While relation is understood as a feature of human nature, care ethicists are eager to
stress also that relations are heterogenous, and that relational particularities entail particularism
about moral responsibilities.
This particularism usually involves not only a rejection of general action-guiding
principles, but also any sort of rigid hierarchy of needs. We cannot structure needs in such a
way that some always take priority over others in ethical decision-making. Slote has defended
this point at length, devoting two entire chapters of The Ethics of Care and Empathy to it. Yet
Slote does believe that there are considerations which ought always to be factored into
deliberation. On Slote’s view, spatial and temporal ‘immediacy’ are morally relevant in making
decisions, and the extent to which particular needs are overriding is in part a function of these
different sorts of immediacy.97 In this Slote appears to echo Hume, who writes that “there is
no human, and indeed no sensible creature, whose happiness or misery does not, in some
measure, affect us, when brought near to us, and represented in lively colours.”98 While the
95
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suffering in the Third World is indeed dire, the suffering one sees on the street as one walks to
work may be more morally demanding because of its immediacy. Similarly, Kittay, in
considering needs in the context of nursing for the disabled, maintains that “the extent to which
such needs have a moral weight depends upon a moral evaluation of [a] practice, as well as the
urgency of the need understood within that practice.”99 So while needs may not be
hierarchically structured in any rigid sense, there are certain factors to which we can reliably
point as reasons to prefer one need over another in some particular case. Immediacy in its
various forms is one such factor, but so too are the demands and norms of particular practices.
It seems, however, that care ethicists do in fact commit to a universalist doctrine when
they embrace care as a universal standard for right action. Care is, as noted above, regarded as
a moral imperative for all. And indeed care ethicists like Tronto, Kittay, Engster, Collins, and
Lynch have all explicitly framed care as a categorical imperative of sorts.100 So how can care
ethicists claim to reject universalism? The answer, I think, is simply to admit that universalism
and particularism are not mutually exclusive monoliths. Defending such a view, Collins writes
that:
Care ethicists’ hostility to principles […] seems rather to be hostility to principles
that are so general as to be poor guiders of action. This does not speak against
specific and action-guiding principles, or indeed general and rightness-determining
(but not action-guiding) principles.101
Care, on this account, can qualify as a universal imperative (understood as a rightnessdetermining principle) without violating particularism, since it leaves sufficient room for
contextual sensitivity in application by being open-ended about the actions which might
constitute caring. But as noted above, this is not typically worked into a detailed theory of right
action, nor is that next rung regarded as necessary.
Once again, we find paradigms of this sort of moral deliberation in parental caring
relations. Ruddick, turning her attention to this subject, notes that women, and specifically
mothers, often have particularistic thought processes or “epistemological perspectives.”102 She
does not deny that mothers are just as capable of universalist thought as others, but she claims
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that “they tend to reject the demands of abstraction and instead look closely, invent options,
refuse closure.”103 This is clearest, she supposes, when mothers are confronted with moral
dilemmas. In the face of a dilemma, those who incline towards ‘concrete thinking’ (that is,
particularism) will typically attempt to find out more – to reject the terms of abstraction and
try to avoid either horn of the dilemma. Whereas proponents of a universalistically principled
ethical system might accept the abstracted, streamlined world of trolley problems and the like,
mothers and particularists prefer to reject such dilemmas, choosing instead to mine for more
information.104 Those who have taught dilemmas and ethical decision-making will no doubt be
familiar with students who refuse to accept that there is a dilemma, that the circumstances are
such that there are only two (usually awful) options, and this is a thought pattern with which
care ethicists typically agree. The details of such situations are paramount to deciphering the
right course of action.

2.1.1. Emotion, Moral Motivation, and Right Action

Much of the care ethical discussion of dependency revolves around the emotions, and these
have come to occupy a vital place in care ethical theories of moral deliberation. Care ethicists
have objected to the hostility in 20th century moral philosophy towards the moral emotions,
and some, like Slote, even go so far as to make sentiments the basis of their normative and
metaethical systems.105
Held identifies two respects in which care ethicists have revisited and resuscitated
emotions:106 first, they recognise the general moral importance of certain emotions and their
proper development. Emotions such as love and compassion are, on the care ethical account,
to be nurtured, whereas emotions such as hatred and anger are to be softened, tempered,
controlled, or done away with altogether. Thus Tong, paraphrasing Held, writes in her
Feminine and Feminist Ethics that:
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Our growing reliance on contracts may be a sign of social disease rather than health
[…] sheets of paper cannot hold people together in the way that blood, sweat, tears,
and laughter can.107
Secondly, emotions are thought to have epistemic outputs or benefits associated with
understanding, and Held contends that emotions may be used to settle conflicts between moral
demands made by particular others. Emotions may direct our attention towards morally
relevant features of a situation, or they may elicit an appropriate (what is sometimes called
‘fitting’) response from an agent to some particular state of affairs. But emotions are also
particularities which care ethicists want to account for in moral deliberation. Lawrence Blum
suggests in Friendship, Altruism, and Morality that “morality is mostly about “being
responsive to the weal and woe of others.””108 And we may add other reasons to think that the
emotions are worthy of care ethical attention. Slote notes that cognition, learning and the
acquisition of (moral) knowledge are affected (“thoroughly permeated and constituted,” 109 in
fact) by emotional factors. The emotions are seen by care ethicists as morally valuable for a
number of reasons associated with (moral) action and deliberation then, but it is an overarching
emphasis on the emotions that characterises the ethics of care.
We can also say more about what caring relations look like in practice by examining the
sentimentalism which undergirds several ethics of care. For enlightenment sentimentalists,
sympathy and emotional engagement played a pivotal role in our relations with others. On
Hume’s view, ‘sympathy’ consists in an ability to feel what others feel, to enter “deep into the
opinions and affections of others, whenever we discover them.”110 Hume defends what some
have termed ‘co-feeling’ or a ‘contagion’ conception of sympathy, a conception which Slote
has argued maps almost precisely onto our concept of empathy (and I agree with him in
thinking that ‘empathy’ is a more accurate term for what Hume is referring to). 111 Smith also
discusses sympathy, devoting the first two chapters of his Theory of Moral Sentiments solely
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to the emotion.112 Smith’s account differs subtly in that he does not assume that we actually
share the feelings we perceive in others. Rather, we sympathise by imagining how we would
feel in some other’s circumstances. He observes, for instance, that we can sympathise both with
infants who possess an extremely limited emotional spectrum, and with the dead, who can feel
nothing at all. A mother who sympathises with her ailing infant does not shed her cognitive
capacities or emotional maturity to do so, but rather “joins, to its real helplessness, her own
consciousness of that helplessness, and her own terrors for the unknown consequences of its
disorder.”113 Sympathy lies at the heart of both Hume’s and Smith’s moral philosophy, a
paradigm of relation and of ethical behaviour.
Several contemporary care ethicists have taken sympathy and empathy of the sort
discussed by Hume, Smith, and other (enlightenment) sentimentalists like Hutcheson, and
incorporated it into their theory.114 Noddings was among the first to analyse this sensitivity as
a component of the theory, and coined the term “engrossment” for its primary mechanism,
which has since become widely used.115 Engrossment begins with a sort of attention, where “a
soul (or self) empties itself, asks a question, or signals a readiness to receive.”116 “When I attend
in this way,” Noddings goes on to say, “I become, in an important sense, a duality. I see through
two pairs of eyes, hear with two sets of ears, feel the pain of the other self in addition to my
own.”117 Engrossment involves reception of the object’s world. When I am engrossed in a
lover’s pain, I feel that pain as if it were my own. Slote, in his exploration of empathy (which
he takes to be identical to Noddings’ engrossment)118 explains that caring involves the carer’s
being “open and receptive to the reality – the thoughts, desires, fears, etc. – of the other human
being,” and that they “pay attention to, and are absorbed in, the way the other person structures
the world and his or her relationship to the world – in the process of helping that person.”119
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Caring properly requires that we care for a person qua a being with their own worldviews,
aspirations, motivations, patterns of thought, and so on. In this respect, caring is receptive, but
also ‘passive;’ we do not project our own thoughts and opinions onto those for whom we care,
and we do not attempt to reconcile their views with ours. Engrossment, much like reading a
novel or watching a movie, means immersing ourselves in the world of another and feeling as
they feel.
It is this sort of attention which gives rise to “motivational displacement,”120 where I
return to my own perspective and am driven to act. “The cared-for,” Noddings tells us, “so
encountered, does not of course “fill the firmament” forever. The moment of nearly pure
relation passes; one must think what to do.”121 Though he makes no mention of Noddings,
Mayeroff summarises this point nicely when he writes that:
In being with the other, I do not lose myself. I retain my own identity and am aware
of my own reactions to him and his world. Seeing his world as it appears to him
does not mean having his reactions to it […] I do not have to be perplexed, for
instance, to realize that he is perplexed, but because I “feel” his perplexity from the
inside, I may be in a position to help him out of it.122
Once I am no longer engrossed in another’s suffering, I am emotionally driven to alleviate that
suffering. Here, we come to Noddings’ notion of ‘natural caring’ – caring where engrossment
yields or evokes a desire to care for the other. We do not, however, always feel moved to act
after engrossment, nor do we always become engrossed when we ought to. The latter is morally
wrong by definition, but the former may be morally permissible or justified. Noddings is open
to the possibility that we become engrossed in the world of someone who is doing something
morally wrong. Engrossment does not always involve an attunement to suffering; it may pay
attention to frustration, for instance, which any of us, ‘good’ or ‘evil,’ may experience. If I am
engrossed in my child’s activities on the playground, I may come to realise that she is not, in
fact, playing with her friend but has been bullying her. In that case, I am more likely to be
disturbed or repulsed by my daughter’s bullying and take steps to prevent her from doing so
again. I might remind her that it is important to be kind, or I may resolve to take her home, but
once I am wrenched from engrossment by this realisation, I no longer desire to see her succeed
akin to the capacity for empathy, the ability to suffer or celebrate with another as if in the other’s
experience you know and find yourself. However, the idea of empathy, as it is popularly understood,
underestimates the importance of knowing another without finding yourself in her. A mother really
looks at her child, tries to see him accurately rather than herself in him (Maternal Thinking, 121).
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in her efforts. In these ways, the emotions and other mental states of those for whom we care
may be accessed and acted upon, and relation impelled beyond the realm of emotion and into
that of action.
The emotions are thus pivotal in dependency relations. Properly calibrated emotions
allow us to meet needs well, and are a source of moral motivation. There is also an argument to
be made here for the claim that emotions are in some sense constitutive of good dependency
relations. As noted above, relations are often seen as valuable not in themselves but in virtue of
instantiating some other sort of value. If one thinks that emotions are linked to value in such a
way that they can thereby give value to relation, then there may be a deeper connection between
emotion and relationality than the ones care ethicists have focused on.123 Nevertheless, the care
ethical focus on emotion as a necessary condition for proper responsiveness in the context of
dependency relations is illuminating.

2.2. Partialism

Relational ontology is also often used to explain and justify care ethical partialism. Like
particularism, partialism is a notoriously difficult concept to define, but care ethicists all share
a commitment to some form of partiality in moral decision-making. Care ethical understandings
of partialism by and large surface in the course of refuting impartialism, which is thought by
care ethicists to occupy the ethical mainstream. Whereas deontologists and consequentialists
in the 19th and early 20th centuries thought very much in impartialist terms, using dicta like
Bentham’s “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one,” or Kant’s principle(s) of
universalisability,124 partialist care ethicists have rejected ethics which advocate “having no
direct involvement or interest in the particular case,”125 and argued that, morally speaking, it is
at least sometimes “permissible and good to favor one’s own near and dear.”126 Of course,
‘permissible’ and ‘good’ are two entirely different categories of moral evaluation, but care
ethicists usually defend both the weaker and the stronger thesis in analyses of particular moral
problems, and on either thesis an action is not ipso facto wrong or morally deficient to the care
ethicist if it gives unequal weight to the interests of certain people. To be partial is not
necessarily to be morally defective. A mother can potentially give more weight to the interests
Feminist philosophers and care ethicists have not been blind to this value – my point is simply that it is
underexplored.
124
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of her child and give less weight to the interests of someone else’s when she acts, even if that
means that her actions are suboptimal by the utilitarian’s moral arithmetic or that she violates
a moral rule and/or her actions do not make for a universalisable maxim.
As Gheaus explains, partiality is justified by care ethicists “in virtue of the special bond
we have with [others].”127 Care ethicists see our responsibilities to show partiality as arising
from our relations to them. As Hume puts this thought in his Treatise on Human Nature:
A man naturally loves his children better than his nephews, his nephews better than
his cousins, his cousins better than strangers, where every thing else is equal. Hence
arise our common measures of duty, in preferring the one to the other.128
But as Randall points out,129 relational ontology of the sort outlined above is not the only source
of justification used by care ethicists. Randall argues that care ethicists like Engster and Collins
also make:
a distributive argument, taking the form of a modified version of Robert Goodin’s
assigned responsibility model of moral obligation; this argument states that
partiality is justified insofar as it enables efficient distribution of general duties to
care.
Randall goes on to argue persuasively that the argument from relational ontology is the stronger,
but there is no need to take a stance on that matter here. The point here is simply that relational
ontology is typically regarded as an underpinning for care ethical partialism, which is itself
regarded as a core care ethical commitment.
Most care ethicists are not, however, ‘purely’ or ‘uncritically’ partialist. Baier, taking a
fairly representative approach to partialism, tells us that “a realistic morality will take the
natural network of ties as the place to start, but not as the place to finish.”130 Many, like Held,
Slote, Jeffrey Blustein, and B.C. Postow, are inclined to leave room for impartial considerations
such as justice and rights. But if that is the case, how are we to understand care ethical
partialism? “What should be resisted,” Held replies, “is the traditional inclination to expand the
reach of justice in such a way that it is mistakenly imagined to be able to give us a
comprehensive morality.”131 Partiality is to be understood as a check on or counterbalance to
the hegemony of impartialism, permitting us to deviate from impartial ethical standards for the
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sake of those we care for without thereby ruling out impartiality in moral decision-making à
outrance. Retaining a set of impartial moral rules and standards, care ethicists argue, is an
intuitive arrangement despite their distaste for moral rules and prohibitions. Blustein offers us
one example of an impartial rule to which care ethicists do and ought to commit themselves:
the holder of a public office should refrain in an official capacity from setting the
interests of some above those of others and should not allow any deviation from
indifferently even-handed treatment of all those in his or her group because of some
special relationship he or she might have with some of them.132
Most care ethicists will agree with Blustein in thinking that membership in particular
institutions or organisations does indeed impose a powerful demand for impartialism, at least
within the institution’s own sphere of operations. Care ethical partialism, then, resists the notion
that morality in toto ought to be impartial, that perspectives like Nagel’s ‘view from nowhere’
are the only permissible perspectives to take.133 But morality is not impartialistic ‘all the way
down,’ so to speak.
Some care ethicists, such as Slote,134 suggest that we explain this by beginning with
partialism and from that distilling impartial moral rules or norms. Rights, for instance, provide
a moral minimum that virtually no carer will want to undermine. The right to life, rights to
education, and rights to healthcare are all cases in point here. The impartiality of these rules is
one which all partial agents look like they ought to accept – the very impartiality of the right to
life is what protects our loved ones from the violence of those who do not care for them as we
do. Because I am so invested in the wellbeing of my friends and family, then, I ought to embrace
impartial moral rules or obligations which protect them from others. Rather than juxtaposing
care ethics and its partialism against an external impartialism, this response builds impartialism
into care ethics with partialism as its foundation. On such an account, the impartial rules come
about as a means to partialistic ends.
Noddings illustrates and explains her kind of partialism and its connection to relationality
by reference to “concentric circles of caring.”135 Those in the innermost circle are family and
friends with whom we first develop caring relations, for whom we care the most, and to whom
we ought to give greatest preference in our moral deliberations. Moving outward, the next
132
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circle consists in “proximate others” for whom we have “personal regard,”136 including
colleagues and acquaintances. People belonging to this circle place weaker moral demands on
us than those in the innermost circle. We are typically and rightly more emotionally invested
in the wellbeing of our nearest and dearest, and we are prepared to go to different and further
lengths for members of the innermost circle. Yet less proximate others are not people for whom
we do not care at all; these are still people with whom we share some sort of relationship. We
may not be friends with all of our colleagues, but ceteris paribus, the fact that they are our
colleagues, and that we are consequently in fairly close relation with them, is enough to
generate special moral responsibilities. I might, for instance, be obliged to offer to teach a
colleague’s class if her father falls ill, or to let her know that a student visited her office while
she was out. The outermost circle consists in people we have never encountered. People in this
circle are potential objects of care with whom I might share a relation at some point in the
future. This category of people includes future students and future family members, but also
people who I may enter into a more fleeting relation with. I may witness a car crash, for
example, and be thrust into a caring relation with the victims I rush to aid. Most care ethicists
since Noddings have entertained a thought along these lines, frequently maintaining also that
impartialists do not permit concentric circles of care such as these to be morally relevant.137

2.3. The Public/Private Distinction

Care ethicists have also treated the rejection of the public/private distinction as a pillar of their
framework. “Feminists reject the implication that what occurs in the household occurs as if
on an island beyond politics,”138 Held tells us, and care ethicists have often appealed to
relational ontology to explain why. Bowden, for example, draws attention to a variety of ways
in which ontological relationality extends our moral boundaries beyond the ‘private,’ noting
first the reliance we all share on the proper upbringing of children: “failure in one’s intimate
relations to learn the ethical orientations appropriate to one’s social milieu, results in social
maladjustment and ethical alienation. From the other side,” she goes on to say:
public practices must express in their own values the virtues of personal practices
of positive co-operation and training – as well as the more impersonally oriented
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ends of consistency, order and predictability – that are necessary to their
maintenance.139
Following that, Bowden also notes the import of Baier’s conception of trust in caring relations,
particularly dependency relations with those who are not in our own inner circle – nurses,
contractors, and the like. The public/private distinction begins to dissolve once we notice the
direct dependency relations between ourselves and others for adherence to communal rules
and standards, relations which only thrive through proper (moral) upbringing.
And the care ethical literature is strewn with similar claims about the variety of ways in
which we rely on other members of the public, or the community as a whole, to care for us.
Care ethicists like Held, and ethicists who theorise about care like Baier, are eager to highlight
the hastening progress of globalisation as a process by which we have been and are all
continually thrust into relations of acute dependence on other members of international
society. Baier, for instance, writes that a ‘care-based’ take on U.S. immigration “would take
into account that some would-be immigrants are near neighbors – Mexicans, Haitians,
Cubans,”140 and indeed this position has taken root in mainstream scholarship on global
justice, of the sort produced by David Miller and Gillian Brock.141 Moreover, pieces like
Held’s “Can the Ethics of Care Handle Violence?”142 have argued persuasively that care in
the global context is not a unilateral relation of third-world dependence upon the first world
for aid. Issues such as terrorism, warfare, capital punishment, and domestic violence extend
our dependence well beyond the nuclear family and into global politics.
Furthermore, both Noddings and Ruddick have claimed that ‘private’ relationships like
those between parents and children provide a model and a basis for the ‘public’ relations we
develop as we mature. They do so in a variety of ways. First, as Bowden claims, they do so by
inculcating certain philosophies or codes of conduct which we carry with us into adulthood.
Ruddick and Noddings agree that relations are thoroughly and inescapably formative for all of
us, including legislators, officials, policymakers and other civil servants, and thus play a vital
role in international relations, education, economics, and other political matters.143 Goings on
in the private sphere continually shape decision-makers just as they shape the rest of us. The
home is where many of our attitudes, habits, and capacities take root, and we take these traits
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with us when we enter into the public sphere.144 For Noddings, the proper functioning of the
public sphere therefore relies upon the proper functioning of the private sphere in that the public
sphere is made up of individuals who were raised in and are permanently rooted within the
private. So not only does a dependency relation exist between ourselves and other members of
the community, one also exists between ourselves and those responsible for inculcating
particular behaviours, including parents and teachers specifically, but also the governments and
institutions under which families and schools operate.
Second, care provides a sort of exemplar or paradigm which sets evaluative standards for
the decisions we make in public life. In Starting at Home, Noddings argues that we can develop
a social and global political philosophy by examining first the values we inculcate at home. To
her mind, political philosophy begins with such questions as “what does the ideal home look
like?,” “what sort of people, traits, and habits characterise ideal homes?,” and “how far can we
extend the attitude of caring that is characteristic of the best homes into the larger social
domain?”145 Robinson, taking this thought and expanding upon it, has argued that a critical
examination of our own perspectives and our own circumstances, which is central to care, is
crucial both for understanding the struggles of others, but also for motivating our efforts to
improve the lives of others at an international level.146 We ought to think as carers when we
tackle problems such as poverty, inequality, and crime, using what we learned of dependency
in the ‘private’ sphere to navigate our relations in the ‘public.’
Ruddick is guided by questions comparable to Noddings’ in Maternal Thinking, but
focuses specifically on motherhood. The issue, for Ruddick, is how a mother would respond
to problems in the public sphere. Would a mother ever endorse warfare? How would she (or
he) go about resolving conflicts? Ruddick believes that the facts and values to which
motherhood attunes us are morally significant even outside of the home, and are enough by
themselves for moral decision-making.147 The perspective of the mother is just as helpful in
the political sphere as the Machiavellian or Hobbesian statesperson’s. Noddings, Robinson,
and Ruddick are, in these respects, each representative of the care ethical approach to
feminism and to the public/private distinction. So for mainstream care ethicists, we are related
to (distant) others as both caregivers and care-recipients, and (ideal) public relations therefore
mirror (ideal) private relations in several crucial respects. There is no hard boundary between
144
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the ‘public’ and the ‘private;’ the care ethical focus on dependency relations highlights just
how interconnected the two spheres are.

3.

Preliminary Objections and Concerns

In this section, I wish to deal with some issues facing the account I have presented here and
some challenges to the comparative project I shall undertake in the following chapters. The first
concerns the scope of ethics. If care ethics is not a comprehensive moral theory, then there may
be some initial questions about its comparability with virtue ethics, or the desirability of such
comparisons. The second regards the novelty of ethics of care. I have parenthetically challenged
some of the distinctions traditionally drawn between care and other ethics above. But if care
ethics is not novel, then it is not obvious why we ought to compare virtue ethics to it over other
ethics. The third worry is about the lack of a definite and comprehensive account of care in the
survey above.

3.1. The Scope of Ethics

I take the claim that our intimate relations are morally significant in the ways outlined above to
be uncontroversial. No contemporary moral philosopher will deny that dependency relations
exist and that they exert a normative pull on their participants. But it is unclear whether the
notion of relationality I have outlined above can cover all of the moral terrain we expect a
normative theory to attend to. In particular, there are questions to be raised over whether it can
provide an intuitive and morally satisfying account of our responsibilities or moral obligations
to distant others with whom we are neither temporally nor spatially proximate. How, after all,
can a normative ethic premised on relation and interconnectedness provide a robust and
intuitive account of our obligations to distant others with whom we share no obvious relation
or interconnection whatsoever? This is not, moreover, a minor issue – as Tronto observes, this
was a defining issue of 20th century normative ethics,148 and it remains important today. And
one might think either that in presenting the views above as parts of an alternative to
consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics I have misunderstood or misrepresented care
ethics, or that care ethics fails to meet a condition of adequacy for a normative ethic, and for
these reasons does not warrant the virtue ethicist’s attention.
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Though care ethicists have often addressed questions associated with care at the global
level, Robinson, Ruddick, and Tronto being three obvious examples, this specific issue has
received relatively little attention, since many care ethicists treat the moral relevance of distant
others as an assumption rather than a premise to be argued for. Amongst those who have taken
a stance on this issue, there is significant disagreement. For care ethicists like Tronto, this is the
point at which ethics of justice take the reins, where ethics of care lose the bulk of their
normative force and must give way to ethics of justice, or indeed to some other ethic. In Moral
Boundaries, Tronto writes that “care is not a sufficiently broad moral idea to solve the issues
of distance, inequality, and privilege,”149 and such prominent care theorists as Kittay, Baier,
Ruddick, Held, Clement, Jaggar, and, at least on some readings, Noddings, seem to agree with
Tronto in rejecting the expansion of care’s precinct to include distant others.150 Marilyn
Friedman, for example, contends that “we ought to advance “beyond caring,” that is, beyond
mere caring dissociated from justice.”151 Justice and care are, for Friedman, mutually
informative though ultimately distinct modes of moral thought.
Some deny that care must be supplemented in this way. Slote, for instance, argues that
empathy can explain obligations to distant others, 152 and Engster takes a more Kantian tack in
arguing for a universalizable duty to care.153 Still others, like Ben-Porath and Petr Urban, justify
responsibilities to distant others by contending that care ethics makes ontological claims not
only about persons, but also about groups. For Ben-Porath:
the way the other is portrayed in the national or group ethos, and the selfunderstanding of each group as related to its role with the other (for example, as
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benefactor, conqueror, economic collaborator, and so on) generates the basis for the
relationship among the groups.154
For Ben-Porath, organisations can act as an intermediary or a source of relations between
distant others. Our membership in a state draws us into relation with other states, and with
groups and individual members therein. Care thus extends across cultures, continents, and
time. Ben-Porath’s focus on portrayal and perception is significant here, given that care
ethicists have often drawn attention to immediacy or proximity as morally salient factors. 155
The fact that some group or state is actively depicted as a (prospective) caregiver or
(prospective) care-recipient reconfigures its (perceived) moral obligations and the moral
obligations of its members. This account stretches relational ontology to include the relations
we share with states or groups, and thus to include the relations that those states or groups
share with other entities.
Though her conclusions are not universally accepted, in this Ben-Porath is representative
of the general care ethical approach to relational ontology. Relational ontology is never
understood purely as a matter of dependence on those near and dear to us, and care ethicists
often point to our dependence on compatriots and members of other social groupings to which
we belong. Not only does our pool of relations expand and deepen as we mature, we also, as
Held maintains, “carry with us at least some ties to the racial or ethnic or national group within
which we developed into the persons we are.”156 And we are also non-negligibly related to
those in our wider society. Whereas my belonging to a family probably entails that I will rely
on them more heavily than others for most of my basic needs, it is clear also that I must rely
on others to whom my connection is less direct and perceptible. Just as children must rely on
their mothers, so too must we rely on our community, our government, and international society
to meet certain needs. So, depending on whether one conceives of care ethics as an independent
ethic or a supplement to other ethics, the set of ethically relevant relations either does not need
to be extended or can be extended to include all those agents we think ought to be recognised
by an ethical theory as subjects of moral concern.
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3.2. Novelty in Ethical Theory

It is also open, of course, for proponents of other ethics to object that this story about human
nature or the commitments neighbouring it have appeared in other normative frameworks
already. I have already suggested that Kantians can explain more than they are given credit
for, and there is more still to be said in favour of Kantianism here.157 And in the chapter which
follows, I shall say something similar about Aristotelianism. It might be thought that this poses
some threat to the integrity of care ethics. There are three points worth noting about this prior
to moving on. First, at least as far as this thesis is concerned, it is not particularly important
whether or not care ethics shares its foundational commitments with other ethics. Care
ethicists, as we have seen, deny that their framework is redundant in this way, and whether or
not this is the case, it is an important question to pose. But given that this thesis takes neoAristotelian virtue ethics as its starting point, that question is both beyond our scope and not
particularly significant. In part, this is because care ethics is already widely regarded as an
alternative to extant normative ethics. Whether or not other ethical frameworks share moral
foundations with care ethics, care ethics is already treated as a standalone ethic in moral
philosophy, and for that reason merits comparative work.
Second, care ethicists are likely comfortable with a shared ontological starting point.
For much of care ethics’ history, care ethics was envisioned not as a competitor to extant
normative ethics, but as a supplement for them. Should Kantian or Utilitarian ethicists prove
receptive to their concerns (and I have already observed that many have), this does not render
care ethics unnecessary or redundant, rather it concedes that care ethicists have been right
about the import of dependency relations for morality. So it may well be desirable to the care
ethicist that their ontological commitments are shared by proponents of other ethics. And it
need not follow that care ethics is therefore unoriginal. Care theorists like Clement and
Friedman have, in fact, acknowledged that some or all of these tenets appear in other ethical
frameworks,158 but have argued that what makes care ethics distinctive is its set of emphases.
Other ethics may leave room for these claims, according to this view, but care ethics is unique
in emphasising them or treating them as the most significant elements of their moral theory.
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Finally, even if it is the case that these foundations are shared by other ethical theories,
care ethics need not collapse into those other ethics because it may well be the case that those
ethics take those foundational commitments in different directions. What distinguishes
Kantian deontology from Benthamite consequentialism, for example, is not their initial
impartialism at the level of right action, but rather the wider philosophical framework into
which their respective sorts of impartialism are built. It matters not only what one’s
philosophical commitments are, but also what one does with them. And given their distinctive
approaches to topics in normative and applied ethics,159 we might think that care ethicists do
something unique with their moral foundations.
So I shall not discuss here whether or not care ethics genuinely represents a departure
from these other frameworks. Even if it is the case that care ethics shares the bulk of its
normative commitments with other ethical theories, it is still worthwhile to consider whether
care ethics itself shares any ground with virtue ethics.

3.3. The Definition of Care

It might also be objected that I have not offered a detailed or complete account of care here.
If that is the case and, as the nomenclature suggests, care ethics takes care as its central moral
concept, then any comparison between care ethics and virtue ethics based on the analysis
above will overlook what is arguably the most important element of care ethics, its primary
definiendum and the its starting point for moral theorising. Here, however, I am offering what
might be called an account of care metaethics. My aim here is to lay out the foundations of
care ethics, specifically its relational ontology and directly subordinate moral claims, so that
we might ask whether or not virtue ethics shares these foundations. That then gives rise to
questions about normative concepts like care and virtue. I shall not, however, neglect the topic
of care for the entirety of this thesis. Once the comparative project spanning Chapters 2 and 3
is completed, I turn to these cornerstone moral concepts to consider what similarities there are
between our two theories at that level.

Ruddick’s work on pacifism stands out here, as do Tronto’s and Held’s work on various topics in
applied/political ethics.
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4.

Conclusion

I have endeavoured to list and explain only those commitments which care ethicists on the
whole see as the central tenets of their theory, and to explain how those tenets all tie into
relational ontology, which is our primary focus at this point. To be sure, it may still be the case
that some care ethicists draw on other concepts or that their central claims are organised
differently. Though their account of care ethics’ central commitments is largely identical to my
own, Engster and Hamington offer another, namely “crossing moral boundaries:”
Given its feminist roots, care ethics embraces the dictum that the “personal is
political,” such that caring should not be a compartmentalized activity of a few
people in the private sphere. In her original formulation of a political theory of
care, Tronto indicated that at least three moral boundaries needed to be redrawn:
the divide between morality and politics, the divide between disinterested ethical
theory and particularist approaches, and the divide between public and private life.
Care challenges the established contours of ethical theory.160
So the set of core commitments I have offered here will, in the eyes of some care ethicists, be
incomplete or inaccurate for failing to map onto all ethics of care. Care ethics has also been
met with several forceful objections from feminists and non-feminists alike, so it may be the
case that care ethicists ought to jettison or otherwise alter one or more of the claims above. 161
But both of these points will be the case with any normative theory. I do not pretend to have
presented an unassailable or perfectly representative account here, just a rough and fairly
accurate conceptual map on which to base our comparative project.
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III
Virtue Ethics and Relational Ontology
The primary function of this chapter is to consider whether Aristotelian virtue ethicists have
endorsed or are capable of endorsing the ontological claims examined in the preceding chapter.
If relational ontology and dependency figures (or could potentially do so) in Aristotelian virtue
ethics, and does so in a sufficiently similar way, then the foundational commitments of care
ethics turn out to be common ground. This chapter begins by outlining contemporary
Aristotelian virtue ethics, touching on several key components of the theory. Specifically, I
unpack the conceptual role of virtue/character, habituation, emotion, excellence, and
particularism. The second section examines Aristotelian meta-ethics, focusing specifically on
the concept of eudaimonia (‘flourishing’/‘living well’/‘happiness,’ depending on the textual
translation) and the naturalism it usually attaches to. In the third section, I scour the writings
of Aristotelian virtue ethicists to ask whether they provide, or can provide, relational ontology
sufficiently resembling that of care ethicists. This chapter concludes by noting the remarkable
similarities between Aristotelian relationality and that to be found in ethics of care. As we shall
find in the chapter to come, this unity is not comprehensive, and some work must still be done,
by the end of this chapter, to bring virtue ethical relationality into sufficiently close alignment
with ethics of care for the two to be considered broadly univocal.

1.

Aristotelian Virtue Ethics: A Brief Overview of Some Central Concepts

Like all other virtue ethical systems, Aristotelian virtue ethics is primarily concerned not with
deontic concepts like rules or obligations, nor with consequences or utility, but with character
traits and areteic concepts like virtue and excellence (arête).162 It is often described as ‘agentcentred,’ because the foremost object of moral evaluation is the agent, and because moral
evaluation of actions and responses flows from evaluations of character. As Aquinas has
memorably put it, “the virtue of a horse is what makes both it and its work good; similarly with
the virtue of a stone, or of a human being or anything else.”163 Whereas a Kantian will evaluate
Arête is often translated as ‘virtue,’ but ‘excellence’ seems to me to better capture the non-moral uses of the
ancient Greek better.
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some course of action against a list of moral maxims, a categorical imperative, a kingdom of
ends, or some similar benchmark, the virtue ethicist will look rather to the character traits that
action embodies, and begin their moral evaluation there. A natural place to embark on an
overview of virtue ethics, then, is the notions of virtue and vice. Both virtues and vices are
character traits. An Aristotelian character trait may be defined, broadly, as a deeply entrenched
disposition (hexis)164 to act, think, and feel in certain ways, for certain sorts of reason.165 A
virtue has an additional, areteic feature which distinguishes it from other character traits: it is
an excellence of character (and, correspondingly, a vice is a defect in one’s character).166 So a
virtue is a deeply entrenched disposition to act, think, and feel in excellent/good ways, for
excellent/good reasons. Much energy has been spent fleshing out each component of this
definition, and we ought, perhaps, to say a little more in order to lay an adequate foundation
for the dialogue to come.
Firstly, to say that a character trait is ‘deeply entrenched’ – that, as Hursthouse says, it
“goes all the way down”167 – is typically shorthand for a cluster of claims about the way one
exhibits and comes to possess a character trait. To start, a character trait is habituated; it is the
sort of thing that arises only with repetition and practice:
we learn by doing; for example, we become builders by building, and lyre-players
by playing the lyre. So too we become just by doing just actions, temperate by
temperate actions, and courageous by courageous actions.168

Hexis (or the Latin habitus) is also often translated as “state,” and there are advantages and disadvantages to
using either translation. I prefer to translate hexis (and habitus) as “disposition” because it sits in several respects
more comfortably with today’s usage, particularly with regard to a common distinction dividing emotions and
dispositions: emotions are occurrent, whereas dispositions are not. Agents who are kind or courageous are kind
or courageous whether they are asleep, unconscious, beside themselves with grief or anger, and so on, and this
point seems to me better captured by “disposition” than “state.”
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As states that are habituated, character traits are “central to the person, to whom he or she is,”169
and they thereby make their possessor in some sense reliable or predictable. They are persistent,
and quite possibly indelible. Habituation is not, however, pure routinisation, as Annas quite
rightly emphasises in numerous pieces on the analogy between virtue and skill.170 Unlike other
sorts of habit, virtue is a reflective disposition which responds to new problems flexibly. So
when virtue ethicists stress reliability, they are not predicating unthinking or reflexive
habituation. Virtue is not akin to mindlessly playing with one’s hair, nor is it like the sort of
habituation one finds in well-trained pets.
For this reason, virtue requires experience and cannot appear in the young regardless of
how well they have been routinized. As Aristotle says of the (intellectual) virtue of phronesis,
though the young become proficient in geometry and mathematics, and wise in
matters like these, they do not seem to become practically wise. The reason is that
practical wisdom is concerned also with particular facts, and particulars come to be
known from experience; and a young person is not experienced, since experience
takes a long time to produce.171
And the same is true also of the other virtues. Our conceptions of virtue evolve as we come to
encounter new people, thoughts, and circumstances, which further embed the virtues and yield
the necessary sensitivity to context. This is not to say that the virtues are ‘purely’ practical, as
if one could learn nothing from attending a lecture or reading a book on virtue. Rather, it is to
say that worldly experience is a necessary element in the development of virtue. So, in brief, a
virtue is a flexible habit which arises primarily out of experience.
Virtue is, moreover, a disposition to act in excellent ways. But what do we mean by
excellent? Any adequate response to this question will be lengthy and multifaceted, and I shall
devote the entire section that follows to expanding upon this very issue, but one answer to this
question ought, I think, to be mentioned here: virtues are dispositions to decipher the morally
right response – the virtuous agent acts well not because their choosing some action makes it
right (as though the action were morally neutral prior to the virtuous agent’s choice), but

Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 9, “Practical Expertise,” in Knowing How, eds. John Bengson and Marc A Moffett
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because they are disposed to detect the (most) excellent course of action.172 As Reeve explains
this thought, the virtuous agent is the gold standard for right/virtuous activity (eupraxia)
because “he reliably tracks the relevant way the world is, not because his judgement makes
something true of the world.”173 So the moral standing of a particular action attaches not to the
agent who acts (we cannot say, for instance, that devoting one’s life to the poor is the right
course of action merely because Mother Teresa did it), but rather to their character traits and
the sorts of responses those character traits dispose the agent to (Mother Teresa’s self-sacrifice
was morally good because it embodied the virtues of compassion, kindness, charity, etc., and
if her self-sacrifice had not so embodied the virtues, it would not have been morally good).174
This, I take it, is a fairly commonsensical point – when our moral exemplars fall from grace
and either descend into vice or are revealed to have been less than virtuous in the first place,
we cease to emulate them and no longer take them to be reliable trackers of morally salient
factors or architects of morally good action. Thus, ‘excellent’ action falls out of the virtues,
and only out of particular individuals when they possess the virtues. Actions cannot be labelled
morally good or evil without reference to some good or evil character trait.
There is a good deal of complexity here, however, and virtue ethicists are discordant
when it comes to the relationship between virtue and acting well. For virtue ethicists such as
Zagzebski, a perfectly just act may also exhibit certain vices – there is no inconsistency in
saying that the action was just yet cruel or merciless.175 For others, to say that an act is perfectly
just is to say that it is no way morally defective. According to thinkers like Annas and
Hursthouse, to say that an action is just (that is, embodies the virtue of justice), is to say, at the
very least, that the action in question is consistent with the other virtues, that it is not contrary
to charity, prudence, etc.176 This latter approach represents one formulation of the unity thesis,
the claim that the virtues interact with or inform one another to some extent. Unity theses admit
of a great deal of variety, and some are much stronger than others. Here, I shall subscribe to a
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relatively modest version of the unity thesis. On my account, the virtues curb, reinforce, and
otherwise intermingle with one another, and, therefore, it is impossible for an
action/thought/feeling to embody both a virtue and a vice. Thus, mercy can curb justice,
kindness can encourage honesty, and friendship or love can provide the virtue of charity with
morally salient content. This is a fairly standard Aristotelian tack on the unity of the virtues.
Indeed, for Aristotle, phronesis (‘practical wisdom’) makes some version of the unity thesis
unavoidable, since phronesis draws upon all of the virtues of character,177 so I am not here
diverging from mainstream Aristotelianism. We shall have much more to say on the unity thesis
in Chapter 4, but for present purposes this short gloss ought to suffice.
Because of the focus on character traits, virtue ethicists are reluctant to evaluate most
actions without knowing first about the sort of person performing them. By and large, a given
action may be performed out of either virtue or wickedness. The courageous and the ignorant
may, as Aristotle acknowledges in the Nicomachean Ethics, sometimes mirror one another in
action, both rushing into battle, say, or facing danger to rescue a loved one. 178 But there is
plainly more to acting virtuously than mere right action. The virtuous agent’s actions are still
intuitively distinct from the wicked agent’s, though they might have gone through the same
motions. And so virtue ethicists distinguish between right action and good action. For the
Aristotelian ethicist, perhaps the most significant factors distinguishing virtuous from nonvirtuous actions are, as Aristotle’s study of courage suggests, the desiderative and appetitive
dimensions of character traits. A character trait is also a disposition to think, feel, desire, and
be motivated in certain ways for certain sorts of reasons. Thus, compassion characteristically
involves a sensitivity to suffering – the compassionate person is one for whom suffering
matters, who will skilfully diagnose and reliably feel troubled by the suffering of others, and
will acknowledge “she is suffering,” “there was a less hurtful way to do this,” and similar
concerns as reasons for action.
This desiderative/appetitive aspect of one’s character (which includes emotion or
pathos), in fact provides the basis for Aristotle’s well-known distinctions between virtue,
continence/self-control (enkrateia), and incontinence (akrasia). Whereas the virtuous agent’s
desires and emotions are in harmony with what he deems to be the right course of action,179 the
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continent/self-controlled agent will possess “strong and bad appetites [epithumia]”180 but
nevertheless acts rightly in spite of these contrary appetites. They will mirror the virtuous
agent’s actions, but not their desires. The incontinent person possesses the same warped
appetites as the continent, but unlike the continent person fails to subdue those desires and act
rightly. Thus, the virtuous agent is distinguished not only by their acting rightly, but also by
their properly calibrated desires, appetites, pleasures, pains, and emotions.181
Though I shall not dwell in this chapter on the desiderative/appetitive nature of virtues
of character, nor on emotion as a component of virtue, it is worth pointing out briefly that by
slotting emotion into the virtues of character, Aristotelian ethicists agree with one pillar of care
ethics: an emphasis on the moral salience of the emotions. Indeed, the emotions have been a
central subject of enquiry for Aristotelians, with thinkers like Hursthouse, Annas, Swanton,
Sherman, Foot, Oakley, Roberts, Nussbaum, and many other contributors to contemporary
virtue ethics all reinforcing the central role allocated to the emotions by ancient and medieval
Aristotelians and Peripatetics.182 Though these thinkers are not without their disagreements
over particular claims about emotion and its relation to morality,183 there is no doubt at this
180
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point that emotion is a lynchpin of virtue and of virtue ethics. And they are not merely in
agreement about the general moral significance of the emotions – they are also in agreement
about some of the reasons why the emotions are morally significant. Recall that Noddings
suggests that ‘natural’ caring (caring which I perform naturally after engrossment/empathy)
ought to be the care ethicist’s gold standard for moral action. Thus, there is precedent in care
ethics for a similar distinction between right and good action, one drawn on the basis of
(amongst other things) one’s emotions. Similarly, virtue ethicists such as Brady have argued,
like care ethicists, that the emotions have a number of important epistemic outputs which
enable us to act rightly.184 Indeed, this is presumably because virtue and care ethicists have
both drawn on, and contributed to, similar discussions in the philosophy of emotion, including
those of the Scottish Enlightenment. So it is not merely that virtue and care ethicists are in
agreement about a vague import of moral emotion – they are in agreement here for largely
identical reasons.
An additional observation ought to be made here in relation to the Aristotelian claim that
particular courses of action are not morally evaluable independent of the character traits
underpinning them. Since the Aristotelian is committed to the claim that almost all actions are
both potentially virtuous and potentially vicious, they fall into some species of particularism
and agree with another tenet of care ethics. Aristotle’s doctrine(s) of the mean will, for many,
be the quintessential expression of Aristotelian particularism.185 Aristotle explores two
doctrines of the mean in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics. The first concerns character traits
and is perhaps the more eminent. It locates the virtuous or the right response between two vices
of excess and deficiency. Thus, courage, a disposition to fear appropriately, is a midpoint
(though not necessarily the exact midpoint) between the vices of cowardice and rashness. The
second doctrine relates specifically to action and feeling, and is more akin to hitting a bullseye
with an arrow, since it recognises a variety of areas in which a response could be excessive or
deficient: thought, emotion, action, the object of the response, the time of the response, the
duration of the response, and so on. The doctrines of the mean are particularist in that they
tailor right action (thought, feeling, etc.) to our particular circumstances – it is a mean relative
to us. Aristotle illustrates with an analogy:186 it is possible to eat too much or too little. But if
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ten pounds of meat is too much to eat, and two pounds is too little, it does not follow that we
should all eat six pounds of meat. Each person’s circumstances produce a unique mean; for
Milo, an athlete, eight pounds may be the mean, whereas a sedentary lifestyle may require only
five pounds. Aristotle’s ethical theory incorporates particularism at a variety of levels, but as
the Milo example illustrates, Aristotle appreciates the need for contextual sensitivity.
Particularism, however, is regarded with wary approval by Aristotelians. The term
‘particularism’ has become so unclear and conceptually laden that many contemporary
Aristotelians have abandoned it in favour of terms like ‘anti-codifiability.’ Hursthouse’s
discussions in On Virtue Ethics, and in papers like “Practical Wisdom: A Mundane
Account,”187 “Fallacies and Moral Dilemmas,”188 and “What Does the Aristotelian Phronimos
Know?”189 of rules within virtue ethics (commonly referred to as ‘v-rules’) are widely regarded
as some of the best contemporary defences of virtue ethical ‘particularism.’190 In a sense,
Hursthouse accepts universalism – she believes that it is possible to establish rules which are
universally applicable, like “be kind,” “be just,” or “do not be cruel.” ‘Particularism’ comes
into play, however, when we compare the v-rules to the deontologist’s rules (‘d-rules’), like
“do not steal” or “do not murder.” The d-rules prohibit, mandate, or permit certain actions,
whereas the v-rules prohibit or demand (though do not, for the most part, merely permit)191
certain character traits, and it is much less clear how to derive action guidance from the latter.
Virtues, we might say, do not admit of a great deal of precision when codified for action
guidance. But Hursthouse rejects the thought that we can provide a codex of rules about action.
Most actions, when considered in isolation from their moral context, are ethically ambiguous,
and may be performed either out of virtue or out of vice. Lying may be dishonest, but it may
also be kind. Killing may be unjust or cruel, but it may also be merciful, compassionate, or just.
There is room, to be sure, for absolute, universal prohibitions on the virtue ethical account.
Aristotle admits that adultery and murder are never morally permissible in Book II of the
Nicomachean Ethics, and Foot leaves room in her normative theory for what she calls
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‘conceptually verdictive’ actions like torture, which can never be morally good. 192 Geach and
Anscombe were also in favour of this idea, Anscombe holding, for instance, that lying is
morally impermissible.193 But for the most part actions may be performed for either good or
bad reasons, and for that reason a lengthy list of universal rules prohibiting or mandating
particular actions is impossible.194 Therefore, virtue ethicists like Hursthouse fall into a
doctrine of anti-codifiability, which is cautiously but undeniably particularistic.
Once again, parallels with care ethics will be apparent. Like virtue ethicists, care ethicists
reject the thought that moral rules ought to represent the bulk of morality, but both camps are
equally inclined not to reject moral rules in toto. Both accept that their central moral concepts
make for a kind of universal imperative. And both regard themselves as departing from
deontological ethics by refusing to prejudge moral actions sans further contextual information.
Care ethicists do not think that any particular action can be considered caring without first
knowing something more about who is performing the action and who its intended beneficiary
is, and similarly, virtue ethicists do not think that some action can be considered virtuous
without first knowing something about its agent’s character and the situation in which they are
acting (and this, of course, includes knowledge about anyone else with a stake). Indeed, it may
even be useful for care ethicists hoping to clarify their stance on particularism to borrow the
virtue ethicist’s notion of anti-codifiability.195 So I take it that care ethicists and virtue ethicists
are in agreement not only over the place of emotions in moral theorising, but also in their
approach to moral evaluations of particular actions, and that this agreement includes not only
particularism itself, but also the reasons undergirding it.
This short overview will, I hope, supply sufficient backdrop for the discussion that
follows. In the ensuing section we return to the subject of excellence, but in order to do so we
must delve into Aristotelian meta-ethics. I turn now to consider meta-ethical eudaimonism and
naturalism with two aims: first, to further flesh out the concept of excellence and what it means
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to be an excellent human being, and second, to search for some commitment to relational
ontology.

2.

Aristotelian Meta-ethics: Eudaimonism and Naturalism

Just how one defines ‘excellence’ and, accordingly, how one identifies virtues, is a matter of
debate, and for that reason a number of competing lists of virtues have emerged over the
centuries. Humeans, inspired by the sentimentalism that rose to popularity in the Scottish
Enlightenment, have categorised virtues as those traits or qualities which are ‘useful’ or
‘agreeable’ to ourselves or to others,196 a classification which fell out of meta-ethics stressing
concepts such as ‘approbation’ and ‘sympathy.’ Nietzsche, conversely, was an egoist of some
description, opposed to and preoccupied with a certain kind of self-sacrificing altruism, and
this is reflected in his ethical writings on such topics as “herd mentality” and “selfrealisation.”197 By contrast, all ancient Greek philosophers (with the notable exception of the
Cyrenaics)198 were ethical eudaimonists; they derived their normative concepts from their
meta-ethical eudaimonism, the currency of which is human flourishing.199 It is worth opening
an overview of eudaimonist meta-ethics by saying something about the diversity of the
eudaimonist tradition. The ancient Greeks are notorious for their philosophical disputes, so it
will come as no surprise that Aristotelian/peripatetic eudaimonism is but one subgrouping
within a miscellany of perspectives on eudaimonia.200 The Epicureans, for example, defined
eudaimonia in hedonistic terms – the flourishing life is characterised by a certain sort of
pleasure: ataraxia, or a state of ‘untroubledness,’ ‘tranquillity,’ or ‘contentment.’201 Socrates,
conversely, defined the flourishing life as the life of philosophy; of argument, reasoning, and
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logic.202 For the stoics, virtue was both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia,203 whereas for
Aristotle, virtue was a necessary but not sufficient component of eudaimonia – flourishing also
relied upon some measure of good luck.204 Eudaimonia and eudaimonism were bones of
contention in ancient Greek philosophy, and Aristotelian eudaimonism represents just one
strand of thought in a complex and tumultuous tradition.
Nor are disagreements over eudaimonism peculiar to the ancients. Eudaimonism endured
as a meta-ethical school of thought into the Middle Ages, branching as it did into a much richer
variety of subdivisions than it had in ancient Greece. A number of Islamic thinkers, al-Farabi,
Avicenna, al-Ghazâlî, and Suhrawardi being perhaps the most noteworthy, inherited and
revised naturalism, eudaimonism, and conceptions of virtue from the ancient Greeks, even
incorporating these elements, as Aristotle did, into their political philosophy. 205 Aquinas and
other medieval Christian philosophers built on Aristotelian eudaimonism too, Christianising it
and thereby incorporating new metaphysical and soteriological commitments into
eudaimonism to add to the already long list of eudaimonist philosophies.206 Thus, Aquinas and
his philosophical descendants207 have infused the notion of human flourishing, and thereby the
concept of virtue, with a specific brand of Abrahamic theology, defining virtues as those
character traits which enable us to live in accordance or union with God’s will and goodness
(but not thereby committing to the necessity of theism for all of the virtues or for earthly
flourishing). In doing so, several additional virtues not considered by Aristotle or Peripatetics
like Aspasius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Theophrastus, including piety, hopefulness, and
charity were added to the list of virtues, and had to be reconciled with non-theological virtues.
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Contemporary areteic philosophy adds even more diversity to the mix.208 Some virtue
ethicists today have continued the supernaturalist tradition to which Aquinas and Avicenna
belong.209 Others have defended secular forms eudaimonism, which has begun to seep into
deontological and consequentialist ethics in recent years.210 By hybridising eudaimonism with
other ethics, such as Kantianism and utilitarianism, the floodgates have been opened for an
even wider variety of positions to gain influence, and it would come as no surprise if
eudaimonism were to mushroom into still more formulations as philosophers in other traditions
continue to consume eudaimonism and aretaic philosophy. So even within Aristotelian
eudaimonism specifically, it is clear that there are a vast host of meta-ethical camps for virtue
ethicists to plump for.

2.1. Virtue as a Necessary Condition for Human Flourishing
How, then, do we derive normative claims from ‘descriptive’ claims about human flourishing?
Like eudaimonism, naturalism admits of a large variety of expressions. Here, I shall take the
standard neo-Aristotelian line, which stays loyal to Aristotle’s eudaimonist meta-ethics,
expanding upon but rarely challenging the fundaments of his meta-ethical apparatus. Aristotle,
together with Foot,211 Hursthouse,212 and Kraut,213 demarcates virtues as those character traits
human beings, as members of a life form or natural category, need to be eudaimon, a view
which Aristotle himself inherits from Plato.214 But it is not obvious how such a theoretical
machine will operate, and there are many sorts of naturalism to choose from. Aristotelian
eudaimonism is naturalistic because it employs judgements which (a) are drawn from the
‘biological sciences,’ and (b) are normative.215 Though he is not usually considered a
peripatetic, Chrysippus has, I think, captured the essence of naturalism elegantly in his
Candace Vogler surveys some of these disagreements in “Aristotle, Aquinas, Anscombe, and the New Virtue
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Propositions in Physics, where he posits that “there is no other or more fitting way to tackle
the theory of good and bad things, the virtues, and [human flourishing] than on the basis of
nature as a whole and the administration of the cosmos.”216 Virtues, on most naturalist
accounts, and on the prevailing strand of Aristotelian meta-ethics, enable us to live well or
flourish because they partially constitute our living well/flourishing qua social, political
animals.217 For thinkers of this stripe, the necessary conditions for eudaimonia are taken to be
universally applicable and ‘objective’ – “what a man needs is what he must have to attain ends
proper to man.”218
‘Need’ and ‘necessity’ are deliberately ambiguous terms here. There are numerous ways
in which we might ‘need’ the virtues to flourish. For some virtue ethicists, the necessity is
contingent; individuals may need different things in order to flourish (consider, for instance,
the role art and aesthetics plays in different lives, and the implications that variability may have
for the flourishing of different individuals).219 Of course, no Aristotelian will deny that external
goods like food and health are universal, that nobody can flourish when they are starving or
terminally ill, but this is quite different from the claim that all human beings need the same
exact set of goods, however abstractly characterised that list may be. Virtue ethicists who take
a weaker, ‘pluralistic’ stance on eudaimonism which renders very few goods absolutely
necessary for flourishing accept that human beings might, in theory, flourish without virtue,
and for those who take this line of thought to its extreme, there may be cases (much like those
rejected in the Platonic dialogues, especially the Gorgias and the Republic) where vice or
misconduct can contribute to our flourishing.220
This account of the relation between eudaimonia and virtue is, however, perhaps more
typical of arguments against eudaimonism than eudaimonist philosophy itself – the literature
is rife with counterexamples where some dishonest, unfair, or cruel action will reap enormous
benefits and thereby bring about happiness or flourishing.221 But this rests on a
misunderstanding of virtue ethical eudaimonism. Most eudaimonists do not press for such a
weak, contingent view of necessitation. For mainstream eudaimonists, the need for the virtues
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is more robust; it is impossible to flourish without them.222 A virtue, then, is a deeply
entrenched disposition to act, think, and feel in ways and reasons that are not contingently
necessary for human flourishing – necessary, that is, only in certain circumstances or within
the context of particular individuals’ lives – but necessary for human flourishing point blank.
As Geach has elegantly put it, “men need virtues as bees need stings.”223 A bee, qua the sort of
thing that defends its hive by stinging, cannot flourish without one – it can survive, to be sure,
but it is not going to live well given its particular life form. And this is the kind of necessity
virtue ethicists have in mind when they tell us that virtues are necessary for eudaimonia. Of
course, since this thesis addresses only a small slice of naturalist meta-ethics, there is no need
to take a definite stance here on many topics and virtues in this vicinity. Our scope is limited
only to relational ontology within naturalistic ethics.
How, then, do we derive normative claims from what many scholars view as purely
‘descriptive’ claims about human flourishing?224 Aristotle’s naturalism manifests in his muchdiscussed ergon (‘characteristic activity’/‘function’) argument. According to this argument,
human beings possess some characteristic function or functions, which provides them with a
telos or several teloi.225 Those human beings who do not carry out their characteristic functions
thereby fall short of achieving their telos and living as they ought to live. Aristotle is, of course,
notoriously unclear about his conception of eudaimonia, and is often read as endorsing two
distinct formulations of it without offering any means of reconciling the two. 226 On the first
view, which dominates the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, eudaimonia is
‘comprehensive’ in that it includes all those practical details and issues to which phronesis
attends. The flourishing life is spent in pursuit of the noble (kalon), mingling with other
virtuous agents, acting justly, and so forth. Aristotle also remarks, however, that eudaimonia
consists in a life devoted to ‘contemplation’ (theoria) or, more precisely, “contemplation of
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God,”227 and this is often linked to an elevation of the virtue of sophia (‘wisdom,’ composed
of epistemē or ‘scientific knowledge’ and nous or ‘intellect’) above the other virtues. As Nagel
puts this view,
it is certainly better to exercise one’s reason well in providing for one’s needs and
in dealing with others – that is, to have moral virtue – than to exercise it badly. But
this is essentially a caretaker function of reason, in which it is occupied with matters
[…] far below those it would be considering if it had more time and were less called
upon merely to manage.228
The inconsistency between these two views of Aristotle’s eudaimonia is immediately apparent,
and it is one which many commentators have found insoluble. Aristotle appears to have
committed himself to blatantly inconsistent positions, one much broader and inclusive, and the
other much narrower and less inclusive.229
Ackrill and Rorty have, I think, rightly objected to the thought that Aristotle has endorsed
so obvious and severe an inconsistency, suggesting instead that there are ways to read Aristotle
which do not attribute two incompatible accounts of eudaimonia to the two Ethics. For Rorty,
the ‘comprehensive’ account of eudaimonia is more than capable of accommodating the
narrower emphasis on contemplation, and such things as friendship are saturated with exactly
the sort of contemplation Aristotle refers to when he exhorts us to live the contemplative life.230
Ackrill, by contrast, argues for an alternative interpretation of those passages which appear to
cast theoria as the sole pursuit of the life of rational activity, and against isolating sophia as the
virtue non plus ultra.231 These seem to be more charitable readings of Aristotle’s eudaimonism,
not least because of the sheer amount of effort he devotes to analyses of phronesis, philia
(‘friendship,’ which in fact expands to include filial and civic relations), and other ‘everyday’
aspects of life which feature so tangentially and minorly on readings like Nagel’s. Without
dismissing the evidence motivating views like Nagel’s, I shall side with thinkers like Ackrill
and Rorty and interpret Aristotle’s claims about contemplation broadly; the eudaimon life is a
life of rational activity adequately furnished with external goods, where this does not
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necessitate the maximisation of theoria.232 Theoria plays a significant role in eudaimonia, no
doubt, but it need not be maximised at the expense of practical deliberation. According to this
reading, Aristotle has a relatively thick notion of the human ergon, against which we can
evaluate humans and identify shortcomings.
As we have already noted, Aristotle’s ergon argument later grounded Aquinas’ brand of
eudaimonist meta-ethics. Aquinas also relied on the notion of proper human function as a
source of normative claims about the sort of life we ought to lead. Crucially, though, Aquinas’
theological commitments permeated his eudaimonism (as it has for many subsequent theists),
and thus, the content of his notion of eudaimonia differs radically from Aristotle’s.233 For
Aquinas, humanity’s ultimate purpose, its overarching ergon, was the beatific vision, a state of
alignment with God’s goodness and a life with God in heaven. Aquinas’ eschatological
commitments did not, however, lead him to abandon hope of earthly flourishing altogether.
Aquinas is quite clear that flourishing is possible in this life, that there is some way of fulfilling
our ergon/erga prior to the afterlife, though it would be fragile and inferior to heavenly
flourishing.234 So we might say that Aquinas developed a ‘layered’ ergon argument, one in
which there were two distinct (though very much overlapping) characteristic functions for
human beings.
The ergon argument survives today, largely intact, in neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism.
Like Aristotle’s ergon argument, neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism employs the biological
sciences to produce normative claims. Michael Thompson, whose philosophy of biology has
laid much of the groundwork for neo-Aristotelian naturalism, presents this simple formula for
the foundational premises of evaluative judgements of living things: S’s are F (where S denotes
some species or life form, and F some predicate).235 Using this template, we generate natural
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history judgements – swans are monogamous, grizzly bears are omnivorous, cheetahs are
quadrupedal, and so forth. These natural history judgements each constitute what Thompson
and Foot call an ‘Aristotelian categorical,’ propositional statements about how a particular kind
of being lives its life, and collectively, these Aristotelian categoricals constitute the life form
of the species or natural category.236
Of course, some organism may not fulfil all of its Aristotelian categoricals. Some
quadrupedal animals may be born with less than four limbs, and so on. And this will very often
render those animals defective. A zebra or wildebeest born without hind legs will be unable to
undertake the migrations those species are renowned for, or to escape from predators, and most
will agree that such an animal would be defective. But diverging from some natural history
judgement does not entail that a creature is defective.237 Assuming it does not inhibit feeding
or movement, a snail with an unusually thick and sturdy shell does not seem to be defective –
it is, if anything, an exemplary snail. This is, however, precisely because Aristotelian
categoricals become evaluative only in light of the organism’s ends. The snail’s ends include
survival, and it obtains that end by developing a shell early on in its life. Consequently, a shell
which is unusually conducive to this end is also an unusually good shell. Yet if the shell was
so large and awkward that it inhibited the snail’s feeding or immobilised it, that shell would be
defective, because it would be detrimental to the snail’s nutritive or locomotive ends (or rather,
those ends for which locomotion is necessary). Thus, in order to evaluate a living creature, one
needs not only to catalogue that creature’s Aristotelian categoricals, but also a list of that life
form’s ends.
For Foot, judgements about humans are no different in structure. She sets the evaluation
of human action “in the wider contexts not only of the evaluation of other features of human
life but also of evaluative judgements of the characteristics and operations of other living
things.”238 Just as a non-human animal is uncontroversially defective if it cannot eat, it is
uncontroversial that human beings must eat, and that human beings are considered defective to
some extent if they are unable to do so. A child who is unable or has no desire to eat is quite
clearly unwell. But despite the fact that our need to eat is a biological fact, it is also the case
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that our need to eat is a source of normative claims – it is not at all jarring to say that somebody
should or ought to eat.239 So, to extend this argument into a more clearly moral domain, since
human beings are characteristically rational – that is, their rationality constitutes an
Aristotelian categorical – it stands to reason that a human being who does not meet this standard
is in some sense defective. They do not live as a human being ought to live. And it is because
of their relation to human flourishing that Aristotle’s list of virtues also included justice,
temperance, courage, (arguably) friendliness/friendship, honesty, liberality (with money), and
magnificence (in regard to money).240 On Aristotle’s and the neo-Aristotelian account, these
virtues were necessary for a human being as an instance of a particular life form to obtain its
ends and flourish.
Among the earlier and more influential accounts of neo-Aristotelian naturalism is that
defended by MacIntyre in Dependent Rational Animals. There, MacIntyre acknowledges that
his widely influential After Virtue (published 18 years prior) “was in error in supposing an
ethics independent of biology to be possible.”241 He cautions us against ignoring our “mere
animality,”242 and devotes a large part of the monograph to the claim that:
the virtues that we need, if we are to develop from our initial animal condition into
that of independent rational agents, and the virtues that we need, if we are to
confront and respond to vulnerability and disability both in ourselves and in others,
belong to one and the same set of virtues, the distinctive virtues of dependent
rational animals.243
MacIntyre goes on to defend a naturalism which bears striking resemblance to the naturalism
of Aristotle and Aquinas, and to contemporary naturalists like Thompson and Foot. Like all of
these thinkers, MacIntyre takes it that flourishing is constituted by the possession and
expression of a certain set of characteristics.244 So, too, is MacIntyre’s naturalist notion of
flourishing comparably ‘objective’ – MacIntyre compares assessments of flourishing to the
judgements of doctors, athletic coaches, and teachers, contending that we are no more experts
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when it comes to our own flourishing than we are when it comes to our health,245 and thereby
distances himself from the thought that our own subjective judgements determine whether we
are flourishing or not.246 Though MacIntyre criticises Aristotle for excessively ‘masculine’
ethics, MacIntyre’s naturalism is unmistakably and systematically indebted to Aristotle and
Aquinas, and in this MacIntyre is representative of most Aristotelian virtue ethicists.
2.2. ‘Metaphysical Biology’ and Scientific Progress: A Brief Note

There is a significant philosophical point to be underscored in brief here about the relationship
between eudaimonism, the ergon argument, and the role of the metaphysical/biological claims
we feed into them. The ergon argument and the eudaimonism it underpins could be described
as metaphysically and biologically ‘neutral.’ We are not required to feed any particular claims
about the human function into the ergon argument, since the theoretical machinery stands
independently of the claims funnelled into it.247 Thus, Aristotle and Aquinas were able to tap
into two overlapping yet still dramatically different conceptions of human flourishing in
delivering their respective ergon arguments. Of course, some metaphysical/biological claims
are unavoidable for proponents of the ergon argument – there must, after all, be some
commitment to one or more characteristic human functions, and some means of linking those
functions to ethics which circumvents the Humean is/ought distinction. But the nature or
content of the human ergon is left undetermined – those with Hobbesian or Nietzschean
conceptions of human nature would find the ergon argument as serviceable to their claims as
the Aristotelian once they are disentangled from Aristotelian natural norms. So while I shall
diverge from both Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ list of natural norms to some degree in this thesis,
as most neo-Aristotelians are wont to do, this does not entail a rejection of the structure of their
respective ergon arguments.248

245

This is a familiar stumbling block for contemporary readers of ancient eudaimonist philosophy. Amongst the
clearest illustrations of the contrast between modern notions of ‘happiness’ and ancient eudaimonia is Richard
Kraut’s “Two Conceptions of Happiness,” The Philosophical Review 88, no. 2 (1979).
246
I do not take MacIntyre to be claiming that our own judgements are irrelevant – how, after all, could I flourish
if, despite having all the necessary external goods for flourishing, I am perpetually miserable?
247
Geach and Nagel also take this view in The Virtues, at 12-13, and “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” respectively.
Foot’s “Goodness and Choice,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 35 (1961), is a
paradigmatic example of the adaptability of ergon arguments.
248
This point will become relevant when we turn our attention towards Aristotle’s conception of friendship and
political community in the chapters to come.

63

3.

Aristotelian Ethics, Relational Ontology, and Dependency

We have, unavoidably, already said a good deal about Aristotelian relationality, and it will
come as no surprise at this point that Aristotelian ethicists have recognised and investigated
relational ontology meticulously. Aristotle’s own works are littered with affirmations of
relationality; two books of the Nicomachean Ethics are spent discussing philia, one more on
justice, and a significant portion of Book IV on what Ross calls “virtues of social
intercourse.”249 We find, moreover, a significant portion of the Eudemian Ethics, the
Rhetoric,250 and the Politics devoted to discussions of our relationality and various kinds of
relationship. So I do not think there is any doubt as to Aristotle’s endorsement of some sort of
relational ontology, but let us look more closely at what he has to say on the subject.
On Aristotle’s view, relationships, like the virtues, are constitutive in some way of
eudaimonia – “a human,” he tells us straightforwardly at the outset of Chapter 9 in Book IX of
the Nicomachean Ethics, “is a social being and his nature is to live in the company of others.”251
Gathering momentum for this thought, he writes that:252
it seems odd, when we assign to the happy person all good things, not to give him
friends, who seem to constitute the greatest of external goods. Again, if it is more
characteristic of a friend to treat another well than to be treated well, and
characteristic of the good person and of virtue to benefit people, and if it is nobler
to treat friends well than strangers, the good person will need people whom he
can treat well.253
So on Aristotle’s view, virtue characteristically necessitates friendships because it pursues the
noble. There is greater nobility in treating friends well than in treating strangers well, and,
recalling his comments on the Delian inscription in Book I, virtue pursues what is noblest. Thus,
virtue and virtuous agents are characteristically relational – relationality is an Aristotelian
categorical, without which we cannot flourish.
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Aristotle returns to this thought in the Politics, where he maintains that “the state is a
creation of nature, and […] man is by nature a political animal.”254 “He who by nature and not
by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity,”255 since “the state
comes into being, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake
of a good [human] life.”256 The Politics thus retains the relational motif of the Nicomachean
Ethics, and uses it to explain how the state comes into being. Naturally, the Rhetoric also offers
glimpses into Aristotle’s ethical thought, and there we find still more evidence of Aristotle’s
thoughts on relationality. Amongst the clearest affirmations of relational ontology appear in
Chapter 5 of Book I, where Aristotle lists the constituent parts of eudaimonia, “good birth,
plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children,” being some of
these.257 Any vestigial doubts that one might harbour about Aristotle’s position on relationality
can be put to rest by noting the prominence of relation and friendship in the Rhetoric. There,
Aristotle praises friendship frequently, and when he lists the components of eudaimonia in the
passage above, relation constitutes almost half of the inventory.
It is difficult, of course, to provide a thorough overview of a commitment so pervasive
in Aristotle’s thought. I have found the commentaries of Aspasius and Alexander of
Aphrodisias to be uniquely helpful here, Aspasius’ commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics
encapsulating the relational ontology we find in Aristotle’s ethical and political philosophy
eloquently:
it is not for someone who lives an isolated life or so as to have happiness concerning
himself, not caring at all whether his parents or children or city or friends are in the
greatest of calamities. For if he were a solitary animal like a wolf or lion, perhaps
his happiness would be of such a kind; but since man is a social and communal
animal, first of all, if he were to live alone and by himself in a desert, even if he had
everything in unstinting measure, there is no way that he would be happy. Next,
even if he were in a city, but witnessed great sufferings on the part of his wife,
children, parents and country, his life would still not be self-sufficient. For the self-
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sufficiency of a social animal is circumscribed by his body and soul, but it is
somehow necessary that he share in the misfortunes of his dearest ones.258
For Aristotle, human beings are characteristically social creatures, and for that reason they
naturally form social structures. The family, the village, and the state all represent modes of
living which are natural norms of human life. And this, of course, mirrors the teleological
account of relation defended by care ethicists. Aristotle has relatively little to say about the
necessity of relations in human life – he is obviously cognizant of the fact that human beings
are the sorts of creature who depend on others, but he does not seem to take a stance on the
non-teleological accounts of relation outline above (though I take it both that the teleological
account is what is doing the bulk of the normative work in care ethics, and that Aristotle’s
remarks hint at least at a weaker relational ontology as it is outlined in Section II.1.1.).
Subsequent Aristotelians have both cemented and expanded upon Aristotle’s notions of
relationality. Aquinas, as we have seen, does not adopt an Aristotelian ontology without
revision, but even after Aquinas’ amendments, the ontology he ends up with remains stalwartly
allegiant to Aristotle’s teachings, perhaps the clearest example of this appearing in the Summa
Theologiae:
the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] says, not, indeed, to
make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he
possesses perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for the purpose of a good
operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do
good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order that
man may do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the
contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends.259
Aquinas’ analyses of charity, moreover, are rooted in Aristotle’s exposition of friendship, but
are far more comprehensive than Aristotle’s in that they seek to establish a relationship with all
of humanity. For Aquinas, “charity, which is friendship in the fullest sense towards God,
extends to all those who are able to see God, and not only to those we do not know, but even to
our enemies.”260 On the Thomistic account, relationality extends to God, and through God, to
all other people. So once again, we find the notion that the flourishing life demands relation.
Aquinas later returns to the subject of relationality in his discussion of natural law, where,
again, one can detect Aristotle’s influence:
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there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially,
according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue
of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature
has taught to all animals", such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and
so forth. [Additionally], there is in man an inclination to good, according to the
nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural
inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect,
whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to
shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other
such things regarding the above inclination.261
Here, Aquinas points to certain activities that characterise the human life form and render us
relational creatures, whether by virtue of our animality or by our inclination towards the good
or certain sorts thereof. For Aquinas, we are relational creatures in that it is part of the natural
law that we participate in relations, and here Aquinas offers us illustrative examples of the
sorts of activities which constitute our good. As this passage illustrates, Aquinas’ ethics not
only echoes Aristotle’s relational ontology, and does so within an unmistakably Aristotelian
eudaimonist framework, it also dovetails into Aquinas’ politics in much the same way
Aristotle’s ethics does.
Contemporary Aristotelians and Thomists have by and large followed suit and embraced
ontological relationality, the claim that human beings are characteristically relational creatures.
Thus, Foot concerns much of her Natural Goodness with social defects, writing at one point
that human beings need “to pursue human ends having to do with love and friendship. They
need the ability to form family ties, friendships, and special relations with neighbours.”262 For
Foot, as for Aristotle and Aquinas, human beings have a social life form as a matter of natural
normativity – a human being which is not social is defective in much the same way a wolf or
dolphin that is not social would be. It is, she maintains, a biological fact that human beings are
social animals, and that human beings are defective if they are unable to interact socially
(through, say, an inability to use language). As an extension of this natural, social normativity,
it is virtues like friendship, love, and justice that enable us to act well in the social sphere, and
II-I, Q94, A2, BP (my emphasis). See also Aquinas’ reply in Article 10 of his Disputed Questions on the
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262
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thus to live well or flourish as human beings. Advancing this ontology, and continuing the
thought above, Foot asks “how could [we] have all these things without virtues such as loyalty,
fairness, kindness, and in certain circumstances obedience?”263 Indeed, Foot stresses the need
for virtues like charity throughout her writings, her oft-cited papers “Euthanasia”264 and
“Virtues and Vices”265 being classic examples. So Foot’s work could quite rightly be regarded
alongside Anscombe’s as a transmission of Aristotelian ontology into contemporary meta- and
normative ethics.
Alongside the philosophers studied above, Hursthouse subscribes to the view that the
virtues “make their possessor good qua human being,”266 contending that naturalists “focus on
evaluations of individual living things as or qua specimens of their natural kind.”267 She makes
a significant distinction between social animals and other sorts of animals, noting that a good
social animal which is relatively sophisticated has four areas in which it ought to be “well fitted
or endowed:”268 its parts, its operations, its actions, and its desires and emotions. Whether a
sophisticated social animal is well-fitted or endowed in these areas is determined by the extent
to which its positioning in those areas is conducive, in ways characteristic of that animal’s life
form, to four ends: the organism’s own survival, the continuance of that animal’s species, the
animal’s “characteristic freedom from pain and characteristic enjoyment,”269 and the good
functioning/operation of the social group. Thus, a good wolf characteristically survives,
continues the species, and promotes the good functioning of the group by pack-hunting, and
not just any sort of pack-hunting, but pack-hunting of the sort that wolves characteristically
engage in (a good wolf will not, after all, attempt to stun its prey as some pack-hunting
cetaceans do, nor will they hunt lizards or insects as mongooses do).
MacIntyre has also written extensively on the subject of relational ontology, and makes
no secret of the fact that his account is heavily influenced by care ethicists like Held and
Kittay.270 His Dependent Rational Animals in particular addresses many of the claims we found
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in Chapter 2. There, he forewarns us against becoming “forgetful of our bodies”271 and calls
attention to the “virtues of acknowledged dependence.”272 One of the central theses of
Dependent Rational Animals is that we rely upon one another for the development of
independence, which itself is (a) inevitable, and (b) a necessary condition for flourishing.
MacIntyre postulates that we transition from childhood dependence in three distinct ways or
stages. The first is “a movement from merely having reasons to being able to evaluate our
reasons as good or bad,”273 the second, “the transformation of the child’s desires and
passions,”274 and the third, “the movement from awareness only of the present to awareness
informed by an imagined future.”275 Any child relies on others to enable or promote each of
these transitional aspects and to do so in the right way, and in his extended analyses of each of
these aspects MacIntyre parallels the work of care ethicists like Held and Ruddick, for whom
parenting and childrearing is, recall, of unique and paramount moral import. What’s more,
MacIntyre goes on to emphasise the social nature of moral development, highlighting the role
that parents play but also the developmental role of friendship and collegiality, and the
“correction” that our friends and colleagues may offer our moral reasoning.276 By that token,
MacIntyre overlaps also with the writings of Friedman and Clement, who, recall, also notice
the ways in which we depend upon one another for proper moral development.277
Richard Kraut is another Aristotelian in whose corpus we can find a clear endorsement
of this kind of relational ontology. In What is Good and Why? we find a very clear
reaffirmation of relationality and its natural normativity, with special regard for childhood and
our reliance upon others for proper upbringing:
it is good for us to receive loving attention as children, to acquire linguistic
competence and the ability to communicate with others [...] to mature sexually,
to learn the complex social skills of adulthood, to enrich and develop greater
mastery over our emotions, to learn how to assess reasons and deliberate with an
independent and open mind, and thus to interact with others as full members of
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the community [...] it is better for us when we are children to develop the ability
to form bonds of friendship, to enjoy the company of others, and to devote
ourselves to the good of others. Total and lifelong isolation from other human
beings would disfigure us.278
While this passage does not make explicit connections to the virtues,279 it is clear that Kraut
thinks that sociality is a precondition for human flourishing and that relations play a special
role in our development. In that respect he, like MacIntyre, draws close to care ethical
reflections on relational ontology. Indeed, Kraut never loses sight of our relational nature in
What is Good and Why? – it permeates the entirety of his ethical discussion, and takes centre
stage in the final two chapters.
MacIntyre and Kraut are not, of course, the only virtue ethicists to draw so close to care
ethical conceptions and discussions of relational ontology. Though they are indeed excellent
examples of the overlap, almost all Aristotelian ethicists show great concern for dependency
and (moral) upbringing. Aristotelians have been so eager to account for dependency, in fact,
that they have afforded moral luck centre stage in their concept of flourishing. Virtue ethicists
like Nussbaum and Tessman have long emphasised the extent to which evaluations of our lives
are left to chance,280 and this they inherit from Aristotle himself. As noted above, Aristotle’s
conceives of eudaimonia, in essence, as the life of virtuous activity adequately furnished with
external goods. But he repeatedly emphasises that the good of our near and dear is one of these
external goods. This is, after all, why Aristotle concludes that King Priam’s life was not
eudaimon – despite a largely well-lived life, King Priam ultimately lost everything he had,
including his children. As we have seen, for Aristotle, virtue is habituated – it is the sort of state
developed over the course of one’s lifetime, and for that reason the correct pleasures and pains
must be inculcated from youth. Hursthouse, again representative of mainstream virtue ethics,
cites Aristotle with approval, and the development of children is a theme she returns to
frequently in On Virtue Ethics and Beginning Lives,281 in contexts as sundry as the role of moral
rules in moral development, the education of the emotions, and the kinds of things (good)
parents will and ought to desire for their children. It is in part this dependency upon others that
motivates Aristotle to mount an attack on the public/private distinction by arguing, in the last

278

What is Good and Why? 138.
Kraut amalgamates these thoughts into a defence of the relational nature of both the virtues and human
flourishing in Section 52.
280
See, e.g., Nussbaum’s The Fragility of Goodness (Rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)
and Tessman’s Burdened Virtues.
281
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
279

70

book of the Nicomachean Ethics, that we ought to legislate for/regulate parenting. Indeed, it is
widely regarded as a strength of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics that it emphasises childhood and
upbringing so forcefully, and Aristotelians have often criticised deontologists and
consequentialists for treating ‘independent,’ ‘autonomous,’ and ‘rational’ adults as if they
“sprang fully formed from [their] father's brow.”282 So though Aristotle attracts MacIntyre’s ire
in Dependent Rational Animals for his masculine conception of virtue, there can be no doubt
that Aristotle, MacIntyre, and most other contemporary Aristotelians283 share a concern with
moral upbringing, parenting, and the dependence we all share upon our parents, peers, and
community for proper development.
Thus, Aristotelians have a starting point, relational ontology, in common with care
ethicists, but they also proceed in a similar direction from that starting point by taking childhood
and moral education as a morally significant aspect of that ontology. 284 Like care ethicists,
virtue ethicists claim that our own wellbeing is deeply reliant upon the wellbeing of others, not
only for basic survival needs, but also because we grow to be invested in the wellbeing of those
we are close to. Once again, we find striking similarities between our two frameworks.285
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3.1. Relational Ontology and Partialism

As a germane illustration of the impact of relational ontology on the normative claims made
by virtue ethicists, we might note that Aristotelian relationality gives rise, as it does in ethics
of care, to some kind of partialism. Once again, Aristotle discusses this subject at length.
Midway through Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics, we find a relatively clear affirmation
of the link between relationality and partialism:
friendships […] differ from one another. That of parents to children is not the same
as that of rulers to ruled; nor is that of father to son the same as that of son to father,
or that of man to woman the same as that of woman to man. For the virtue of each
of these is different, the characteristic activity is different, and so are the reasons
for their becoming friends; and therefore the affection and the friendship differ as
well. Each, then, does not get the same from the other, nor should they seek it; but
when children give to parents what they ought to give to those who brought them
into being, and parents give what they ought to their children, the friendship
between them will be lasting and good.286
Here, Aristotle accepts that (a) relationships do and ought to admit of a great deal of variety (I
might be a father, a daughter, a cousin, a stranger), and (b) that variety is the source of
(potentially asymmetrical) moral obligations which differ according to the nature of each
relationship. Passages like these provide the foundations for neo-Aristotelian partialism,
summarised by Cottingham thusly:
The development of rewarding personal relationships, which is, in virtue theory,
the very core of the good life, requires an emphatically preferential assignment of
time and resources to a few chosen individuals—one's close friends and family.287
Aristotle returns to partialism at several points throughout the Nicomachean and Eudemian
Ethics, and afterwards in the Politics. In Chapter 2 of Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics, he
asks whether someone should “always defer to his father and obey him in everything, or should
he trust a doctor when he is ill, and appoint as a general someone skilled in war?”288 There, he
gives a limited endorsement of partiality; sometimes it is morally good to be partial, as when
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one is asked to ransom one’s father, but at other times – when one is electing officials, for
instance – it is morally wrong.
A reading of the wider passage and of Aristotle’s other references to partialism does give
the impression that he is hesitant to prescribe any general guidelines for partiality, though this
is presumably because Aristotle is mindful of his earlier assertion that we can expect only as
much precision as a subject matter admits of.289 There is also a great deal to be said about the
way in which Book IX squares with Book V, which is where Aristotle discusses justice and its
various varieties. Aristotle’s views on politics colour his moral philosophy, so his stance on
partialism will naturally have informed and been informed by his views on the way a state
ought to be governed (and vice versa). But despite such difficulties, there can be little doubt
that Aristotle incorporates some species of partialism into his ethics. Aristotle is not bothered
by partialism per se, but by the extent to which it determines right action.
Contemporary Aristotelians often endorse partiality with similar tentativeness. Foot
wrestles with partiality throughout both Natural Goodness and Virtues and Vices, but like
Aristotle (and Aquinas) her doubts are not over whether partiality can be morally permissible,
but rather when it is morally permissible. Foot typically takes it as obvious that friendship
involves partiality when it comes to things like time and material resources, and she cites with
approval pieces like John Taurek’s “Should the Numbers Count?”290 Hursthouse also
addresses partiality in On Virtue Ethics, when she considers Singer’s impersonal benevolence
in terms of her naturalist meta-ethics. “It rather looks,” she says carefully,
as though the species and familial bonding that are part of our biological, animal
nature, and make us ‘partial’ to our own species and children, play an essential role
in sustaining these two ends.291
And MacIntyre is equally sympathetic to the partialist’s case. Dependent Rational Animals,
and indeed his larger corpus, concentrates specifically on notions of community and the ethical
dimensions of belonging. He approvingly observes, for instance, that “the practices of
receiving and giving informed by particular just generosity are primarily exercised towards
other members of our own community related to us by their and our roles.”292 In particular,
MacIntyre concerns himself with the family, and though his primary focus is on the conditions
necessary for a family to flourish, he often alludes to the partiality that constitutes one of those
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necessary conditions. For MacIntyre, partiality towards one another is part of what makes a
good family. So we can, once again, trace in Aristotelian ethics a similar trajectory to that of
care ethicists in their discussions of relational ontology, though both are (rightly) careful in
advancing partialism as a doctrine.
Virtue ethicists thus also agree with care ethicists about partialism. Like care ethicists,
virtue ethicists acknowledge special obligations placed upon us by those with whom we are
related, and the fact that we are related to them gives us reason to afford them special weight
in our moral deliberation. Virtue ethicists also agree with care ethicists in limiting their
partiality to certain spheres of life – indeed, both offer similar cases where partiality ought not
to be shown. So virtue and care ethicists appear to be in agreement over all of the core
commitments care ethicists pick out as central to their framework.

4.

Conclusion

It seems, in light of the numerous philosophical conversations surveyed above, that Aristotelian
ethicists do indeed endorse a relational ontology, and most of the commitments care ethicists
identify as central to their theory besides. This harmony is substantial – not only do virtue
ethicists and care ethicists share relationality in a broad sense, they also derive similar priorities
and subjects of discussion from it. Like care ethicists, virtue ethicists also focus on childhood,
upbringing, and moral community as a result of their appreciation of relationality. But these
agreements raise several interesting questions, the most obvious of which asks where, if
anywhere, the two frameworks diverge. I turn to this question in the following chapter.
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IV
Distinguishing Care Ethics From Virtue Ethics
I shall assume at this point that we can discern a great deal of continuity between our two
ethical theories. Both care ethics and neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics conceive of human beings
as characteristically related beings and draw normative conclusions from dependency and the
indispensability of caregiving in human life. These similarities have, unavoidably, been painted
in rather broad brush strokes. Nevertheless, the reasons offered above certainly seem to yield
a prima facie case for the claim that virtue ethics accepts a sufficiently similar relational
ontology, and thus agrees with the meta-ethical mainstay of care ethics (and I have, throughout
the prior chapter, offered reasons to believe that virtue ethics also endorses the other four core
commitments identified by care ethicists, namely particularism, partialism, the moral salience
of emotions, and a rejection of the public/private distinction). Supposing that this set of claims
holds true, questions will begin to crop up as to what follows from them. If the core
commitments studied above are to be treated as necessary and sufficient conditions for an ethic
of care, and virtue ethics satisfies those conditions, then it follows either that the two terms are
synonymous or that one is a subspecies of the other. We would not be alone in reaching this
conclusion; virtue ethicists like Curzer have already argued as much, 293 though generally in
less detail, and the opinion that care ethics is a subspecies of virtue ethics is apparently so
common that care ethicists have perceived a need to speak out against it.294 I do not think,
however, that we have exhausted the set of considerations which might distinguish care ethics
from virtue ethics. Indeed, I suspect that careful reflection will uncover several.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. The first is to consider some reasons to be
suspicious of arguments which identify care ethics with virtue ethics, and thereby to make a
See his “Aristotle: Founder of the Ethics of Care,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (2007).
See, e.g., Groenhout, Ruth, “Virtue and a Feminist Ethics of Care,” in Virtues and Their Vices, eds. Kevin
Timpe and Craig Boyd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Sander-Staudt cites Noddings’ Caring;
Spelman’s “The Virtue of Feeling and the Feeling of Virtue” (in Feminist Ethics, ed. Claudia Card (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1991); Slote’s “The Justice of Caring;” Rachels’ The Elements of Moral Philosophy;
McLaren’s “Feminist Ethics: Care as a Virtue,” in Feminists Doing Ethics, eds. Peggy DesAutels and Joanna
Waugh (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001); Tessman’s “Critical Virtue Ethics: Understanding Oppression
as Morally Damaging,” in Feminists Doing Ethics, eds. Peggy DesAutels and Joanna Waugh (Lanham: Rowman
and Littlefield, 2001), and Halwani’s “Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics” (Hypatia 18, no. 3 (2003)) and Virtuous
Liaisons as culprits here, maintaining that all of them order care ethics underneath virtue ethics. Three others are
Vrinda Dalmiya’s Caring to Know: Comparative Care Ethics, Feminist Epistemology, and the Mahābhārata
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) specifically at 42, Van Hooft’s “Bioethics and Caring,” Journal of
Medical Ethics 22, no. 2 (1996), specifically at 88 and Tessman’s Burdened Virtues.
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second contribution to the literature at this intersection. The second is to set the stage for
chapters to come by pointing out concerns which Aristotelians ought to see to. In the first three
sections, I analyse three sorts of difference between our two ethics, some of which have been
defended by philosophers in either camp, and others which philosophers familiar with both
ethics are likely to raise. I argue that none of these actually withstand scrutiny. I then move on
in the fourth section to explore a significant difference between the two theories which seems
to pass muster. In short, the claim is that care, the sole/primary moral currency accepted by
care ethicists, has no equivalent in virtue ethics. The fifth section, related to the fourth, argues
that care and virtue ethics are different in that they organise their moral concepts differently,
and that they consequently end up with dissimilar theories of right action. It is the difference
canvassed in Section 4 which I respond to in the remaining chapters of this thesis. In those
chapters, I treat the concept of care as a concept which virtue ethicists ought to account for,
and I spend the remainder of this dissertation responding to these issues on behalf of the
Aristotelian virtue ethicist. The overarching intent of this chapter is therefore to unearth
problems lying at the borders between these frameworks, not to erect impermeable conceptual
distinctions.295
It quickly becomes apparent, in surveying the disagreements between virtue ethics and
care ethics, that some of those identified by care ethicists can be immediately set aside as
criticisms of sentimentalist virtue ethics. In Justice, Care, and the Welfare State, for example,
Engster explains that care ethics is not a kind of virtue ethics because “virtuous intentions are
not enough,”296 and insists that care ethics “places greater emphasis on outcomes than virtue
theories usually do.”297 Context suggests that Engster has Slote in his sights when he develops
this criticism, and it is much more difficult to maintain that consequences are a blind spot for
Aristotelian virtue ethics. Aristotle tells us that “the happy person lives well and acts well, for
we have claimed that happiness is pretty much a kind of living well and acting well.” 298 It is
therefore essential that virtuous agents manifest their virtues in action. And for that reason,
phronesis takes centre stage in Aristotelian virtue ethics. Phronesis aims specifically at
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obtaining the ends laid out by the virtues of character. While a proper upbringing may have
inculcated the correct cognitive and affective habits in us, it is phronesis that enables us to go
out into the world and put those habits into practice effectively. To do the wrong thing with the
right mindset is thus not morally equivalent to doing the right thing with the right mindset,
since the former is characteristic of an agent lacking a virtue.299 So it is difficult to see how
objections like this could succeed against Aristotelian strains of virtue ethics, and Engster’s
case against “virtue theories” seems in fact to threaten just one variety thereof. I shall look only
at the gaps that exist or could exist between care ethics and (neo-)Aristotelian brands of virtue
ethics.

1.

Sexism and Conservatism

The first set of discrepancies I should like to set aside was mentioned in the introduction and
will have lurked in the periphery since. They claim, briefly, that virtue ethics is sexist or
conservative in a way that feminist ethics of care could not be. In Chapter 1, I considered these
objections as reasons to look deeper into the intersection between our two theories. Now, I
wish to say something about their veracity. Accusations of sexism and xenophobia can be taken
in a variety of ways. Aristotle notoriously entertained sexist and xenophobic attitudes which
any feminist today would recoil from, and contemporary virtue ethicists have sometimes faced
charges of inheriting this kind of conservatism from a number of feminist philosophers.
Aristotle did, after all, use his naturalism to explain and validate the various kinds of slavery
that upheld the Athenian economy and to establish a relationship of “superiority” 300 and
domination between men and women.301 It seems ironic, then, for an ethic that remains for the
most part loyal to Aristotle’s ethics to attempt to align itself with a staunchly feminist theory.
As a feminist ethic, the ethics of care has always aimed to demolish certain forms of
oppression, and no care ethicist writing today would give quarter to an ethical framework
which endorsed or required slavery or the subordination of women to men. Yet this is also true
of contemporary virtue ethicists. No mainstream neo-Aristotelian would take seriously a
proposition that some members of society were by nature fitted to be nothing more than slaves,

Recall here Aristotle’s distinctions between virtue, continence, and incontinence.
Nicomachean Ethics, 1158b11-13.
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or that women are by nature inferior, morally or otherwise, to men. Most, in fact, are at pains
to criticise and distance themselves from these particular claims of Aristotle’s.302 There is no
reason, then, to suppose that neo-Aristotelians will share the ontological suppositions that led
Aristotle to adopt his sexist and xenophobic attitudes, or at least no more reason than there is
to suppose that care ethicists would share in Hume’s racism.303
Moreover, care ethicists have been accused of making comparably sexist claims under
the guise of feminising moral philosophy. In “Rescuing Womanly Virtues,” Barbara Houston
attacks Gilligan’s, Noddings’, and Ruddick’s ethics for advocating “a form of female
essentialism,”304 and in “Caring and Exploitation,” she contends that “[the ethics of care] is a
dangerous one, especially for women, precisely because the ethics can abet exploitation.”305
Onora O’Neill has also criticised ethics of care for conservatism about gender, complaining
that:
a stress on caring and relationships may endorse relegation to the nursery and the
kitchen, to purdah and to poverty. In rejecting ‘abstract liberalism,’ such feminists
converge with traditions that have excluded women from economic and public
life.306
Care ethicists have sometimes had to review and adapt their positions in light of these worries,
and the threat of essentialism has dramatically shaped the trajectory of the discourse. The
charge of essentialism forced Noddings to rename the later editions of Caring307 and has led
many care ethicists to strip central moral concepts of their gender (mothering, for instance,
does not necessitate womanhood for Ruddick, so both men and women can be mothers on her
account).308 Clement takes the worry that care ethics “[grows] out of women’s oppression, but
also [contributes] to the perpetuation of that oppression” seriously enough to devote an entire
chapter to it in Care, Autonomy, and Justice, and Groenhout spends almost an entire chapter
of Connected Lives responding to charges of sexism. Thus, at least in the mouths of care
ethicists, accusations of conservatism seem open to several responses. Both virtue ethicists and
care ethicists have been attacked for similar kinds of sexism/conservatism, and both camps
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have also taken steps to show that their respective approaches are less sexist/conservative than
they initially appear. The care ethicists who seek to distinguish their view from virtue ethics
on this basis will then, at the very least, have to offer some reason to think that virtue ethicists
have not defended their ethic successfully – an argument which has not been tendered as far as
I am aware, and which in my estimation does not seem particularly promising.
Even if we disregard accusations of sexism, one could certainly be forgiven for thinking
that the virtues, sensitive to cultural context as they are, would entrench cultural values and
attitudes instead of enabling or disposing the virtuous agent to challenge them. We might
therefore accuse the virtue ethicist of a kind of conservatism opposed to cultural progress,
which entrenches rather than undermines patriarchal power structures. Indeed, Held advances
just such an objection in The Ethics of Care, writing that:
Virtue theory has characteristically seen the virtues as incorporated in various
traditions or traditional communities. In contrast, the ethics of care as a feminist
ethic is wary of existing traditions and traditional communities: Virtually all are
patriarchal. 309
Here, Held echoes the concern we saw Annas raise in Chapter 1. However, several convincing
responses to this concern have already appeared in the literature. Annas addresses it at length
in Intelligent Virtue, suggesting that the virtuous agent comes to challenge conservatism as
their community expands outwards, much like we often come to challenge the beliefs
inculcated in us by our parents as our social circle expands to include those beyond our
family.310 Hursthouse also suggests a way of avoiding conservatism in Part III of On Virtue
Ethics, where she argues that virtuous agents adopt a Neurathian method whereby they
dismantle particular norms from within their cultural setting, just as one might replace parts of
a boat without deboarding. Kristjánsson also tackles this problem in “Ten Myths About
Character, Virtue and Virtue Education – Plus Three Well-Founded Misgivings,”311 and several
others besides have offered responses to charges of conservatism.312 These responses are, in
my view, sufficient to defuse the objection, so I shall defer to them here. It is also noteworthy

The Ethics of Care, 19. Groenhout is even less impressed by virtue ethics. In her “Virtue and a Feminist Ethics
of Care,” at 481, she writes that “the historical roots of virtue theory lie in deeply hierarchical and patriarchal
theories, are unreservedly elitist and assume only the powerful will live good lives.” See also Tove Pettersen’s
“The Ethics of Care: Normative Structures and Empirical Implications,” Health Care Analysis 19, no. 1 (2011):
55.
310
This argument appears in Chapter 4.
311
British Journal of Educational Studies 61, no. 3 (2013).
312
Curzer’s “An Aristotelian Critique of the Traditional Family,” (American Philosophical Quarterly 47, no. 2
(2010)) is also noteworthy here.
309

79

that care ethics has faced similar worries about conservatism. Commenting on the threat of
conservatism in care ethics, Tronto writes that:
in focusing on the preservation of existing relationships, the perspective of care has
a conservative quality. If the preservation of a web of relationships is the starting
premise of an ethic of care, then there is little basis for critical reflection on whether
those relationships are good, healthy, or worthy of preservation. Surely, as we judge
our own relationships, we are likely to favor them and relationships like them. It is
from such unreflective tastes, though, that hatreds of difference can grow.313
So care ethics is not uniquely immune to such concerns.
Yet there are plenty more discrepancies in this vein to consider. Clement suggests that
the “fundamental difference” between ethics of care and virtue ethics is that “the study of ethics
of care, at least at its best, has brought critical attention to the gender-coding of our moral
concepts. It has clarified and challenged the sexual division of moral labour,” 314 and thereby
challenged conservatism. Presumably, Clement is referring to the sorts of labour that are
stereotypically divided along sexual lines – childrearing, nursing, and so forth – and virtue
ethics has admittedly been rather silent on these issues until very recently. As Held puts it, “the
traditional Man of Virtue may be almost as haunted by his patriarchal past as the Man of
Reason. The work of care has certainly not been among the virtuous activities to which he has
adequately attended.”315 These topics/issues are not marginal for feminists, either. Splitting
feminist concerns into two categories, Stohr writes that:
The first category is the set of concerns […] about the need for a moral theory to
account for the full range of moral experience. Obviously the focus within feminism
is on the moral experience of women, but feminist ethics has traditionally allied
itself with those asking parallel and sometimes overlapping questions about the
experience of men and women of color, persons with disabilities, and others who
have historically suffered under oppressive and unjust social structures.316
“Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care,” Signs 12, no. 4 (1987): 659.
Care, Autonomy, and Justice, 4. Sandrine Berges distinguishes virtue ethics from ethics of care in A Feminist
Perspective on Virtue Ethics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), at 109-110, on a similar basis:
Previous ethical theories, including Aristotelian ethics, tended to focus on the kind of moral
experiences that would be part of the life of an independent male making decisions and
judgements for himself, free of the kind of pressing, everyday preoccupations that a woman
at home might experience and perhaps, as a result, more abstract and less personal.
Berges goes on to argue, however, that care ethics owes major philosophical debts to women virtue ethicists like
Heloise, Christine de Pizan, Wollstonecraft, and Sophie de Grouchy, and that virtue ethics can make sense of
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So one might reasonably think that virtue ethicists have overlooked the gender-coding of
concepts central to these professions and lived experiences, and to feminist ethics more
broadly.
Yet it is not clear that virtue ethics, at its best, has not brought critical attention to the
gender-coding of moral concepts. This may have been true when virtue ethics was still vying
to establish itself, but virtue ethics has progressed well beyond that point, and feminist virtue
ethics is now widely discussed (Stohr’s own paper being a case in point). Indeed, we might
even say that virtue ethics has been in the business of dismantling gender-coding for centuries.
There are sizable tracts in Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ work which champion traits like
compassion and thoughtfulness which are usually regarded as feminine.317 So it does not seem
entirely fair to assert that care ethics differs from virtue ethics in that it has challenged the
gendering of moral concepts. That said, even if we accept that virtue ethics has failed to call
attention to the gender-coding of moral concepts, why think that this is anything more than an
accident which can be easily rectified?318 Ethicists are in the business of identifying and filling
lacunae in their theories, and it is not obvious that this is not simply another lacuna which can
yet be filled.319 It is further puzzling that Clement has limited her claim to care ethics at its
best, for this implies that there are care ethics and/or care ethicists who themselves do not do

The second broad category of feminist concerns includes issues that might best be described as
concerns about justice and women’s rights. It is hardly news that women are still not treated as the
full moral and political equals of men. Women lack political standing in much of the world and
suffer higher rates of poverty and general economic hardship as a result of unjust social structures
and policies. Moreover, women and girls around the world are routinely subjected to sexual
servitude and exploitation through prostitution, forced marriage and childbearing, sexual violence,
and so forth. Identifying these deeply oppressive structures and remedying the wrongs they impose
is an essential goal of feminism. Any feminist version of ethics needs to be able to employ the
language of justice and human rights in a way that captures the moral weight of these issues
adequately and effectively.
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in Making all the difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991),
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this. If some care ethics/ethicists have not brought attention to the gender-coding of our moral
concepts (and Clement likely has scholars like Mayeroff in mind here), then those ethics will
not possess this fundamental difference. So in attempting to draw a neat distinction between
care and virtue ethics, Clement may well have opened a rift between the various ethics of care
instead.

2.

Eudaimonism and Naturalism

Eudaimonism seems to furnish another distinction between virtue ethics and care ethics. Virtue
ethicists, it might be conceded, do accept and emphasise relational ontology, but theirs is also
a rational ontology, and many other kinds of ontology besides. Indeed, it is difficult in reading
eudaimonist philosophy like that of Aquinas and Kraut not to be struck by just how thick
Aristotelian eudaimonist ontology can be. Kraut’s developmental theory of human nature, for
instance, posits that “a flourishing human being is one who possesses, develops, and enjoys the
exercise of cognitive, affective, sensory, and social powers (no less than physical powers).”320
Commenting on the expansiveness of this concept of flourishing, Foot notices that:
a great change has come over the conceptual scene with the move from animals
(other animals) to humans, and that we shall have to look afresh at the necessities
standing behind the evaluation in their case. To begin with, we now have to deal
with the much larger number of harms, and here also of deprivations, that can be
suffered: deprivations that belong to the world of imagination and understanding
for instance. On the most simple level, and leaving aside such things as art and
science, one notices that a human being who is unable to follow a tune or a dance
is deprived, and therefore does not have what a human being needs for the good
things that human beings enjoy. […] Flourishing, for human beings, encompasses
the enjoyment of many good things.321
By contrast, the care ethical focus on relational ontology, and specifically on dependency,
might seem to give rise if not to a thin ontology, then to a one-dimensional one. Care ethicists
often dedicate so much space to elucidating or fine-tuning their relational ontology that they
neglect other/prospective aspects of human ontology. Bowden, for example, is able to spend
the entirety of Caring unpacking just four kinds of relation: mother-child relations, friendly
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relations, nurse-patient relations, and compatriotic relations; as could Ruddick’s Maternal
Thinking be truthfully described as a study of just one: the mother-child relation.322
However, once again, this will not erect a solid divide between our two theories. Ruddick,
Held, and Martin all develop substantial accounts of rationality and link them to their
ontologies,323 and Held, Lynch, Petterson, Mayseless, Groenhout, and Gilligan all explicitly
link care to a broader concept of flourishing.324 Most care ethicists will accept moreover that
rationality and relationality are intertwined in such a way that one cannot excel in either area
without meeting some minimum standard in the other. Few after all would deny that one must
be rational in some sense to be a good carer, or that care aims at least partially to produce,
maintain, or restore rational agency, whatever we take that to mean. Nor can we say that care
ethicists do not employ a eudaimonistic or Aristotelian conception of flourishing or rationality,
since Lynch and Mayseless use just that.
One might also distinguish virtue ethics from care ethics by reference to naturalism.
While feminist philosophers like Baier and Walker have embraced the last century’s turn
towards ethical naturalism of various stripes, a number of care ethicists have resisted it. In a
paper called “Moral Subjects: The Natural and the Normative,”325 for instance, Held takes aim
specifically at the type of naturalism associated with neo-Aristotelianism, developing several
reasons to think that naturalism is a faulty doctrine, that care ethics is not naturalistic, and that
care ethicists ought to reject the traditional dichotomy between naturalism and supernaturalism.
Engster also argues against ‘natural law arguments,’ contending that they “rest upon a natural
See particularly the introduction to Bowden’s Caring and the preface to the 1995 edition of Maternal Thinking.
Interestingly, Sander-Staudt believes that it is virtue ethics whose ontology is narrower. In “The Unhappy
Marriage of Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics” (Hypatia 21, no. 4 (2006)), at 36, she writes that:
Even when VE [sic] adopts a relational ontology, the role such ontology plays in VE differs from
the one it plays in CE [sic]. The relational ontology of VE emphasizes the relational aspects of being
in terms of individual virtue development, whereas CE emphasizes the relational aspects of being in
a much broader sense. The relational ontology of CE construes the entire self as constituted, known,
and maintained through relationship, and construes virtue as a quality that nurtures relationships
appropriately.
Needless to say, I believe Sander-Staudt is mistaken about this, and I take the expository work done in Chapter 3
to evince this.
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teleology that translates biology into destiny and difference into hierarchy.”326 The first thing
to note here, however, is that Held’s and Engster’s argument is only necessary because this
distinction has already been undermined. Held writes in response to a growing trend amongst
care ethicists to identify as naturalists, a trend which Held aims to reverse. As we saw above,
care ethicists (including, I suggested, Held herself) begin their ethics with a theory of human
nature. Thus Collins, paraphrasing Groenhout, writes that according to care ethics, “our ideas
of what humans are is not entirely separable from our ideas of what they should be.”327 And in
“Rethinking Care Theory,” Engster in fact attributes a kind of naturalism to Tronto, Fischer,
Baier, Fineman, Kittay, Walker, and West. Quoting Streuning, he characterises the view as
follows:
By defining caring in terms of the general functions that it serves in reproducing
human life and society, Tronto and Fischer ground this concept in an objective,
material moral foundation. Other care theorists have similarly defined caring “as a
social practice that is essential to the maintenance and reproduction of society.328
Held’s and Engster’s argument is therefore not a pre-emptive one. It is a rebuttal against a
position which already has significant purchase in care ethics, and for that reason does not
earmark an extant distinction between care ethics and virtue ethics.329
Furthermore, Held’s arguments target a caricature of naturalism which most naturalists
will reject. She writes, for example, that “naturalism in ethics undermines our ability to make
the needed distinction between what we observe and describe and what we normatively commit
ourselves to,”330 remarking later on that “naturalistic Aristotelian, Humean, or scientistic
tendencies suppose that what is approved should be, or that what has evolved serves a morally
acceptable purpose.”331 These are puzzling claims, and one senses that Held fails to appreciate
the mechanics of the neo-Aristotelian naturalist’s transition from ‘is’ to ‘ought.’ Whatever
brand of Aristotelian ethical naturalism we buy into, it will not be one which translates just any
descriptive judgment into a normative one. Indeed, naturalists like Foot, Hursthouse, and
Annas have gone to great lengths to demonstrate just how such a judgment would err. The
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thought underlying naturalism, as we saw in Chapter 3, is something like what Hacker-Wright
suggests:
to situate an organism against the background of the characteristic function of its
species is to look at it from a normative perspective. To situate an organism against
its species is precisely to make an assessment of that organism against what is
normal for organisms of that type. That is, it is to make a normative assessment.332
Thus, while the naturalist’s set of moral standards coheres with the natural sciences and their
judgments about the sorts of organisms we are and have evolved to be, this does not erase the
distinction between the descriptive and the normative.333 A callous person will not measure up
to the care ethicist’s ideal, but nor will they measure up to the virtue ethicist’s, despite the fact
that human beings are the sorts of creatures that are sometimes callous. So Held’s argument
against naturalism seems to target a position which Aristotelians do not endorse, and in
distancing her moral philosophy from that naturalism, she has not in fact distanced it from neoAristotelianism.

3. Individualism

Some of the most interesting and widespread objections raised by care ethicists criticise virtue
ethics for what they call ‘individualism.’ Many care ethicists have taken virtue ethics to task
for this shortcoming, and whether or not they are all making identical allegations, it is clear
that a number of care ethicists believe that care ethics is unique in (and superior for) rejecting
individualism. Unfortunately, most care ethicists are unhelpfully vague about this charge, so
we cannot always be completely sure just what this critique consists in. Noddings and Held
buck this trend and articulate it in great detail, however, so I shall focus on their respective
contributions to the argument.

3.1. Individualism and Withdrawal

Noddings develops the charge of individualism throughout her corpus, but she seems to have
several different objections in mind. One of these, which seems to me to constitute a different
“What is Natural About Foot’s Ethical Naturalism?” Ratio 22, no. 3 (2009): 311 (my emphasis).
I ought to note here that there is some debate about whether the language of derivation is appropriate.
Hursthouse argues that it is not, and that the naturalistic project ought to be understood as “coherentist” rather
than “foundationalist” (“Human Nature and Aristotelian Virtue Ethics,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
70 (2012)).
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objection to the one Noddings defends most often, couches individualism in terms of
introspection or inwardness. In Caring, The Maternal Factor,334 and “Care Ethics and Virtue
Ethics,” Noddings differentiates care ethics from virtue ethics according to their conflicting
guidance. As Noddings frames it, virtue ethics recommends “turning inward,” 335 and by this
she means that virtue ethics advises us to contemplate its “ethical ideal,” how we compare to
it, and how we might achieve it. For Noddings, this advice is sorely inadequate because it
precludes what she calls “sympathetic attention.”336 Sympathetic attention, she tells us, “does
not function as most virtues do. It directs us away from ourselves as admirable characters and
toward the one who addresses us.”337 Unlike virtue ethics, care ethics takes as its ideal an agent
who is sympathetically attentive through and through. Noddings’ caring agent, recall, is one
who becomes engrossed in the life of the cared-for, and engrossment draws heavily on the
notions of sympathy and empathy we find in enlightenment sentimentalism. By contrast, in
counselling us to become and act as if we were virtuous, the virtue ethicist advises us to turn
inward, studying and refining our own character rather than attending to or becoming engrossed
in the lives of those with whom we share a relation, and therefore leaves insufficient room for
anything like sympathetic attention.
One gets the impression that in formulating this objection, Noddings envisages the virtue
ethicist advising us to follow in Gauguin’s footsteps and abandon our relations, not for the sake
of painting on an island in the Pacific, but for the sake of soul-searching and the cultivation of
“admirable characters.” Indeed, when she raises the possibility of using virtue ethics as a
foundation for her study in Caring, she discards it because virtue ethics’ ethical ideal could
include “the holy man living abstemiously on top of the mountain, praying thrice daily, and
denying himself human intercourse.”338 Yet while this objection does not miss its mark
completely (no virtue ethicist will deny the import of self-cultivation), there are a number of
reasons to set it aside. First, Noddings spends much less time developing it in her corpus, and
she presumably sees it as less important. Second, it is almost certainly one of the more
exaggerated and uncharitable ways to frame the thought that virtue ethics demands
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introspection of its adherents. It is, I think, unfair to paint the virtuous agent as a contemplative
hermit or an inattentive intellectual, especially in view of the usual candidates for virtue (the
list of which includes figures like Martin Luther King Jr., Mother Teresa, and the 14th Dalai
Lama). In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas refers to virtues as habitus operativi (‘operative
dispositions’),339 and this nomenclature is informative – the virtues, including those which Ross
calls the ‘virtues of social intercourse,’ are dispositions which must be put into action in the
flourishing life. As we saw in Chapter 3, some read Aristotle as a defender of Noddings’ picture
of virtue in light of his remarks in Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, but most virtue
ethicists today will flatly deny, for reasons including but not limited to those I shall attempt to
clarify in the sections and chapters to come, that Noddings’ portrayal of the virtuous agent is
an accurate one.340

3.2. Individualism and Relational Evaluation

Even once we have left this objection by the wayside, however, we seem to be left with a
number of objections in Noddings’ writings. Noddings’ language is surprisingly slipshod when
it comes to this objection, and it seems at first glance as if the objection splinters into several
distinct concerns. At some points, Noddings seems to equate individualism with a failure to
acknowledge the participation in and contributions of the cared-for to the relationship.341 At
others, individualism seems to amount to nothing more than a tendency amongst virtue ethicists
to discuss individuals rather than the relations they share with others.342 Sometimes,
individualism seems to mean that only the actions or traits of individuals can have moral value
or be treated as good or evil.343 Elsewhere, individualism seems also to consist not only in
limiting moral value to actions or traits, but also in shoehorning care into that view so that it
becomes an action or a trait of particular persons.344 In other passages, individualism appears
to mean an evaluative bias towards individuals, or a reluctance or a refusal to include relation
as an object of moral evaluation.345 Finally, Noddings’ individualism seems at times to mean a
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failure to recognise relation as causally/morally prior to the individual, in the sense that moral
agency is impossible without relation.346
In noting the variety of plausible interpretations of Noddings’ writings, I am not implying
that none of them can be reconciled or aligned with any other. It is perfectly consistent for
Noddings to say that virtue ethics spends too little time discussing relation, and that it also
neglects the central role care plays in creating moral agents. Indeed, it would make sense to
read these two objections as related. It would also make sense, by these lights, to argue that
care receives so little attention because the only things that can have moral value are the actions
and traits of individuals. We could then explain Noddings’ claim that care gets subordinated to
virtue by the fact that virtue ethicists have such difficulty with evaluating relations and the
contributions made to the relation by non-moral agents like infants. So it is not as if the different
meanings of individualism cannot be worked into a broader idea of what Noddings might mean
by ‘individualism.’ In fact, this would be a much more charitable strategy than to suggest that
Noddings has no clear idea of what she means by individualism, or that she equivocates when
she accuses virtue ethics thereof. But if we are to read Noddings’ charges of individualism
consistently, what is the kernel of the objection?
Noddings’ primary issue seems to be that virtue ethics and care ethics clash over the
value each affords to care. To her mind, virtue ethicists derive the moral value of relation only
from the value of traits (which give actions their value, too). Care ethicists, by contrast, derive
the value of virtue from the value of (caring) relations. As Sander-Staudt puts it:
The concept of care features in CE [sic] in a way that it does not in VE [sic] […]
CE scrutinizes virtue in the context of how best to achieve the goals of care, while
VE scrutinizes care in the context of how best to achieve virtue and a flourishing
life.347
Thus, virtue and care ethics have essentially endorsed opposing positions on the evaluative
priority of virtue and care. The faultline therefore lies in value theory, and Noddings’ comments
on value likely represent the kernel of the objection. I have already pointed out that this could
explain both her thought that virtue ethicists neglect care and that those who do acknowledge
care end up shoehorning care into virtue. It also explains quite well the emphasis she perceives
among virtue ethicists on particular moral agents over the role of care in bringing those agents
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to bear. If this is actually her claim, then it also becomes easier to see why Noddings feels the
need for excursions into value theory, why she isolates and repeatedly revisits the verification
of virtue as a purpose of care, and why she takes issue especially with the necessity of freedom
of choice for moral value. So it seems to me that there is ample reason to take this to be the
core of her objection.
Held also attacks virtue ethics on this front, and her concerns seem in large part to mirror
Noddings’. In The Ethics of Care, Held responds to Curzer’s claim that Aristotle founded the
ethics of care by insisting that “we need moral evaluations of relations, not just dispositions,”348
and that “in seeing care as a virtue, [Curzer] misses a central feature of care: its evaluations of
and recommendations concerning care.”349 Held attacks Curzer’s reductive approach to care,
asserting that it is “limited to evaluating an individual’s dispositions and behaviour, including
interaction with others, but not relations themselves between persons.”350 In The Ethics of Care,
she says also that virtue ethics focuses on “the dispositions of individuals, whereas the ethics
of care focuses on social relations and the social practices and values that sustain them,”351 and
she goes on to argue that Slote’s virtue-cum-care ethic:
misses the centrality of caring relations for an ethic of care. A caring person […]
will not only have the intention to care and the disposition to care effectively but
will participate in caring relations. If persons lack the capacity to do so, they can be
persons who are trying to be caring, but they are not yet caring persons. To be a
caring person requires more than the right motives or dispositions. It requires the
ability to engage in the practice of care, and the exercise of this ability.352
Held also illustrates her position on the limitations of individualism with an illuminating
example. She begins by telling us that “judgments about relations often need to be rather
different from judgments about individuals,”353 and then asserts that a relation between two
virtuous individuals can be “hostile, conflictual, and unhelpful to either”354 despite the fact that
both individuals are morally good. A caring relationship cannot be antagonistic in this way; it
“requires mutuality and the cultivation of interdependence in human life.”355 Virtue ethics, for
Held, does not recommend and cannot properly evaluate relations because it is only equipped
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to evaluate the dispositions of individuals. Held and Noddings therefore agree that virtue ethics
fails to appreciate the participation in caring relations because of its emphasis on character
traits. On their view, moral evaluations of relations are not reducible to moral evaluations of
individuals, virtuous agents are not guaranteed to have caring relations because of their virtue,
and moral evaluations of relations which are not derived from evaluative claims about character
traits are an integral part of a complete picture of moral life. Held differs from Noddings,
however, in that she seems not to think virtue ethics capable of evaluating relations at all,
whereas Noddings admits that virtue ethics can afford care some kind of instrumental value.
We thus have at least two distinct forms of this objection, Noddings’ being the more modest,
both of which revolve around the claim that virtue ethics does not and cannot value caring
relations rightly.
I take it that the claim at the core of Noddings’ and Held’s objections, that an ethic whose
primary source of moral value is the traits of individuals is incapable of (properly) valuing
relations, is worthy of serious thought for a number of reasons, its pedigree among them. Held
and Noddings are not the only care ethicists to have advanced criticisms along these lines. Care
ethicists like Hamington, Sander-Staudt, and Groenhout have proffered similar objections,
though usually much more briefly.356 What’s more, the responses to this argument have been
disappointingly sparse and, in my view, rather ineffective. Halwani both explains and dismisses
this objection in the space of two short paragraphs in “Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics,” 357 but
that response amounts to little more than the claims that (a) virtue ethics is not egoistic in such
a way that it forbids acts of self-sacrifice or endangerment, and (b) the virtue ethicist does not
need to treat relations as ontologically basic in order to incorporate or mirror the care ethicist’s
normative ethics. While a complete response to the care ethicist’s point will touch on both of
these points, neither of them strike me as completely satisfying. Alan Thomas likewise
acknowledges this objection, and goes on to respond to it by claiming both that “the relation is
not the value,”358 and that the argument rests on “at worst a metaphysical mistake, or at best a
mere figure of speech.”359
In light of Chapter 3, however, a different response is immediately apparent. As we saw
there, eudaimonists concern themselves with a complete life, and thus lives such as King
Priam’s cannot qualify for eudaimonia despite their many goods. Eudaimonistic judgements
See Sander-Staudt’s “The Unhappy Marriage of Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics,” 34-36, Hamington’s Embodied
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are supposed to assess one’s life as a whole against a particular life form.360 The keystone
concept under Aristotelian eudaimonism is flourishing, the lifelong performance of one’s
characteristic activity, which is to say that one lives a virtuous life adequately furnished with
external goods. For the Aristotelian virtue ethicist, this cannot be done outside of a web of
relations, and for that reason relations are included in assessments of eudaimonia. As Berges
puts it:
even as propounded by Aristotle, [virtue ethics] does not fail to take relationships
into account. Even if its focus is on the character of individuals, they are from the
very beginning regarded as operating within a community. Virtue is seen as that
which enables us to perform our function well; hence, a part of flourishing depends
on being part of a city.361
From this, it ought to be clear that eudaimonists do not derive evaluations of relations solely
through evaluations of character traits. One of Noddings’ major concerns is that virtue ethics
would reduce care’s value to a function of virtue’s, thereby overlooking care’s intrinsic value.
This is not the case. Caring relations are not valuable only insofar as they conduce or facilitate
or provide opportunities for the expression of virtue. Relations derive their value not from
virtue, but from flourishing. Thus Held’s example of two virtuous agents in a hostile relation
with one another seems easily explained. Neither agent can have done anything blameworthy,
since virtuous agents by definition do not perform blameworthy actions, but we are not thereby
left incapable of making normative claims about their relation. Rather, assuming this relation
makes some non-negligible difference in their lives, their relation is an external evil – it is a
stain on their lives, and it may even preclude either agent’s eudaimonia.
One can of course consistently maintain that a particular relationship is a good one
because it encourages or allows its participants to become virtuous. Indeed, it is difficult to see
how anyone could develop virtue without such relationships, or how a virtuous life could be
well-lived without opportunities to be a good friend/family member/romantic partner. One
could also make a Platonic observation about relations between the wicked which foster vicious
behaviour. In these senses relations may also be evaluable as platforms or stages for virtue or
vice. But none of this is inconsistent with the derivation of relational value directly from
eudaimonia, as elements of the flourishing life which can go better or worse in a variety of
Ackrill frames this thought nicely in “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” at 10 (original emphasis):
A giraffe is one organism and its functions are coherently organized. Its proper excellence is not just
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ways.362 The fact that one participates in genuinely caring relations is in itself a satisfaction of
one condition for eudaimonia, and thus the relation is valuable to some extent independent of
its relation to virtue. We can know that something is going well in a life by knowing that its
relationships are caring, irrespective of the agent’s character.
We need not think that care ethicists and virtue ethicists have any major disagreements
over the moral nature of this value, either. Both care and virtue ethicists seem to want relations
to belong to a theory of the good human life. Relations are a moral matter for virtue ethicists
because the fundamental question they take themselves to be answering, namely “what sort of
life should I live?” encompasses much more than mere right action or good character. For virtue
ethicists, the scope of moral evaluation extends to include all those things which bear upon our
flourishing, including such apparently amoral things as the trajectory of our careers, our health,
and our relations. Though the scope of moral evaluation is sometimes limited to right action in
(rudimentary) forms of consequentialism and deontology, virtue ethicists blur the lines between
conventionally moral subjects like right action and subjects which non-philosophers are
unlikely to think of as moral or ethical.363 Care ethicists are engaged in a similar project. In
urging us to treat caring relations per se as morally evaluable in some sense, and not just as
particularities which a theory of right action ought to consider or as a kind of backdrop against
which moral agency takes place, care ethicists are engaged in a project of redrawing morality’s
borders. So it seems that eudaimonism, insofar as it too expands the scope of morality, retains
the distinctly moral status care ethicists have afforded relation.

4.

Care and Virtue

There are lengthy discussions to be had over each of these potential discrepancies between
virtue ethics and ethics of care, and I will not claim to have resolved any of them. I have,
however, offered what I think are fairly persuasive reasons to believe that none of them are
genuine. I turn now to two which seem to me to hold more promise.
Thus far we have avoided any substantial discussion of care itself. We have addressed
features that all ethics of care will have in common, and in doing so have touched sporadically
on what it means to participate in a caring relation, but we have not engaged in a detailed or
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thorough discussion of what care is. Omitting a full discussion of care until now will surely
have struck the reader as peculiar – we are, after all, discussing care ethics. But there are a
number of reasons why we did not address the topic in Chapters 1, 2, or 3. Chief among these
is that Chapter 2 was concerned not with care itself, but with the commitments underpinning
care. Our primary task was, we might say, a more meta-ethical one. What we have laid out there
is the foundations of ethics of care, not the central normative concept. Another reason for
avoiding the concept in care in a study of care’s fundaments is that care seems at first glance to
be so contentious a topic that it would be impossible to say anything of substance without
adjudicating between accounts and selecting a small handful for explication. This was not, of
course, the primary task of the last two chapters. Our aim was to paint a broad picture of general
care ethical commitments. And while care ethicists usually define care in their writings, they
often do not, perhaps for the reason above (or perhaps because it is too obvious to mention!),
list care or any particular way of cashing it out amongst the essential features of care ethics.364
Care is clearly not identical to relation, though caring relations are a cornerstone of the
framework, nor is it typically reducible to a kind of partiality or a constellation of emotions.365
It is a distinct concept which involves but cannot be whittled down to any of the commitments
we explored in the preceding chapters. And though defining care via negativa in this way
remains well within the limits of orthodoxy, it is not particularly informative. I turn now to the
task of unpacking care, and to the claim that virtue ethics does not employ an analogous
foundational concept.
Though concepts of care are incredibly diverse, some efforts have still been made to find
commonalities between positive conceptions thereof, and to use those in the construction of an
additional feature that all ethics of care will have in common. Indeed, any care ethicist who
hopes to maintain some sort of conceptual boundary between care ethics and virtue ethics, and
is convinced by an analysis like the one presented in the preceding chapters, will likely view
this as the most obvious point of departure. Yet philosophers wishing to take this step are subject
to a handful of constraints. It is obvious that care is not an empty placeholder, but we also
cannot define its essential properties haphazardly. The primary constraint on the essential
content of care seems to me to be that it must represent and admit all those thinkers we
ordinarily take to be care ethicists. To exclude philosophers like Noddings, Held, Tronto, and
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Sevenhuijsen would be unacceptably dissonant with the broad agreement in the literature over
who qualifies as a care ethicist and the value of their insights about the nature of care. For this
reason, we cannot advance a ‘thick’ definition of care which adjudicates between the diversity
of views about what care involves; whichever way we choose to define care, it must be one that
accommodates rather than ignores or rejects that diversity. Yet while this constraint shrinks the
set of options dramatically, it does not empty the set entirely. Held, for instance, has
persuasively argued that care ethicists all define care as a response and/or a responsiveness to
need. At the outset of The Ethics of Care, she tells us that “the central focus of the ethics of care
is on the compelling moral salience of attending to and meeting the needs of the particular
others for whom we take responsibility.”366 And she has not been the only care ethicist to notice
this. In “Care Ethics and Animal Welfare,” Engster writes that:
most care theorists agree that caring at least entails helping others to meet their basic
needs, develop their basic capabilities, and avoid unwanted suffering and pain.
Building upon this minimalist approach, caring maybe defined as everything we do
directly to help others (1) to satisfy their basic needs for food, sanitary water,
clothing, shelter, rest, a clean environment, basic medical care, and protection from
harm; (2) to develop and maintain their basic capabilities for sensation, emotion,
mobility, speech, reason, imagination, affiliation, and literacy and numeracy; and
(3) to avoid harm or alleviate unwanted suffering and pain. The most general goal
of caring is to help others to survive and function so that they take care of
themselves and others and pursue some conception of the good life.367
Held and Engster are not alone in giving need pride of place in their ethics. Though most
care ethicists do not go so far as to locate a particular, thick concept of care at the heart of any
adequate theory of care, Held and Engster do seem to be correct in noting the universality of
need across competing definitions of care. Bubeck, for example, defines care in Care, Gender,
and Justice as “the meeting of the needs of one person by another person,”368 and Sevenhuijsen
defines it as “an ability and a willingness to ‘see’ and ‘hear’ needs, and to take responsibility
for these needs being met” in Citizenship and the Ethics of Care.369 Held’s work is, moreover,
enormously influential, and many care ethicists (such as Robinson) adopt her definitions more
or less verbatim, and thus inherit her focus on need. Tronto’s work, which has been equally
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influential amongst care ethicists, is also equally emphatic about care’s concerning need. In
explicating her concept of care, Tronto writes that “what is definitive about care […] seems to
be a perspective of taking the other’s needs as the starting point for what must be done.”370
Need also features prominently in the definitions offered by Noddings, Pettersen, Kittay,
Clement, Ben-Porath, and many others besides.371 So there seems to be enough of a consensus
to justify Held’s and Engster’s claim that, whatever else the concept includes, care is universally
defined at least in part as a response or a responsiveness to need. Even amongst care ethicists
who opt not to define care in their work (Bowden and Clement, for example) response to need
is treated as a fundamental component of care. One need not offer or endorse a full definition
of care in order to admit that some elements of care are essential, after all.
Yet while there may be enough consensus for Held to justifiably claim that care, so
defined, constitutes a foundational feature of care ethics, and that any conception of care must
include some account of need as that to which carers respond, there are a number of questions
this manoeuvre elicits. First, we might wonder whether ‘need’ has any universal meaning at all.
If, in referring to need, we are equating a number of very different concepts, then the
universality of need may be more a reflection of linguistic ambiguity than an indicator of
consensus, and need will therefore prove less apt as a core commitment of all care ethics than
it seems at first blush. Indeed, there are complex and contentious issues to be raised regarding
whether and how similar states like desires or interests might constitute needs, how and why
future or past needs, imagined needs, and so forth figure in care, and more generally about how
or why something qualifies as a need. Tronto, for instance, tells us that interests and needs come
apart because needs are not “individualistic” in the way interests are, and because needs are less
dispensable or negotiable than interests.372 Similarly, Bubeck insists that one can care only for
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needs which the cared-for cannot meet him- or herself,373 a point which Engster resists, and
which Engster claims is also resisted by Schwarzenbach, Tronto, and possibly also Waerness.374
Bubeck also notices that care responds only to a particular kind of need, and that the concept
must therefore be restricted in scope. In “Justice and the Labor of Care,” she invites us to:
consider that a lot of activities, notably all services and, even more widely, all
activities productive of use-values – and this could include most paid work in the
various sectors of the economy – could be described as at least mediately “meeting
needs.” […] presumably, nobody would think it adequate to describe the production
of a car as “caring,” so obviously the “meeting of needs” has to be qualified
appropriately. Now the most typical cases of care, as illustrated previously, seem to
involve interaction between carer and cared for, although the interaction may not
cover the whole activity or set of activities that is or are described as caring. Take
the following examples: cooking her favorite dish for a sick child, arranging an
appointment with a physiotherapist for an elderly person who is hard of hearing, or
inquiring into possibilities of help for one’s partner who is depressed.375
Tronto’s account thus precipitates difficult questions about closely related concepts and states,
Bubeck’s about the judgments of capability or capacity involved in assessing need, and about
the distinction between what we might call ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ needs, or needs relative to
the care-recipient’s own capacities, but also about the kinds of needs we have in mind when we
use ‘caring’ as a descriptor.
Nevertheless, while care ethicists do disagree about the nature of need and the set of needs
to be included, it is also the case that some needs are uncontroversial. “Although ‘need’ has
been the central concept of the ethics of care from the very beginning,” Gheaus writes:
it has so far remained relatively under theorized. Various authors on care have
intuitively used it to refer to most of what we usually call ‘needs’ in common
language, that is biological as well as emotional needs.376
The need for food and shelter have gone unargued in the literature, as have the needs for
mothering, education, and healthcare.377 So from disagreements about the nature of need and
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about difficult cases, and furthermore from Held’s reliance, and the reliance of other care
ethicists, primarily upon paradigmatic examples, it seems reasonable infer that no particular
definition of need is thought to be necessary, but also to infer that there is a set of needs which
all care ethicists recognise as paradigms of care. Thus, whichever account of need virtue
ethicists adopt, it must be one which acknowledges those needs in order for virtue ethics to
possess a concept of care.378
We might wish to place other restrictions on the concept of need. Gheaus seems to do so,
arguing that:
it is not the mere meeting of needs that is valued by the ethics of care, but the fact
that needs are met within the settings of more or less close human relationships (as
opposed, for instance to having the needs met by the natural world, by machines,
or by mass distributors of goods and services).379
That some needs must be met in the context of close human relationships seems intuitive
enough. After all, as Gheaus points out, some needs are for close, intimate human
relationships.380 But this is not to say that all of the needs we meet in caring for one another
must be met in those contexts. Healthcare professionals and good Samaritans are not in close
personal relations with those whose needs they meet much of the time, but we do not hesitate
to describe their actions as caring and indeed nursing is widely regarded as a paradigm of caring.
Nor indeed does Gheaus’ claim that care ethics values the meeting of needs by our near and
dear entail the claim that those needs must be met by our near and dear in order to qualify as
caring. So I shall not adopt Gheaus’ restrictions here.
Treating need as somehow essential to care also raises a second question regarding the
relation of care to need. Some care ethicists define care as a disposition or a motive,381 and that
kind of care would be best described, I think, as a responsiveness to need. Other care ethicists

care and resorting instead to the use of paradigmatic examples like these. Engster does not describe them as such,
but he offers a similar list of what we might take to be paradigmatic cases of care in “Rethinking Care Theory,”
at 55-56. Engster also offers the following list in “Care Ethics and Animal Welfare,” at 522: “feeding the hungry,
providing medication to the sick, teaching a child to walk or talk, sheltering or clothing someone, and helping a
person to regain basic functioning after an accident.”
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I assume this is so because one of the needs that people have is to be part of individualized
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take a more functional tack, and define care either as a mental state aroused by need,382 or as an
activity performed in response to need,383 both of which seem to me to be better classified as
responses to need. Of course, in order to reliably respond well, one will have to be responsive
in the right way, and a carer will likely not be properly responsive if they did not respond or
actively care at least some of the time. But there is still a debate to be had over whether care is
at its heart a response or a responsiveness to need (or both), and what merely falls out of that
definition. That said, in introducing this condition Held presumably does not wish to say that
only care ethicists who accept her take on care, which renders care both a response and a
responsiveness, will qualify as care ethicists. It is much more charitable to read Held as
imposing a rather light substantive requirement on ethics of care – given the lively debates over
conceptions of care, there is no reason as yet to suppose that one account of care is superior to
all others, or that ethics of care must all operate on the same account of care. Held’s
requirement, as I interpret it, can accommodate differing perspectives on the nature of care and
of its relation to need. It does, however, require an ethic to develop and revolve around things
that could plausibly be called ‘care’ and ‘need.’
Plausibility, on my view and the view I take Held to espouse, demands nothing more than
(a) some concept of need(s) that can account for the usual cases cited by care ethicists, and (b)
some concept of response or responsiveness, which (c) includes some story about how, when,
and/or why we ought to respond or be responsive to them (thus making the account normative
as opposed to purely descriptive). This condition is rather thin, and it is not intended to scaffold
a complete picture of care, but by that token is capable of admitting Slote’s or Darwall’s
sentimentalist definitions of care,384 Ruddick’s or Bubeck’s functional definitions of care,385
and any ethic of care which falls in between. Baier’s ethics of trust also qualifies,386 though it
may be more than an ethic of care and Baier is not typically considered a care ethicist, as may
the ethics rooted in sympathy that rose to prominence during the Scottish Enlightenment. I do
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not view this uncertainty as worrisome, however. Borderline cases are not, in my view,
indicative of a defect, because there will always be such cases in a taxonomy of ethical
theories.387 Other ethical theories will pass this particular test too. Singer’s utilitarianism may
not be a particularly attractive ethic for a number of reasons, but it surely cannot be criticised
for ignoring human need and deprivation.388 This is not problematic either, however, since this
element is to be added to the five discussed in Chapter 2 with the aim of better capturing what
an ethic of care is. Utilitarianism can certainly make sense of need, and certainly encourages
response/responsiveness to need, but if any one of the essential features of an ethic of care turns
out to be too permissive, the others can compensate.
If Held and Engster are correct in thinking that care is universally and essentially needsbased, then we appear to have uncovered a conceptual boundary between virtue ethics and
ethics of care. Though relational ontology features prominently in virtue ethics, care of the
specific sort we have been detailing is rarely the subject of sustained analysis, particularly, as
we noted earlier, in the contexts care ethicists usually attend to (nursing, childcare, and other
work traditionally associated with women and people of colour). Held offers a short metaanalysis in support of the same conclusion in The Ethics of Care, reporting that:
Care and caring are […] not mentioned in the indexes of Alasdair MacIntyre’s After
Virtue, or James Wallace’s Virtues and Vices, or the volume called Virtues and
Reasons, devoted to leading virtue theorist Philippa Foot. Care and caring are not
even mentioned in the index of MacIntyre’s more recent book, Dependent Rational
Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, in which he acknowledges the
enormous dependency of human beings on one another.389
Assuming that Held is construing care as I have presented it above, it is clear that Held views
what we have said thus far about need and care as a distinguishing feature of care ethics.
Evidently, what Held offers here is nowhere near an exhaustive list of texts, but it does give us
good reason to look deeper into whether Aristotelians have explored this facet of moral life.
The next two chapters will do this.
At this point, however, it may be useful to distinguish between two questions raised by
these disanalogies. The first of these is whether or not Held’s disanalogy rests upon an accurate
picture of the theories it represents. Her distinction relies upon a particular characterisation of
each theory, and while it branches into normative matters, the questions of whether or not those
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characterisations are fair is a descriptive (as opposed to prescriptive) matter. Yet we could also
ask, in light of this disanalogy, whether virtue ethicists ought to take steps to bridge this
philosophical divide. We might reasonably ask whether or not the features of care ethics or
virtue ethics are to be treated merely as such, or whether they ought to be treated as desiderata
for the other (or indeed any) moral theory. Since we are approaching care ethics from an
Aristotelian perspective, the task would be to look at whether care, as a form of response or
responsiveness to a particular set of needs, ought to be adopted by virtue ethicists. A
prescriptive analysis like this assumes that certain descriptive questions have already been
answered, since ethical theories cannot be brought together if they have not been teased apart.
To prescribe the development of an account of care as response or responsiveness to need is to
assume that such account does not already exist.
It is not my aim, however, to challenge the thought that care ought to be incorporated into
virtue ethics. There are numerous reasons for thinking that it is worthwhile to do so. The first
of these is that need is an inexorable part of human life. Care ethicists are certainly right to
emphasise the moral importance of responsiveness to need in our early years, when we are
infirm, and when we are too old to care for ourselves. If we are dependent on others to meet
basic human needs, our care becomes a moral matter of great import. Care is also, I would
argue, simply intuitively morally important. It is common knowledge that need is one of the
most urgent and uncontroversial considerations in the moral landscape.390 Consequentialists
have always appreciated the moral salience of need, and while the deontology we teach in
introductory ethics courses often seems insensitive to need (an opinion animated perhaps by
deontological approaches to trolley problems and moral lemmas), this is more a caricature of
the theory than an accurate representation of what deontologists argue for. Kant also left ample
room for the promotion and maintenance of rational agency, of which responsiveness to need
is a major part, and philosophers like Korsgaard have done much to advocate a wider concern
for needs not only of our fellow human beings, but also of non-human animals and of the
environment. So I take it to be platitudinous that ethical theories ought to focus on needs.
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4.1. Reasons for Scepticism
There are, however, several reasons to regard Held’s claim that virtue ethics lacks an account
of care with suspicion and to think that this matter warrants further investigation. It is, firstly,
worth noticing just how extraordinary Held’s claim is and how odd it would be were it true.
We have spent Chapters 2 and 3 arguing that care ethicists and virtue ethicists are much more
closely aligned at the meta-ethical level than is usually acknowledged. Like care ethicists,
virtue ethicists have developed an ontology which is relational and focused upon dependency,
and have done much to defend partiality, particularism, and emotion in their moral philosophy.
If it is true that this ontology dates back to virtue ethics’ earliest iterations, then virtue ethicists
have had ample time and reason to construct a concept of care atop these foundations. This
gives us a prima facie reason to think that Held is wrong – if care ethicists are correct in thinking
that relational ontology, partiality, and emotion lead us naturally to conclude that care is a
morally central aspect of human life, then virtue ethicists must have failed catastrophically to
understand their own ethical theory in overlooking care. If Held is right, virtue ethicists will
have spent two and a half millennia ignoring one of the most urgent dimensions of their own
normative ethical theory. Not only this, but if it is also true that care is, as I suggested above,
intuitively morally important, then not only have virtue ethicists missed an area of morality
whose significance they were philosophically primed to recognise, but they have also
collectively lost touch with moral common sense!
Held’s analysis of virtue ethical care also consists simply in searching a few canonical
texts for use of the term “care.” The methodological issues with this strategy are obvious.
Indices are often sparse, covering little more than a few key thinkers, topics, and terms of art.
While they typically give one a feel for a text’s contents, and are often more helpful than
abstracts, they overlook a vast amount of content and are no substitute for a thorough reading.
Nor, for that matter, is Held’s sample representative. Christine Swanton’s Virtue Ethics: A
Pluralistic View, for instance, references care frequently (though Swanton ultimately rejects
care ethics),391 and this appears in the index. Held’s survey does not, therefore, offer a
particularly strong justification for her conclusion. But though methodological concerns seem
capable of toppling Held’s argument, I want to begin this discussion with another, more
pressing concern.
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I take it that one can entertain a concept of care without calling that concept ‘care.’ A
philosopher who spoke solely in terms of engrossment, empathy, love, intimacy, shared
interests, and so forth could be called a care ethicist even if, for whatever reason, they failed to
refer to their definiendum as ‘care.’ Such a case may seem unlikely, perhaps, but the use of
particular descriptors could not plausibly be used to exclude a moral theory from a given
category unless it can be shown that those differing descriptors also expose substantial
philosophical disagreements. Held’s argument assumes the falsity of this thought without
offering any reason to think it incorrect. Held does not argue that care ethicists must use a
particular nomenclature, and it is difficult to see why that ought to be the case. Held does not
argue, furthermore, that virtue ethicists do not address such topics as motherhood and
caregiving, nor does she suggest that those terms fail to appear in their reference lists. But if
Held’s assumption that care must be mentioned specifically in the indices of prominent virtue
ethicists both goes unargued for and is counterintuitive, then it is possible that virtue ethicists
have already developed a concept of care (a) without labelling it as such, (b) without indexing
it, and (c) without it thereby registering in Held’s analysis. The content would be there, but it
would not appear in the index as ‘care,’ and hence would not appear in Held’s survey. So there
are a number of reasons for further enquiry here.

5.

Organisation of Concepts

One might also suggest that each ethical framework organises its moral concepts differently.
In particular, one might think that virtue and care ethics can be distinguished by the general
processes by which some claims are derived from others. One of the more obvious indications
that we are discussing two distinct ethics is the organisation of the subsections in each of the
chapters above. Alternatively, and more specifically, one might think that the theories of right
action defended by or available to each ethic are significantly different. In this section I explore
both of these discrepancies.

5.1. Relations Between Meta-Ethical and Normative Concepts

We might, to begin with, submit that care ethics is unique in its means of deriving its central
normative claims from its meta-ethical ones. Emotions, for example, occupy different roles in
care and virtue ethics. Whereas emotions in care ethics are usually discussed in terms of proper
responsiveness to dependency (and thus derive their significance primarily from that concept),
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emotions in virtue ethics derive their value in large part from the concept of eudaimonia.392
This brings a sort of ‘intrinsic’ value to the forefront in virtue ethics, because one’s own
emotional wellbeing is regarded as, and underscored because it is, part of the good life – an
emphasis which emotions do not typically receive in care ethics. 393 So though care and virtue
ethicists agree that emotions ought not to be neglected by ethicists, the reasons why the
emotions are afforded special place differs according to each ethic’s philosophical
superstructure. The reader will likely have noticed also that particularism is not solely tied to
relation or dependency in virtue ethics. For virtue ethicists, particularism flows from the
virtuous agent’s sensitivity to reasons, not from a need to tailor action to the needs of a
dependent. Of course, needs may well be construed as a kind of reason for action,394 but even
so the set of considerations demanding particularism remains different (we could say that care
ethicists offer a more restricted set of reasons/cases in their defences of particularism). So one
might think that virtue ethics and care ethics could be differentiated by their respective reasons
for endorsing the claims care ethicists see as central to their ethic.
This is another relatively weak distinction – care ethicists need only expand the set of
considerations/cases they typically consider in order to draw closer to virtue ethics’
particularism. And as we have seen, care ethicists have already begun to adopt eudaimonia as
a central moral concept. Those care ethicists who do so are, of course, in a prime position to
adopt virtue ethical arguments for emotion and particularism without generating any obvious
inconsistencies. Philosophers who wish to retain a distinction in light of this might choose
instead to argue, as Groenhout does, that ethicists’ taxonomic methods need revision. In
“Virtue and a Feminist Ethics of Care,” Groenhout argues that the standard taxonomy for
organising moral theories is inadequate, and that it is only because of that inadequate taxonomy
that we think that care ethics and virtue ethics are subspecies of one another, or two identical
theories which have mistakenly been teased apart. Groenhout does not, however, offer much
in the way of guidance there. It is not clear how we ought to classify our ethical theories if we
do not do so either by their central concepts or by the way those concepts are related. So this
too seems an unpromising avenue.

Recall here Noddings’ remarks on engrossment, especially.
See Section 1 of Chapter 3.
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5.2. Theories of Right Action

Another distinction between our two frameworks stems from their respective treatments of right
action. Distinctions between normative ethics premised upon their theories of right action are
not novel – this, after all, is how virtue ethics is often differentiated from utilitarianism and
deontology.395 So we might think that a similar distinction can be drawn between virtue ethics
and ethics of care. Virtue ethics has by now several well-established theories of right action and
moral deliberation. Perhaps the most influential is Hursthouse’s, the first premise of which is:
V1. An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e.
acting in character) do in the circumstances.396
Care ethicists, by contrast, typically do not present a theory of right action as virtue ethicists
have come to do. Most who identify solely as care ethicists (as opposed to philosophers like
Slote and Halwani, who identify as both) by and large eschew formulaic approaches to
right/good action. Recall Noddings’ claim that “care theory is not greatly concerned with moral
credit. It is concerned with the enhancement of human life (especially moral life), and that is
why it recognizes the contribution of the cared-for.”397 Even Collins, who is friendlier towards
moral ‘principles’ than most care ethicists have been and develops a theory of care from which
we can glean moral responsibilities to respond to dependents, distinguishes her project from
those seeking to establish “foundational theories of the right or good (ethics), or the just
(politics), [which] are theories about what makes things right, good, or just, simpliciter and in
all circumstances.”398 Unlike most virtue ethicists, mainstream care ethicists do not regard the
organisation of moral concepts into a theory of right action to be a principal ethical undertaking.
Not only do care and virtue ethics differ, therefore, in that one has several nuanced theories of
right action and the other does not, they also differ in their understandings of what moral
philosophy involves, and what it ought to prioritise, generally. Ethicists of other stripes will
likely see the care ethical stance on right action as objectionable. As the virtue ethical
renaissance has taught us, ethics which are not obviously action-guiding come under pressure
to produce a theory of right action – some way of explaining how we ought to respond to the
world unfolding around us. So though we might distinguish care ethics by its refusal to offer
See, for example, Crisp’s introduction to How Should one Live? ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1996).
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criteria for right action, it is not unreasonable to expect a care ethical theory of right action to
emerge in future.
We need not speculate here about what that theory might entail. Some, like Slote, have
offered something akin to a first premise. In The Ethics of Care and Empathy, Slote argues that
we ought to tie “moral evaluation of actions to caring as a motive/sentiment lying behind such
actions and ‘reaching out’ to and connecting with particular individuals.”399 Slote thus straddles
the boundary between care ethics and virtue ethics. Slote’s account is more often than not the
subject of criticism by care ethicists, however,400 so we cannot take it to be representative of
the general care ethical approach to right action. Yet Slote’s account does approximate the
obvious care ethical account of right action. A care ethical theory of right action is likely to take
as its starting point a theory of care, just as virtue ethical theories of right action begin with a
theory of virtue. So one plausible first premise for a care ethical theory of right action which
parallels the first premises found in consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics might be
the following:
C1. An action is right if and only if it is caring.
Like the first premises of other normative theories, this premise is open to a variety of
interpretations and can be taken in a number of different directions. One of those directions,
and the reason why care ethics and virtue ethics are not necessarily distinct at this point, is that
a “caring” action may simply defined as a virtuous one. It could well be the case, as it is in
Slote’s work, that care is synonymous with a given definition of virtue, in which case there is
at bottom no distinction between the care ethical and virtue ethical accounts of right action.
But it will be obvious from Section 4 that this is not typically the case. Indeed, we might
think that Section 4 supplies us with a second premise for a care ethical theory of right action:
C2. An action is caring if and only if it responds to needs (or some set thereof).
Yet as noted in Section 4, needs are not always regarded as the only items in care’s precinct.
Section 4 lays out minimal conditions for an account of care, but this is not identical to a
complete account of care. Thus, a secondary premise is more likely to look like one of the
following:
C2*. An action is caring if and only if it promotes flourishing for its subject (Lynch).401
C2**. An action is caring if and only if it is in someone’s interests (Collins).402
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Neither of these accounts, however, directly parallel the virtue ethical account of right action.
So though care ethicists have been reluctant to develop a theory of right action, the theories
which seem most likely to emerge appear to be markedly different from virtue ethical ones. A
further point of interest about such care ethical accounts of right action is that they are subject
to criticisms which are unique to ethics of care – criticisms which, I think, reveal further
differences between our two ethics. Take one familiar dilemma, which any account of right
action based upon (C1) will face. The first horn of the dilemma emerges when we consider
what care ethicists take to be the fundamental components of care. As we saw in Chapter 2,
care ethicists like Noddings, Held, and Tronto contend that care is partial, emotional,
particularistic, and relational (that is, these concepts are elements of care, and not simply
commitments to which care ethicists wed themselves – it is one thing to espouse partialism and
entirely another to claim that care is partialistic). These traits have given rise to a dichotomy
which is by now well-explored: the care-justice dichotomy.403 Justice, usually couched in
Kantian terms, is supposed to be impartial, unemotional, and universalistic – the inverse of care.
Yet it is clear that care ethicists do not think that justice ought to be discarded. Many care
ethicists are willing to take into account or to operate alongside considerations of justice, and
to concede that there are some instances (cases of nepotism, for instance) where impartiality
and unemotionality is appropriate.404 Care ethicists who accept this line of argument might
choose to reformulate (C1) to leave room for ethics of justice, positing something like the
following:
C1*. An action is morally right if and only if it is caring or just.
One could also suggest “caring and just,” but this does not leave room for cases involving only
justice or care. By using “caring or just,” I leave open the possibility that some actions concern
care but not justice and vice versa. And this is a popular account. Though many care ethicists
have wavered on this, this view has been defended at one point or another by care ethicists
including Gilligan,405 Held,406 and Ruddick.407 But here we arrive at our first point of
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divergence between virtue ethics and care ethics. Virtue ethics, we have seen, is monadic in its
first principle of right action, as are deontology and consequentialism. Care ethicists who buy
into (C1*) depart from most other normative ethics in their pluralism at this stage. To say that
some actions are not the province of care but can be morally right or wrong nonetheless is to
allow an additional normative concept into the mix. The care ethicist who endorses (C1*)
accepts two moral currencies, care and justice, and thus takes a pluralistic approach to moral
value relatively early on. At least at the intuitive level (and in order for the appended “or just”
above not to be tautological), these two currencies are irreducible to one another. Just actions
cannot be further reduced to caring actions, and vice versa. And this leads to familiar conflict
problems.408 Virtue ethicists, by contrast, do not typically face an analogous worry since they
are usually happy to allow for more indeterminacy at this stage than care ethicists appear to be.
Virtue itself is neither partial nor impartial, emotional or unemotional, particularistic or
universalistic at this broad level,409 since virtue ethicists must leave conceptual space for virtues
as disparate as justice, friendship, respectfulness, and loyalty. Virtue ethicists do not, therefore,
come under pressure to pluralise their first premise. Thus, we come upon another discrepancy
between virtue ethics and care ethics: (V1) and most of the more popular first premises which
aim account for the usual host of virtues trade on a more conceptually indeterminate currency
than (C1) does, and thus avoids conflict problems of the sort (C1*) runs into.410
The second horn of the dilemma has come to light relatively recently. Care ethicists have
grown much more hospitable in recent decades to the idea that care itself can account for justice
and other moral considerations.411 The care-justice dichotomy which once forced care ethicists
to view their ethic as a supplement to ethics of justice has, for many care ethicists, been
dissolved. If these thinkers are correct, then we are not forced into pluralism, but can accept
(C1) and account for justice in the expository work which necessarily follows. Thus, we arrive
at a theory of right action like this:

Interestingly, Kohlberg et al. write, in response to Gilligan’s critiques, that care and justice can both be brought
under the heading of “respect for persons.” See their “The Return of Stage 6: Its Principle and Moral Point of
View,” in The Moral Domain: Essays in the Ongoing Discussion Between Philosophy and the Social Sciences,
ed. T. E. Wren (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990).
409
See discussions of the v-rules in On Virtue Ethics, 36-39, and Intelligent Virtue, 36-40 as well as Aristotle’s
list of prohibited actions in the Nicomachean Ethics (II.6.), and Foot’s condemnation of torture in Natural
Goodness, 49.
410
But runs into others later on.
411
Consider Engster’s The Heart of Justice. Clement notes in Care, Autonomy, and Justice, at 17, that Noddings
takes this position too in later writing. See Noddings’ “The Alleged Parochialism of Caring” (American
Philosophical Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 90, no. 2 (1991)), cf. her “Ethics from the Standpoint of
Women,” in Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Difference, ed. Deborah Rohode (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1990)).
408

107

C1. An action is right if and only if it is caring, and;
C2***. An action is caring if and only if it is just or meets needs or promotes it subjects’
flourishing or…
This approach makes care look much more like the moral theories it is sometimes intended to
supplant, because it limits itself to a single foundational normative concept, and then goes on
to account for morality as whole underneath it. A deontological account will replace “is caring”
in (C1) with something like “obeys the moral rules,” and a utilitarian will do the same, but with
some variant of “maximises aggregate utility,” and both theories will then go on to develop a
premise analogous to (C2***), explaining what it is that they mean by “moral rules” or “utility”
with the aim of providing a comprehensive account of morality. On this account of care ethical
right action, monism about first principles is common ground.
The difficulty which appears here, and the second horn of the dilemma, is that a care
ethical account of right action which moves from (C1) to (C2***) appears inconsistent with the
definition of care defended by care ethicists like Held. Care ethicists, we have said, typically
define care as partial, particular, emotional, and so forth. Yet in moving from (C1) to (C2***),
the care ethicist appears to use care as a placeholder with far greater ambiguity. In this case,
care is not partialistic, particularistic, or emotional, because justice is impartial, particularistic,
and unemotional and justice can be caring. So it seems that the care ethicist cannot use (C1) in
tandem with (C2***) without thereby jettisoning the core features of care as it stands. Chapter
2 has already noted some strategies for resolving this problem, and I do not mean to suggest
that this horn is one on which care ethics gets impaled. As we saw, it is open to the care ethicist
to fall back on pluralism in their first premise, or to attempt to justify impartialism,
universalism, and unemotionality from a partial, particularistic, and emotional concept. A care
ethicist might also choose to redefine care such that it is no longer attached directly to these
concepts, or to deny that one or all of their opposites deserve any place in a normative theory.
The point, however, is that such manoeuvres are not necessary for proponents of other ethics.
Consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, once again, do not face this problem in their
accounts of right action, for the same reason they avoided the first problem: at the level of first
premises, they are silent on issues such as partialism, impartialism, universalism, particularism,
emotion, indifference, and so on. In light of this, care ethics may be distinguished from virtue
ethics by pointing to the different sets of challenges each faces as a result of their different
conceptual superstructures.
Contrasting the virtue ethical and care ethical approaches to right action, then, seems to
highlight a number of differences between the two frameworks. First, as we noted initially,
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many care ethicists reject the project of developing a theory of right action, which virtue
ethicists typically do not do. Care ethicists thus differ from proponents of other ethics in their
understanding of the central tasks of normative ethics. Second, though we have some reason to
suspect that a care ethical theory of right action might be forthcoming, that theory of right action
begins with a moral concept, care, which as we saw in the preceding section, is not thought to
be analogous to virtue (or indeed to any single virtue). Third, because care is usually defined
thickly, the conceptual starting point for a care ethical theory of right action takes a stance on
several meta-ethical issues which are usually not dealt with at this level by other normative
ethics. And because of this, care ethics faces a number of unique problems which other ethics
do not face so early on in their theories of right action. I shall not pursue this particular line of
thought any further, since my aim here is not to lay out a care ethical theory of right action, and
the similarities (or lack thereof) between care and the virtues strike me as a more philosophically
interesting topic. But there do seem to be additional differences between the two normative
frameworks beyond those which I shall be discussing here.

6.

Conclusion

This chapter has traversed a great deal of challenging territory, so it is pertinent to take stock.
We began with the assumption that virtue ethics and care ethics share what care ethicists have
listed as the essential moral commitments of their theory. Following this, we suggested three
factors or considerations which might serve to distinguish care ethics from virtue ethics, and I
offered reasons to either reject or withhold judgment on each of them. We then turned to
consider some differences which seem more defensible. Care, we observed, has been
universally defined as a particular kind of response or responsiveness to a particular set of
needs. We also offered, in brief, reasons to suspect that virtue ethics has no account of care
which satisfies this condition, and we therefore concluded that care ethics and virtue ethics
come apart in that core area. Following this, we examined some broader differences regarding
the methods each ethic uses to organise its concepts into a cohesive moral philosophy. The
difference which I shall concern myself with for the remainder of this thesis was discussed in
Section 4. The chapters to come will ask whether or not virtue ethics has or can supply an
account of care similar to the one developed in Section 4. I do not, therefore, explore Section
5’s argument in further detail except tangentially. But this need not be problematic, since my
aim has not been to mount a decisive argument for identity or non-identity between care and
virtue ethics.
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V
The Virtue of Care
Over the next three chapters I argue, contra Held, that virtue ethics can provide an account of
something approximating care which both is both satisfying and meets Held’s and Engster’s
minimal criteria. I begin in this chapter by exploring some accounts of what I call the ‘virtue
thesis’ about care, according to which care is a virtue. I then develop a taxonomy of the
different ways in which care has been or can be translated into a virtue or virtues. These are:
analogical approaches, which treat care as analogous to some pre-existing virtue; additive
approaches, which translate care into its own standalone virtue; and bundling approaches, some
of which cardinalise care or treat it as equivalent to a bundle of pre-existing or new virtues. In
Sections Four and Five I defend the virtue thesis and the analogical approach as its most
promising variant.

1.

The Virtue Thesis

To construe care as a virtue is the obvious step for virtue ethicists seeking to respond to Held’s
disanalogy without dismissing care’s import. But this strategy admits of several variants. Here,
I consider only one method of doing so, which I call the ‘virtue thesis’ about care. As I
understand it here, the virtue thesis claims just that care is a virtue. There are several things to
note about this formulation, the first is that the virtue thesis excludes the interesting and not
implausible notion that care is virtue.412 That claim warrants its own analysis – here, the claim
is simply that care is one virtue. As it stands, the virtue thesis is also noncommittal about
definitions of its two relata and ambiguous about the nature of their relationship beyond a
general identity claim. This identity claim can be spelled out in a number of ways, and we
ought, in particular, to distinguish between stronger and weaker versions of the virtue thesis.
According to a strong virtue thesis, care is just a virtue. A strong virtue thesis exhausts the set
of conceptual categories into which care falls. Care is a virtue and nothing more. A weak virtue
thesis, by contrast, claims that care is at least in one sense a virtue. A weak virtue thesis is
open-handed about the set of conceptual categories into which care can fall; care is a virtue,
but it can also denote an emotion, a profession, an activity, and so on.
412
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There is no reason at the outset to suppose that care ethicists are hostile to the virtue
thesis per se. The common argument that care and virtue ethics are not equivalent does not
entail any particular stance on the relation between care and the virtues qua moral concepts.
The opponent of the virtue thesis who wishes to bridge the two arguments must hold that care
and virtue ethics are distinct precisely because care is not a virtue in any way in order to rule
out all of its variants, and this particular argument has yet to gain traction in the literature.
Though they tend to oppose the strong virtue thesis, care ethicists seem to be generally open to
something like the weak virtue thesis. Noddings, for instance, deliberately leaves room in her
account for a weaker variant of the virtue thesis. Like most care ethicists, she accepts that:
The virtue sense of caring is still significant. We do, after all, say such things as,
“He is a caring person,” “They are a caring family,” “Nurses are more caring than
doctors.” When we understand the relational sense, however, the virtue sense takes
on new meaning.413
On this point there is some consensus. Held too has done much to distinguish care from virtue
ethics, but she also accepts that “to be caring is no doubt a virtue, [though] the ethics of care is
not simply a kind of virtue ethics,”414 and here Noddings and Held represent a number of
prominent care ethicists.415 Many of care ethics’ most renowned proponents see no
inconsistency in distinguishing care ethics from virtue ethics whilst simultaneously endorsing
the weak virtue thesis.416
We ought perhaps to briefly note that the virtue thesis is one for which several arguments
are already in circulation. In the passage above, Noddings argues that the virtue thesis simply
enshrines moral common sense. To be caring is intuitively to possess a particular kind of
character; to respond but also to be responsive. Thinking of care as a virtue or collection of
virtues also offers a convenient scaffold for an expanded definition of care. A virtue on the
standard Aristotelian account is a deeply entrenched disposition to act, think, and feel in certain
(excellent) ways for certain (excellent) reasons, and this definition provides a useful program
for those who set out to formulate care as a virtue and some springboards for excursions into
the philosophy of emotion, moral epistemology, political theory, and other adjacent
philosophical topics. An ethic of care will also, as we in Chapter 4, likely have to offer actionguidance, and conceiving of care as a virtue grants the virtue-cum-care ethicist access to virtue
413
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ethical theories of action-guidance, including doctrines of the mean, which have proven helpful
in the field of applied ethics not because they algorithmically deliver action-guidance (which
the care ethicist is not in search of anyway) but because they identify a number of areas in which
it is possible to do better or worse. So proponents of the virtue thesis have access to a continually
expanding agenda with which to develop their theory of right action. Furthermore, extolling
care by framing it as a virtue confers the status and centrality of virtue upon care. It emphasises
the vital role that care plays in our lives, and it sets care up as a focal point for moral enquiry
and a standard for moral evaluation. Care ethicists have argued at length that care ought to take
a more central position in normative ethics, and framing it as a virtue grants it that status.
This approach also resists the implication that one culture or society is better attuned to
what care involves or requires. There has, in recent feminist work, been a great deal of
opposition towards the marginalisation of underprivileged/feminine/non-heterosexual
outlooks, and the outlooks of people of colour, in academic philosophy.417 Generally, this
opposition has insisted not only that members of these groups are as deserving of a platform as
any other philosophers, but also that the ‘common morality’ of particular (Western) societies
is not morally superior to that of other (non-Western) societies.418 Virtue ethicists have not
been blind to intersectionality. They can and have allowed for the virtues to be contextually
sensitive, such that virtues in one person, society, or culture can look radically different to
virtues in another without entailing that one or the other is mistaken. 419 Virtue ethicists have
accommodated the claim that respect, for example, may manifest in divergent (perhaps even
conflicting) ways, and if care is to be a virtue or reducible to virtues we can expect similar
contextual sensitivity. So this approach to care seems capable, at least at first gloss, of keeping
pace with several major discursive trends in feminist ethics. Thus, I take it that there are several
good reasons to endorse at least a weak virtue thesis. But a number of questions now arise.
How should we cash out the claim that care is a virtue? What relation, if any, does this establish
between care and the other virtues? Does care add anything of value to virtue theory, and if so,
I have found Brittney Cooper’s “Intersectionality,” in The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory, eds. Lisa
Disch and Mary Hawkesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016) particularly informative on this. See
also Kimberlé Crenshaw’s “Mapping the Margins,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (1991), a classic piece on the
subject.
418
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what? Sections 2-4 go some way towards answering these questions by way of an analysis of
three different approaches to the virtue thesis.

1.1. Virtue and Responsiveness

Responses and dispositions are clearly conceptually linked, and one might think that in treating
care as responsiveness, we also treat care as a kind of disposition. This seems, initially, to be a
reasonable point – it is difficult to see how this could mean anything other than that a caring
person is disposed to (that is, will reliably) behave in certain ways. Somebody who is
responsive to need sees need as a reason for action, and can, ceteris paribus, be counted upon
to respond in some way. But the virtue thesis entails a relatively thick notion of responsiveness.
An interlocutor might observe that responsiveness does not necessarily reveal all that much
about what sort of person one is. Consider, for example, a responsive nurse, who tends to her
patients dutifully, but for no other reason than that it is her job and she would prefer not to lose
it. She takes no interest in her patients as people, her eyes glaze over when she is tending to
them, and she spares no thought for them when their condition deteriorates or when they pass
away.420 It makes sense to speak of such a person as responsive, since we can infer from her
past behaviours that she can be counted upon to respond to patients’ needs (indeed, she
responds well because she wants to keep her job), but this tells us almost nothing about the
reasons on which she acts. We could not, for example, claim with any certainty that she would
respond to someone she found unconscious on the street, or indeed that she would respond
when she encounters needs in any other area of her life. We might say, then, that she acts as
the virtuous person acts without acting virtuously. We know that she is responsive in this
particular area, but from this we learn nothing important about her as a person. Contrast this
with someone who we know to be compassionate. A compassionate agent is responsive to the
suffering of others, but in noticing that someone is compassionate, we notice something about
her reasons for action spanning all sorts of situations. She will tend lovingly to a wounded knee,
refuse to stand by as someone is bullied, and so forth, and we can infer this because we have
some insight into her values and how she thinks. The juxtaposition of these two cases highlights
just how thick the notion of responsiveness entailed by the virtue thesis will be.

420
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We might think, however, that in excluding cases such as the apathetic nurse’s, the virtue
thesis fails to present an account of care as it is defined by ethics of care. But at least two
responses will be immediately apparent, both of which involve revising the set of paradigmatic
cases of care. One option is to expand our account of need to show that our nurse is not
genuinely caring or not caring as she should. One might argue that a nurse who simply goes
through the motions, doing only so much as necessary to keep her job, fails to attend to the
some of the most pressing needs of her patients. Patients also have mental and emotional needs,
needs to interact and be treated as individuals of value, needs for support and comfort, and so
forth. And one could argue that a nurse who mirthlessly does her job, concerned only for her
earnings that day, is not responsive to those needs whatsoever. Moreover, we can see how one
who is responsive to those sorts of needs will be more likely to possess or develop a certain
character. But this is still insufficient, because we are not searching for actions which correlate
with certain traits, or even for actions which foster them. We are looking, rather, for actions
which originate with certain character traits. In order to qualify as a character trait, we must
conceive of care as something more than a motivationally neutral tendency to meet others’
needs, whatever those needs may be.
Another option is to distinguish between different kinds of responsiveness. An apathetic
nurse demonstrates one kind of responsiveness, but not others, and we could argue that the
virtue thesis entails a concept of responsiveness which acknowledges the sort of responsiveness
above, but requires others in addition (and thus seems better able to explain condition (c) from
Section IV.4., which requires the account to be normative). A more robust view of
responsiveness could include specific motivational structures, values, and the like. That view
of responsiveness will, of course, exclude the case above, but it will not abandon nursing as a
paradigm of care. Nor indeed does it preclude us from admitting that our apathetic nurse is
rightly responsive in at least one way. A nurse who is responsive in this more elaborate sense
shares the apathetic nurse’s disposition to meet needs, but the reasons undergirding her
responsiveness differ; she possesses distinctive understandings of and attitudes towards need.
The virtue ethical account of responsiveness need not, therefore, dismiss such cases wholehog. Rather, it seems to offer a commonsensical explanation of our moral judgments regarding
such cases of responsiveness – they do not fall short in every respect, but they do not represent
ideal responsiveness to need. A virtue ethical account of responsiveness may therefore be more
stringent than some care ethical accounts, but that does not prevent it from acknowledging
specific elements of such cases as excellent.
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2. Analogical Approaches
One way of framing care as a virtue is to equate it with one which is already established. Care’s
precinct overlaps with those of several other virtues to such an extent that they represent
potential analogues. Love of some sort will be amongst the strongest candidates for such a tack,
since care ethicists have modelled much of their moral advice on maternal or parental love. 421
Admittedly, love is regarded most often not as a character trait but as a type or a trait of
relationships, and is normally associated not with virtue but rather with emotions, desires,
attitudes, and other mental events or states. Yet there are other sorts of love for the analogist to
appeal to. Contemporary philosophers of love have sometimes attempted to articulate love as a
disposition or virtue, arguing primarily that love of the sorts we find in our closest personal
relationships is akin to virtue in that it is not (always) occurrent, is deep-seated and enduring,
is in some sense a part of one’s identity, and is compatible with occasional bouts of apathy and
even antipathy.422 But we must be more specific about love if we are to present a plausible case.
Eros, one sort of love, has frequently been reduced to “love of desire,”423 a “bittersweet, sly,
uncontrollable creature”424 – one which is far too base and egocentric in some philosophers’
view to be characteristic of a virtuous agent. Robert Solomon in particular has done much to
rehabilitate eros, broadening it to include a great deal of what personal relationships consist
in.425 But even if we follow suit and broaden eros into a more general type of romantic love,
we can account at best for only a handful of the central cases of care. Nurses do not demonstrate
erotic love for their patients, nor do parents manifest erotic love in caring for their children. So
it seems that we ought to shelve even more permissive definitions of eros.
Eros is not, however, the only sort of love we might appeal to. Philia, amicitia, agape,
or even caritas may seem better suited to the task than eros, so it may be preferable to translate
care as friendship or charity. Our contemporary moral lexicon restricts these virtues to smaller
spheres, but amongst virtue theorists they still govern vast swathes of moral life – enough,
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perhaps, to be synonymous with care. Care ethicists have already anticipated and explicitly
rejected some of these analogies, though. In The Ethics of Care, Held dismisses analogies with
charity:
Some people suggest that caring is close to the Christian virtue of caritas, but
caritas is equivalent to charity. Care, however, is not the same as charity – when
we take care of our children we are not being charitable – and being caring is not
the same as being charitable. Valuing care is entirely independent of any religious
foundation, and is the stronger for this, since those not sharing a given religious
tradition have few reasons to attend to arguments that appeal to that tradition.
Understanding the value of care can be based on a universal experience of having
been cared for and being able to engage in caring.426
But Held’s argument against charity is not sufficient to rule out charity in toto. To begin with,
theism is not necessary for charity; virtue theorists can and have defended non-theistic versions
thereof.427 And though Held’s other quarrel with charity in the passage above does not stand or
fall with theism, it does not undermine a premise common to all accounts of charity. Held is
right to suggest that even if we disentangle charity from its theological context and define it as
a dispositional sort of universal goodwill/benevolence, the resulting picture of charity is
incapable of encapsulating care in its entirety. We cannot characterise the relationship between
a loving parent and a child as a generalizable love, a universal goodwill, or a manifestation of
some broader regard for humanity.428 And since caring for one’s own children is paradigmatic
of care, charity does not by itself seem to yield an adequate account of care. But virtue theorists
seem to have something rather different in mind when they address charity. Foot, for instance,
defines charity as a virtue which “attaches us to the good of others,”429 and this is perfectly
consistent with pluralism about the kinds of attachment one can have, and about their relative
weights. So Held’s attack on charity successfully topples only one sort – the others remain
potentially viable analogues for care.
Indeed, something akin to neo-Aristotelian charity (often used synonymously with
benevolence)430 seems, in my view, to satisfy all of the minimal requirements laid out by Held
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and Engster for an account of care. Recall that Held’s minimal conditions for a theory of care
require, firstly, a response or responsiveness to a particular set of needs. Charity, at least on
Foot’s account, is responsive to a wide array of needs.431 Most famously, perhaps, charity is on
Foot’s account responsive to the sorts of good in human life which pertain to debates over the
permissibility of euthanasia.432 But charity’s scope is much broader than this. Euthanasia is, of
course, just one dimension of the relation between medical practitioners and their patients, and
there is no good reason to think that charity does not govern other dimensions thereof too. Foot
also considers parental relations in “Euthanasia,” so it is reasonable to suppose also that her
charity governs some aspects of those relations too. Charity governs our relations with those
less fortunate as well. “If charity is a virtue,” she writes, “this is because it makes its possessor's
action good in the area of aims such as the relief of poverty.”433 “Charity,” she goes on to
explain:
is a prime candidate as a virtue, because love and other forms of kindness are needed
by every one of us when misfortune strikes, and may be a sign of strength rather
than weakness in those who are sorry for us.434
So charity, on Foot’s account, also seems to cover Samaritanism. Charity thus governs a diverse
array of needs in Foot’s work, including not only the sorts of needs faced by the impoverished
and the unlucky, but also needs for such things as honesty.435 And Foot ties charity to general
needs explicitly in Virtues and Vices, writing that:
a lack of charity and of justice can be shown where a man is denied something
which he both needs and has a right to: both charity and justice demand that widows
and orphans are not defrauded, and the man who cheats them is neither charitable
nor just.436
So Foot’s account of charity seems to satisfy not only the requirement that an account of care
lean on a theory of needs which admits all those paradigmatic needs discussed by care ethicists,
but also the requirement that they involve an account of responsiveness to those needs. Foot

431

Kraut offers a much more minimal concept of charity in What is Good and Why?, but his intent is (like ours
was in Chapter 4) to lay out minimal criteria for an account of charity, so I do not think his view is opposed to
Foot’s.
432
Laid out, of course, in “Euthanasia.”
433
Natural Goodness, 106.
434
Ibid.
435
In “Euthanasia,” at 97, she writes that “charity may demand that someone be aided, but also that an unkind
word not be spoken.”
436
Ibid. She also links charity to first aid in “Virtues and Vices,” at 4:
Charity requires that we take care to find out how to render assistance where we are likely to be
called on to do so, and thus, for example, it is contrary to charity to fail to find out about elementary
first aid.

117

also parallels many care ethicists in drawing on the language of sympathy to explain how
charity operates. Foot tells us that charity and justice both “correspond not to any particular
desire or tendency that has to be kept in check but rather to a deficiency of motivation; and it is
this that they must make good,”437 and in the case of charity, a “sympathy for others which
makes it easier to help them is part of the virtue itself.”438 Charity is, of course, also a normative
concept rather than a purely descriptive one – on Foot’s account it is a good trait of character,
not simply a non-moral disposition like tidiness; Foot writes that “by the criteria of natural
normativity charity is a prime candidate as a virtue, because love and other forms of kindness
are needed by every one of us when misfortune strikes.”439 So it seems that Footean charity
satisfies all of the minimal criteria for an account of care laid out in Section IV.4.
What’s more, even if we grant that charity and care are not analogous, it does not follow
that care has not appeared at all in normative ethics in the form of a virtue. Indeed, a
comprehensive study of Thomistic caritas will find it rooted in Aristotle’s philia, another
promising candidate for an analogue of care. Aristotle’s tripartite theory of friendship is
nuanced enough to encompass both relations with our near and dear and relations with our
compatriots, and is also, at points, reminiscent of analyses of care. Identifying certain marks of
friendship, Aristotle writes that:
some people define a friend as someone who wishes and does what is good, or what
appears to be good, for the sake of his friend; or someone who wishes his friend to
be and to live for his own sake – this is the attitude of mothers towards their
children, or of friends who have come into conflict. Others define a friend as
someone who spends time with another and chooses the same things as he does; or
someone who shares in the sorrows and joys of his friend - and this quality too is
found in mothers in particular. It is by one or other of these characteristics that
friendship is defined as well.440
Here and elsewhere, Aristotle picks up on several major themes in care ethics.441 He accounts
for relations between mothers and children, and between friends (in the colloquial sense), two
relations which take centre stage in ethics of care. He also conceives of a friend as ‘another self’
(allos autos), thereby rejecting hard self-other distinctions on which atomistic accounts of
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human nature rely. Aristotle also emphasises the import of interaction and/or cohabitation with
philoi, a feature many care ethicists will find attractive, and Book VIII of the Nicomachean
Ethics explicitly allows for philia between members of a political community, so Aristotelian
philia is (debatably)442 broad enough in scope to cover occupational and institutional cases of
care.
This bodes well for philosophers who wish to construe care as an analogue of some
established virtue, and indeed commentators have already noted some of these resemblances
and used them to mount analogies between care and philia. Curzer, for instance, has argued that
Aristotle’s philia amounts to an account of care. In “Aristotle: Founder of the Ethics of Care,”
he writes that:
Aristotle cannot be an ethics of care advocate without a concept of care, but
Aristotle does have a concept of care. Although the Greek terms philēsis and its
infinitive version to philein are typically translated as “love,” or “friendly feeling,”
or “friendly affection” by Aristotle’s translators, Aristotle uses philēsis and to
philein to mean approximately what advocates of the ethics of care mean by
“caring” and “care.”443
Curzer’s concept of care is, moreover, one of need-responsiveness.444 So his claim is, in part,
that philia involves attending to needs just as care does, and, more strongly, that friendship
covers all of the paradigmatic cases of care identified by care ethicists. Curzer is certainly right
to think that philia can cover many instances of care, but I shall argue that philia is incapable
of accounting for all of them, and therefore cannot serve as an analogue for the concept.
There seem to be several difficulties with the use of Aristotle’s philia as an analogue for
care. The first reason to think that Aristotle’s friendship is inadequate is that it requires
reciprocity. As Aristotle puts it, friends must “have goodwill to each other, wish good things to
each other […] and not be unaware of it.”445 This may not seem problematic at first gloss, since
Noddings also requires some contribution on the part of both parties in order to ‘complete’ the
caring relation.446 But reciprocity is a more demanding condition than completion, and we can
imagine cases where agents care or are cared for without anything like this sort of mutuality.
Medical professionals in emergency wards and aged care facilities are often confronted with
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hostile, aggressive, or despondent patients who bear them no goodwill whatsoever, as are
parents caring for moody teenagers. But one can perhaps circumvent counterexamples like this
by suggesting that such patients (and teenagers?) do not actually wish their caregivers ill.
Aristotle cannot have been ignorant of occasional disagreements and even moments of
antipathy between friends, and it would be uncharitable to assume that he means to suggest that
friends are constantly in an occurrent state of mutual well-wishing. Aristotle means to say only
that friends are disposed to feel goodwill towards one another, and this is perfectly consistent
with flares of hostility felt by patients, though it may of course fail to characterise the most
extreme and enduring cases of dislike.
Yet Aristotelian philia will struggle to make sense of other central cases of care. I have
in mind here four objects of care, namely infants, vegetative or unconscious persons, nonhuman animals, and the environment. The first of these is a paradigmatic case of care and is
therefore the most worrisome, but the latter three count against Aristotle’s friendship for the
same reasons: (a) strictly speaking, it is unclear that they can bear their caregivers any goodwill
or wish good things upon them, and (b) even if they did, it is difficult to see how we might be
justified in the belief that they do. A baby’s gurgling and a cat’s purring, delightful though they
are, are no indication of any particular mental state or event beyond pleasure, let alone goodwill
or affectionate well-wishing. And unconscious strangers and vegetative persons are similarly
unwieldy for Aristotle’s account. In some cases, it is not even clear that they know their
caregivers exist, but even if they do, there is no obvious way to reliably tell that they wish their
caregivers well (or that they themselves know that they are recipients of goodwill). Such cases
are especially problematic where caregivers are complete strangers, but even in cases where
comatose or vegetative persons are cared for by their loved ones it is unclear that they can
possess the sorts of mental states necessary to qualify for Aristotelian friendship. The
environment, of course, cannot bear anybody goodwill, except in a metaphorical sense. Insofar
as Aristotle’s reciprocity condition excludes care for infants, then, it cannot account for all of
the central cases of care identified by care ethicists, but excluding care for unconscious
strangers, vegetative persons, non-human animals, and the environment ought to cast serious
doubt on such claims too.447
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Love, charity, and friendship are the obvious choices for an argument that care has already
appeared in the Aristotelian tradition the form of a pre-existing virtue. I have not presented a
full defence of any virtue’s adequacy or inadequacy, but I hope to have offered some persuasive
reasons to believe that care ethical arguments against the analogical approach do not rule out
all possible analogues for care – or at least for the minimal account of care Held and Engster
see as the core of more expansive accounts. This is not, however the only means of
incorporating care into virtue ethics, and I want now to examine another.

3. Supplementalist Approaches

Adopting an alternative strategy, some have argued that care is a novel virtue with its own
distinctive set of excellences, skills, capacities, and so forth. McLaren addresses the relationship
between care and virtue ethics in her “Feminist Ethics: Care as a Virtue,” concluding that care
ought to be “fostered as a feminist virtue”448 alongside virtues like compassion and empathy.
Care is, on her view, incapable of standing as an independently viable normative theory,
because its association with women perpetuates stereotypes about women and femininity,
because of its apparent inability to provide meaningful advice beyond the private realm (due to
its particularism), and because it is so often binarized and juxtaposed with justice – unhelpful
commonplaces, in McLaren’s eyes.449 McLaren’s preferred approach is Aristotelian, and in
defending the integration of care and virtue ethics, she recounts what she takes to be the features
of Aristotelian virtue ethics that render it hospitable to care as a moral virtue. Care ethics and
virtue ethics, she tells us, share a relational ontology, a sensitivity to particulars, and
appreciation of the moral salience of social and political context, and she takes these
commonalities to indicate that virtue theory can accommodate care. As McLaren sees it, care
ethics ought to be treated as a subspecies of virtue ethics rather than an independent and
comprehensive moral theory in its own right because virtue ethics is capable of accounting for
care and avoids the pitfalls of standalone ethics of care. The most natural way to merge the two
is to treat care as a virtue.
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Halwani, defending this take, defines care not only as an Aristotelian virtue,450 but as one
which is “primary,”451 and though he relies on an indistinct account of care it is clear that he
believes care is a virtue with no existing analogue. On Halwani’s view care is, like the other
virtues, a character trait regulated by phronesis and necessary for human flourishing.
Marshalling his evidence, he argues that:
it is no violation of our understanding of caring to think of it as a deep trait of a
person; or as enduring (a caring person is one who is liable to stay a caring one,
everything else being equal); or as acquired: while we might have the capacity to
care, caring properly is a trait acquired by training and good upbringing. Caring is
also an excellence because, simply, it is a good trait to have.452
Halwani justifies this last claim along eudaimonist lines, writing that it is “an obvious point to
make that without proper care human beings cannot generally grow up to lead mentally and
emotionally healthy lives,”453 and that “if intimate relationships are essentially characterized by
caring, and flourishing is constituted by intimate relationships […] then the necessity of caring
to a flourishing life stares us obviously in the face.”454 On Halwani’s account, then, care satisfies
virtue’s areteic standard because of its necessity for proper human development, and because it
is partly constitutive of intimate relationships, which are themselves necessary for human
flourishing.
Putman, too, argues that care is a virtue, citing three reasons for thinking so. The first of
these is that it “increases the possibility of forming and maintaining a community.” 455 On
Putman’s view, caring is a virtue which promotes cohesion in society, and serves to draw out
the best in each person qua a member of various social units.456 Care is thus a virtue for all, but
especially for teachers and those whose job it is to mould others into productive and caring
members of society or to return them to that state. The second reason why care is a virtue for
Putman is that it motivates caring agents to use their intellectual resources to act well. 457 Care
thus plays a similar role to the virtues of character in Aristotle’s system, in that it establishes
certain ends as good or desirable and prompts the intellectual/calculative virtues to deliberate
about particular sorts of action in particular contexts. In doing so, caring also “opens up avenues
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for new experiences and development by the agent herself.”458 A third reason offered by Putman
to treat caring as a virtue is that it allows us to achieve MacIntyrean internal goods.459 Appealing
to Noddings’ discussions of engrossment, Putman argues that the virtue of caring allows one to
be “completely present to the practice, whether it be a conversation or an athletic event.” 460
This ‘engrossment’ is, on his view, essential if we are to appreciate the goods internal to caring
relations and practices. Putman’s caring is, in part because it leans so heavily on Noddings’
ethics, less focused on needs than it is on such things as generosity and forgiving, and his
argument is therefore a defence of a particular, thick understanding of care as a virtue, but
Putman’s reasoning can be applied mutatis mutandis to thinner conceptions of care as
responsiveness to need. Putman is unclear about what exactly it means to be “present to” the
object/relation of care, but MacIntyre sorts internal goods into two categories, both of which
could yield plausible interpretations here. MacIntyre separates the excellence of a practice’s
products/performance from “the good of a certain kind of life.”461 Care may be a virtue in that
it enables one to excel at meeting needs, either by bringing about some good in the carerecipient or manifesting some good in the caregiver. The life of a carer may also be a good life.
Certainly there are elements which are dirty, unglamorous, and unpleasant, but philosophers
like Kittay and Ruddick have shown just how much value there is to be found in a life of care.
So there are several ways in which care may generate MacIntyrean internal goods.

4. Bundling Approaches

Both of the approaches above treat care as a unitary virtue, albeit one which serves a diverse
array of functions ranging from the detachment of care from a normative theory ill-suited to
feminist aims, to the explanation of how political communities are maintained. But why think
that care, whose ambit is regularly supposed to be broad enough to ground a comprehensive
moral theory, is best translated into a single virtue? It is perhaps a little odd, after all, to think
that every single instance of care will map onto one disposition or excellence only, since needs
are so diverse and admit of so many variables. Yet we can also distinguish approaches which
treat care as a bundle of virtues. There are variants of this approach which do not assume a
virtue thesis about care – it may be possible to conceive of care as something other than a virtue
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whilst still treating it as a bundle thereof. And this is, in fact, an approach which care ethicists
have shown some sympathy for. Engster, for instance, identifies attentiveness, responsiveness,
and respect as central “virtues of caring.” The virtues of caring are, in his words:
those qualities necessary for meeting the aims of caring. They are constitutive of
caring in the sense that one cannot successfully achieve the aims of caring without
them, or at least do so with any regularity.462
Yet Engster’s definition of care is functionalist; he defines care as an activity or practice,463 but
one which cannot be performed successfully in the absence of certain traits. The aims of care,
in turn, are “to help individuals to meet their basic needs, develop or maintain their basic
capabilities, and live as much as possible free from suffering,”464 and these supply the criteria
for successful care and are therefore the aims which necessitate virtue in caring agents. The
first virtue, attentiveness, is necessary because successful caring requires us to notice, and
partly consists in our noticing, when our charges are in need, and to respond appropriately in a
way that satiates the need. Responsiveness also serves a major corrective function, in that carers
may be otherwise prone to ignoring crucial information and feedback supplied by the caredfor, and respect relates to the recognition of the cared-for as an agent “worthy of attention and
responsiveness”465 and “capable of understanding and expressing their needs.”466 This bundle
of virtues is thus a necessary condition for, and is partly constitutive of, good care, but care is
not thereby a virtue. Engster is not alone in taking this approach. Ruddick spends much of
Maternal Thinking exploring the virtues of motherhood, including humility, cheerfulness, and
forgiveness.467 Like Engster, Ruddick seems reluctant to conceive of care as a virtue, but she
is open to the inclusion of virtues underneath care.
Not all bundling approaches reject the virtue thesis, however – some do treat care as a
virtue. This particular kind of bundling approach I call the ‘cardinalising approach.’ Section
4.1. expounds upon this alternative to the analogical and supplementalist approaches, and
Section 4.2. briefly explains how cardinalising approaches to care can be used to hybridise the
two alternative approaches.
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4.1. Cardinalising Care

A cardinalising approach to the virtue thesis assumes that the virtues can be nested within or
subordinated to one another in some way. This assumption opens up conceptual space for
notions of care as a cardinal virtue under which other virtues may be ordered, precedent for
which appears in several strands of virtue theory.468 One of these is Platonic. Plato is wellknown for his conception of justice (dikaiosunē) as a cardinal virtue consisting in the proper
functioning of the disparate parts of the soul (psuchē) – temperance, courage, and wisdom are,
on the Platonic account, components of the virtue of justice because justice consists partially in
the oversight of these parts by reason.469 The Stoics are also well-known for treating justice,
wisdom, courage, and temperance as cardinal virtues.470 To introduce a notion of cardinality to
the virtues is, to be sure, a major step away from Aristotle’s ethics, since Aristotle does not
employ a concept of cardinality, but cardinality does resurface in Thomistic virtue ethics. Like
Plato’s, Aquinas’ set of cardinal virtues includes prudence, justice, courage, and temperance.
His bases for classifying them as such are also similar to Plato’s: they represent excellences
over particular spheres of human life, and encompass smaller virtues which preside over more
specific areas.471 Aquinas’ misericordia, for instance, is subsumed under the heading of caritas,
because caritas consists in a broader love of others, and thus contains a sensitivity to their
suffering.472 There are thus a number of virtues spanning several strands of virtue theory to
which care might bear structural similarity. We need not attempt to shoehorn care into the place
of one of these. The point here is simply that virtues can be said, very generally, to contain or
govern one another, and we can imagine a care ethicist borrowing from a number of figures in
the tradition in order to generate an account of care like this, which retains its status as a virtue
in its own right but also conceives of care as a bundle of other virtues.
Cardinalising approaches to care are not unpopular amongst care ethicists either.
Groenhout seems to favour one version of this view. Care ethics, she tells us, “centers on what
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sorts of people we must be in order to care properly for one another,”473 which is just to say that
character traits are its primary moral currency, and when reflecting upon care ethics’ roots in
maternal experience, she writes that “a consideration of mothering practices [can] offer
guidance in thinking about what sort of person I ought to be.”474 For this reason, Groenhout
prefers “to say that Care resembles virtue, rather than is a variant of virtue theory.”475 She tells
us unambiguously that there are “central moral character virtues that make up Caring,”476 and
she lists altruism, empathy, and sociality as three of these. These are not, to be sure, the only
character traits relevant to an assessment of caring agents in her view, but Groenhout sets most
others aside because care ethics shares them with other moral theories. 477 Groenhout views
these three virtues as unique to care ethics, and premises her distinction between virtue ethics
and care ethics not on differing foundational concepts, but on differing sets of virtues. By these
lights, Groenhout appears to be committed to cardinalising care.478
Groenhout is arguably not an outlier in taking this position. While Tronto explicitly
rejects the strong virtue thesis,479 she has no quarrel with weak ones,480 and her discussions of
attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness in Moral Boundaries can be
plausibly read as accounts of different virtues. She refers to these as “the four ethical elements
of care,” to be distinguished from “the four elements of care,” which are:
caring about, noticing the need to care in the first place; taking care of, assuming
responsibility for care; care-giving, the actual work of care that needs to be done;
and care-receiving, the response of that which is cared for to the care.481
It quickly becomes apparent in the passages that follow that the four ethical elements of care
are dispositional excellences with respect to the four elements of care.482 Tronto even goes so
far as to juxtapose the ethical elements of care with what seem to be vices – attentiveness, for
example, is opposed to ignorance. Groenhout and Tronto are not the only major care ethicists
to take a cardinalising approach to the virtue thesis either. Noddings also treats certain virtues
473
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as integral components of (good) care, arguing that a set of virtues is both necessary and
sufficient for what she calls “caring-as-virtue.”483 So there is some support amongst those who
endorse a virtue thesis for the thought that care amounts to a virtue which oversees the operation
of other, more localised virtues.

4.2. Hybrids

Cardinalising care is not necessarily a departure from the other two approaches we have
discussed. If one believes that some existing cardinal virtue is analogous to care, then one could
argue that there is nothing new to be added to the list of virtues, since all of care’s normative
content already exists in virtue theory. Similarly, one could argue for care as a cardinal virtue
using a supplementalist approach alone. Such an account would argue that new virtues ought
to be added to the list, and that those new virtues are governed by the virtue of care, itself a
novel cardinal virtue. The cardinalising approach to care could thus instantiate rather than
challenge the other two approaches surveyed here.
Cardinalising approaches can also be used to hybridise the analogical and supplemental
approaches. A hybrid of these two approaches will claim that some care-related virtues have
already appeared in virtue theory, but that new virtues must still be recognised. This can take
one of two forms, depending on whether one wishes to cardinalise care or to order care
underneath a cardinal virtue. Either we maintain that some existing cardinal virtue equates to
care, but that this virtue contains at least one hitherto unrecognised virtue, or we maintain that
care is contained by an existing cardinal virtue but is itself a new virtue. In the latter case, no
analogue for care exists, but at least some of care’s normative content has already been
accounted for under the precinct of an existing virtue.484 Given her acknowledgement of
significant overlaps between care and virtue ethics and her claim that altruism, empathy, and
sociality distinguish care ethics from virtue ethics, it seems fair to suppose that Groenhout
endorses a hybrid of the two accounts. And indeed this is an unsurprising position for care
ethicists to take, given their apparent preference for bundling and the varying degrees of traffic
seen by the virtues they typically list. Attentiveness, responsiveness, empathy, sociality, and
other virtues in that vein are repeatedly cited by care ethicists as virtues partially constitutive
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of care,485 but are not usually referred to as virtues in (Aristotelian) virtue theory. Other virtues,
such as compassion, humility, courage, and honesty, are also commonly acknowledged
elements of care, but are fixtures in the literature. So hybrids of the analogical and supplemental
approaches look to be leading contenders amongst the various kinds of virtue thesis.

5.

In Defence of the Virtue Thesis

In this section I raise and respond to three foreseeable objections to the virtue thesis. I begin
with the thought that virtue as a conceptual category is insufficiently sensitive to gender, and is
therefore ill-suited to care’s feminist aims. I then raise two apparent inconsistencies between
the care ethical claim that care is natural and the standard Aristotelian picture of virtue. On the
one hand, care’s naturality appears inconsistent with the claim that virtue is habituated, and on
the other it appears inconsistent with concepts of virtue as a corrective. Care also seems like the
sort of thing one can get wrong, and if this is the case then care cannot be a virtue. I argue that
none of these problems pan out, and this provides a solid foundation for an evaluation of the
competing approaches laid out in Sections 2, 3, and 4.
One reason to reject the virtue thesis is Sander-Staudt’s. Attacking Halwani’s and
McLaren’s Aristotelianism, she maintains that interpreting care as a virtue is antithetical to
certain feminist ends because “gender neutral definitions of virtue […] prevent them from
highlighting the gender sensitive distinction between care as a motive and care as an end.”486
According to Sander-Staudt, male or masculine virtue is typically associated with caring
motivations (“caring about”) whereas female or feminine virtue is more often associated with
caring practices (“caring for”). In defining virtue as a matter of both motivation and practice,
she argues, the virtue thesis blurs a moral distinction which tracks gender and, for that reason,
presents an account at odds with feminist aims. But it is unclear why this is the case, primarily
because Sander-Staudt gives us no reason to suppose that virtue and care theorists are
committed to this picture of care as a virtue. Sander-Staudt assumes a monolithic virtue of care
which, in its generality, cannot be tailored to gender-sensitive defects. Her ‘caring about’ and
‘caring for’ are supposed to delimit areas where we can, and qua members of a gender are more
inclined to, fail to care as we ought. Yet Sander-Staudt is not prescribing one sort of care for
485
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men and one for women. Sander-Staudt (rightly) wants both men and women to care about and
for others, so a morally ideal agent on her view would be caring in both senses. And if that is
the case, then it becomes unclear why Sander-Staudt’s picture of care differs substantively from
an appropriately compartmentalised virtue of care. Sander-Staudt’s morally ideal agents are
still caring in a broad, amorphous sense, but they also exhibit excellences in particular areas of
care – a portrait of care which, it seems, is just as tenable if we treat care as a unitary but
subdivided virtue. The problem here applies only to particular theories of virtue.
Additional issues arise once we begin talking of care as a natural phenomenon. Care
ethicists univocally assert that care is in several senses natural or innate. We are enmeshed in
caring relations from birth and so we typically remain for the rest of our lives, and more than
this, we are naturally disposed to nurture and maintain these relations. Consider, for example,
Halwani’s remarks above, and Noddings’ comments on our inborn tendency to care:
[Care is] that condition toward which we long and strive, and it is our longing for
caring – to be in that special relation – that provides the motivation for us to be
moral […] as human beings we want to care and be cared for.487
Caring is not something that one must struggle for, in the way that one must sometimes wrestle
with oneself to be temperate or courageous. Instead, “we love not because we are required to
love but because our natural relatedness gives natural birth to love.”488 So one might think
that our motivations and desires typically do not need to be corrected, and that care is not
therefore an excellence of character. In contrast, there are at least two ways in which virtue
seems not to come naturally. First, virtues are supposed to be habituated – “virtues arise in us
neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but nature gives us the capacity to acquire them, and
completion comes through habituation.”489 According to the dominant view, virtues are a
product of a lengthy process whereby particular patterns of thought, affect, and action become
engrained. Thus Aristotle concludes at the end of Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics that “the
person who is to be good must be nobly brought up and habituated.” 490 Second, virtues are
supposed to be correctives. The inculcation of virtue is, on the dominant view, a process of
setting our dispositions aright in areas where our actions, thoughts, and feelings tend to miss
the mark.491 If we were born perfectly just or kind, we would have no need of correction, and
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no reason to afford justice or kindness the special moral status of virtues any more than we
afford that status to self-love.492 So one might also think that care’s naturality rules it out as a
virtue because our motivations and desires in the sphere of care typically do not need to be
corrected, and therefore care cannot represent an excellence of character.
Rather than jettisoning these claims about virtue or care, I think it can be shown that these
inconsistencies are merely apparent. To begin with, natural inclinations to care are
unproblematic as far as habituation and moral education are concerned. Virtue theorists do not
deny the existence of natural inclinations or tendencies. Indeed, they have often deliberately
left room for them by treating such inclinations and tendencies as integral to the formation of
character and virtue. Annas exemplifies this in Intelligent Virtue, writing that:
we teach children to be fair and honest not by teaching them what they should do
and then trying to interest them in having a new motivation to do this. Rather, we
try to educate and form motivations that are present already.493
So the mere fact that we tend to be motivated to form friendships, to tell the truth, to share, and
so on, does not entail that friendship and honesty are not habits we pick up and perfect. Rather,
these inclinations will (in the best of cases) provide the loam from which virtues grow.
Likewise, an inclination to care is not evidence that care is not habituated and cannot qualify as
a virtue. Just the opposite – it unites care with virtues like friendship, benevolence, and justice.
Like the other virtues, any natural inclination to care will invariably need to be refined during
the process of enculturation. We do not know innately that some people enjoy surprises and
others do not, or that one cares for a sick person by taking them to the doctor.494
A similar point can be made in response to the notion that care does not need correction.
The opponent of the virtue thesis might even concede that we sometimes fail to respond rightly
to those we care for, but argue that care nonetheless does not have a tendency to go awry, or at
least not disastrously so. The contours of such an argument are not difficult to trace. Many of
us in the first world have our needs reliably met and grow up to live relatively well, despite the
fact that care is not always perfect. As Ruddick puts it:
mothers often find themselves unable to deal with the complexities of their
children’s experience because they are overwhelmed simply tending to their
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children’s survival or are preoccupied by their own projects or are simply exhausted
and confused. Children survive nonetheless.495
Given the necessity of care for human life, we might think that the fact that most of us will live
well into old age despite our frailties is some indication of the general adequacy of care. What’s
more, those whose needs go unmet often suffer not because their caregivers do not care, but
because they cannot care. Caregivers often do not have the means to care well in the first place,
but what needs correction in those cases is not unresponsiveness, as in a disposition or tendency
not to respond properly to the needs of others, but inhibitive resource scarcity (though we
might, in that case, wonder whether political leaders and societies more broadly care
enough).496 One might say, then, that care tends not to go awry in practice and that there is no
need for a corrective disposition here. Such lines of argument might concede that care
constitutes a character trait of sorts, but will attempt to show that it does not represent an
excellence of character, and therefore cannot qualify as a virtue.
But defenders of the virtue thesis may reply here that it is unfair to extrapolate from points
such as these a general adequacy of care. The claim that care is natural cannot be taken to entail
the claim that good care is natural without an overly romantic picture of care. Caring relations,
as many care ethicists have stressed, are difficult.497 It is all too easy to care too much or too
little, to care for the wrong person, to care for the wrong reasons, and so on. Human beings
generally seem prone to overestimating the urgency or severity of our own needs, and
conversely, to downplaying or being insensitive towards the needs of others. We are all familiar,
after all, with tropes such as the self-absorbed miser who is blissfully unaware of the dire
situations of those nearby, and we are familiar also with more mundane cases of failure to
properly respond to the needs of the underprivileged, the suffering, the elderly – even,
sometimes, when they are right under our noses.498
Excessive responsiveness is also familiar. One does not have to look far to find wellmeaning caregivers who smother their charges and thereby do them harm, and indeed care
ethicists have often cautioned us against just that.499 Caregivers do their charges no favours by
tending to their every whim. As we noted earlier, care aims partially at establishing or
maintaining a measure of autonomy, at times best achieved by retreating and allowing the
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cared-for some independence – as Ruddick notes in Maternal Thinking, the set of maternal tasks
includes “letting a child grow into her life – which also means growing away.”500 It is not
immediately obvious that we require a corrective disposition for this, of course. But to avoid
these shortcomings, it does seem that one must possess a particular sort of character. One must
be disposed to notice the need for care and to respond rightly in action, affect, and thought. One
must be properly motivated by the existence of needs, and one’s values must be so calibrated
as to reliably meet them well. This, after all, is why care ethicists like Noddings and Engster
choose to retain notions of virtue despite their ongoing frustrations over being mistaken for
virtue ethicists. Good care seems intuitively to be in part a matter of character. So without
denying that we are naturally embedded in caring relations, it seems reasonable to suppose that
caring well requires a corrective disposition. And this is particularly clear when we begin to
move away from the usual paradigms of caring relations. Our inclination to romanticise care
seems to wither entirely when we consider the ways in which we fail to care for the
environment, for victims of domestic violence, for the impoverished, and for non-human
animals; it is glaringly obvious that we fail to care as we should for those needs. Care may well
be natural, but good care does not, therefore, come naturally.501
A related argument against the conventional approach is that caring seems to be
something other than a virtue insofar as it is possible to get caring wrong. 502 As noted above,
we speak naturally of caring too much or too little, of caring for the wrong person, of caring
for the wrong reasons, of caring for people who no longer want or deserve our care, and so
forth. And indeed, however one chooses to define care, the wicked clearly can and do care for
others in some sense. Many of them are or were caring parents, lovers, and children, despite
the fact that they are/were vicious and despite the fact that their caring will likely have been
tainted by their vices. But to be virtuous is, by definition, to ‘get it right,’ so it seems that
common usage and understandings of ‘care’ make it preferable to conceive of care as
something other than a moral excellence.
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Closer examination of the thought that care is a corrective disposition in this sense also reveals another reason
to endorse the virtue thesis. Regarding virtue as a corrective to temptations or inclinations to act, think, or feel
wrongly seems to bring the discourse squarely into the realm of feminist political thought. Care may correct for
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care ethical ends nicely.
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We shall be better equipped to respond to this objection after Chapter 6, but it is worth
saying something on this matter here. First, this is perhaps more an indication of the flexibility
of our moral lexicon than a disqualifier for care. As is often noted in the literature, we
sometimes speak of courageous Mafiosos while in the same breath condemning them for their
vices, and although this leads to philosophical puzzles, it has not convinced virtue ethicists to
abandon courage. Foot shows just how such a response to cases of a non-virtuous care might
take shape in “Virtues and Vices”503 where she compares the predicate ‘courageous’ to the
predicate ‘poisonous,’ claiming that we could speak of some substance characteristically
acting as a poison without implying that it always operates as one. “It is quite natural,” she
explains, “to say on occasion ‘P does not act as a poison here’ though P is a poison and it is P
that is acting here.”504 Thus virtue ethicists do not err in saying, as Geach does, that “the
conscientiousness of a villain like Himmler, his triumph over his own feelings in order to do
monstrous deeds, only makes him more detestable.”505 So the mere fact that we use descriptors
like ‘caring’ and ‘courageous’ to describe both excellences and traits which are not excellences
does not automatically disqualify care as a virtue. There is precedent in virtue ethics for the
thought that it makes sense to speak of caring villains, but that in them care is not acting as it
characteristically does and is therefore not a virtue.

6.

In Defence of Analogism

Suppose the virtue thesis holds water. An additional question now arises as to which of the three
approaches above one ought to adopt. In this section, I defend the analogical approach as the
most promising, despite the initial appeal of the other two. Section 6.1. contends that the
cardinalising approach, perhaps the most attractive at the outset, rests on mischaracterisations
of the virtues subordinate to care. Section 6.2. argues that the supplementalist approach fails,
not because the approach is philosophically inadequate, but because it assumes the failure of
the analogical approach – an assumption which is, at this point, untenable. Section 6.3. argues
that the analogical approach is not as unattractive as care ethicists have sometimes thought, and
that it can be made to share one of the most attractive features of cardinalising approaches.
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6.1. Against Cardinalism

As noted above, the cardinalising approach, and the bundling approach more generally, have
garnered significant support from care ethicists. The primary reason for this seems to be that it
neatly explains central elements of care; good care involves a set of interlocking excellences
and is, therefore, a constellation of virtues rather than a single, undifferentiated virtue.506 Here,
however, I want to challenge the notion that care is best thought of as a cardinal virtue governing
a set of subordinate virtues. I shall mount two arguments, the conjunction of which seems to
me to suggest at best that we ought to suspend judgement on cardinalism, and at worst that
cardinalism fails. The first is that many of the virtues identified by care ethicists may not in fact
qualify as virtues. The second is that those subordinate traits which do qualify as virtues are not
governed entirely by care, and thus do not map onto conventional understandings of cardinality.
One point to make against cardinalizing care is that some of its subordinate virtues may
not qualify as excellences of character at all, because they can be possessed also by the wicked.
Take, for instance, attentiveness. Attentiveness is more or less a disposition to notice
particularities (especially minutiae) which need to be factored into practical deliberations if one
is to care well.507 People who are attentive notice the symptoms of need – a pained expression,
an empty pantry, sunken eyes, etcetera. That moral exemplars are attentive is without doubt;
one can hardly care well if one is not paying attention. But we also seem to find this trait in the
wicked. Those who are patently spiteful or hateful or manipulative are just as capable of
recognising the needs of those around them as good carers are. Indeed, what is often most
harrowing about wicked individuals like Hannibal Lecter and Charles Manson is how very
attentive they prove to be. But if one believes, as many virtue ethicists do,508 that the wicked
cannot by definition possess moral virtues (either because the virtues necessitate one another,
or because they necessitate moral decency), then attentiveness cannot be a virtue. Those
committed the claim that attentiveness is a sort of excellence are better off classifying
attentiveness not as a moral excellence, but perhaps as a morally neutral perceptual capacity
which can be put to good or evil uses. And one would likely have to say the same of virtues
like competence and cheerfulness. These may well be good traits to possess in some sense but
they do not seem to be moral excellences insofar as the wicked can and do exhibit them.
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This argument does not empty the set of virtues which could be governed by care, and
care ethicists will likely complain that I have mischaracterised attentiveness. Attentiveness, it
might be said, ought to be further specified; the virtue of attentiveness lies within the context of
caring relations. Sociopaths may be attentive, but because their relationships are not caring,
their attentiveness falls short of virtue. Furthermore, even if we concede that attentiveness can
be put to evil uses, the same appears to be true of courage, but most of us will balk at the idea
that courage is not a virtue. As we saw in Section 5, the mere fact that particular traits admit of
vicious iterations does not show that they cannot admit of virtuous iterations. This manoeuvre
strikes me as odd, however. Foot develops these thoughts on virtue in response to the apparent
heterogeneity of concepts subordinate to courage. ‘Courage’ is a locution flexible enough to
describe both virtuous and wicked traits, and this creates a puzzle for virtue ethicists who wish
to reserve the term solely for a morally praiseworthy trait. But it is not clear that the concepts
subordinate to attentiveness are heterogeneous in this way. ‘Attentiveness’ is not obviously
ambiguous in the same way courage is – though the term is indeed as malleable as ‘courage,’ it
is not clear that this malleability exposes the kind of conceptual equivocation which Foot’s
account aims to defuse. ‘Attentiveness’ could just as easily refer to traits which are identical in
the virtuous and the wicked, but which differ outwardly because of factors external to
attentiveness itself.
Even if we grant for the sake of argument that attentiveness is like courage in this respect
and that traits we label virtues can also sometimes serve wicked ends,509 however, there is
another point to be made here against care’s cardinality. Those virtues which remain seem not
to slot neatly into conventional understandings of cardinality. As it is usually understood,
cardinality is a function of generality. Charity is a cardinal virtue because its sphere is abstract
or broad enough to encompass smaller, more localised virtues. But this does not describe care’s
relation to its subordinate virtues. Care does not encompass responsiveness, empathy, or
responsibility, because all of these virtues appear to fall also within the precinct of justice,
kindness, and friendship too. Kindness surely involves a sort of responsiveness to others, and
one certainly cannot possess the virtue of friendship if one is not empathetic. Virtues like
attentiveness and competence also seem to fall well within the ambit of practical wisdom. There
is a long history in virtue theory of using perceptual analogies to illustrate practical or moral
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wisdom,510 and what is attentiveness if not a sort of perceptual skill or disposition? So it seems
that many, possibly even all, of the virtues typically ordered underneath care in fact belong to
several virtues. Good care might involve the virtues, but the virtue of care does not seem to
contain them. And this, of course, is inconsistent with theories of cardinality like those of Plato
and Aquinas, which rest on a process of abstraction.

6.2. Against Supplementalism

I argue in this section that the supplementalist approach too ought to be abandoned, at least in
the interim. My reason for this is simply that supplementalism assumes the failure of the
analogical approach, and thus a burden of proof falls upon its proponent to prove as much – a
burden which, hitherto, has gone unmet. The addition of care to the list of virtues in virtue
theory assumes that care has not appeared already. To add care to a list of virtues, one of which
already contains all of care’s normative content, is simply to introduce a synonym for that preexisting virtue. So supplementalism only makes a meaningful contribution to the virtue
theoretic tradition if care has not been acknowledged in some form already (if, in other words,
the analogical approach has failed).
In itself this is not enough to show that the supplementalist approach is redundant. But it
is not at this point clear that the assumption of care’s novelty is tenable. Care ethicists have
sometimes argued, as we saw in Section 2, that particular virtues are poor analogues for care.
And this will be part and parcel of any case against analogical approaches. But there are two
methodological problems with the usual strategy for dismissing analogical approaches. The first
is that they are rarely defended in much depth. Extant virtues tend to be given short shrift,
acknowledged for their prima facie resemblance to care but quickly shelved in order to pursue
other philosophical aims. Without dismissing those aims, this is a tack which invites rebuttals
such as the one I offered in Section 2 against disanalogies with charity/benevolence. Pending
philosophically robust disanalogies, however, we have at best a relatively weak reason to think
that any particular analogue fails. Greater attention must be paid to the virtues neighbouring
care if we are to have confidence in the need for an additional virtue of care. Perhaps more
concerning, however, is the usual strategy itself. Arguments against analogies with charity do
not rule out analogies with friendship or love. Care ethicists must show at minimum that there
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is good reason to suspect that all initially plausible analogues fail. In-depth studies of particular
virtues will be integral to this, but the study of a single virtue, no matter how thorough, cannot
justify the rejection of the analogical approach tout court. Pending such arguments, we ought
to withhold judgement on the supplemental approach for its reliance on an undefended and nonobvious assumption. Until we are given reasons to doubt the analogical approach itself, rather
than reasons to doubt particular instances thereof, there is no good reason to suppose that we
need to add care to the list of virtues.511

6.3. In Defence of Analogism

Many care ethicists will no doubt find these conclusions, that both the cardinalist and
supplementalist approaches ought to be rejected in the interim, unpalatable, for they imply that
analogism is in fact to be preferred. But virtue ethicists will not share care ethical fears of
subsumption under another ethic. And here I shall argue that the analogical approach is just as
capable of capturing care’s complexity as cardinalism, so one forceful reason for preferring
cardinalism also lends support to analogism.
One of the most attractive features of the cardinalising approach is that it enables care
ethicists to draw on a wide range of specific, localised virtues. Attentiveness, empathy, and
other subordinate virtues are traits any good caregiver will possess because they are
indispensable elements of good care. In rejecting a cardinalising approach in favour of an
analogical one, it might be thought that we have sacrificed this advantage. But this is not the
only means by which care theorists can draw on other normative concepts in care’s
neighbourhood. Another takes the form of the unity or reciprocity theses. Recall that reciprocity
theses, the weaker of the two, blur the boundaries between particular virtues by claiming that
the possession of one virtue necessitates possession of them all. Usually, this is because acting
well is at least sometimes impossible without a collection of virtues because each virtue’s
province overlaps with others’. Aristotle’s is perhaps the quintessential statement of the
reciprocity thesis. For Aristotle, what distinguishes ‘natural’ virtues from ‘full’ virtue is
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phronesis (‘practical wisdom’).512 Phronesis is a calculative or deliberative virtue which
enables its possessor to act well. It does not deliberate about ends; that is the task of the virtues
of character like courage, generosity, and temperance. Rather, phronesis takes those ends and
deliberates about how best to further them. Phronesis does not, moreover, call on one virtue at
a time. Instead, it produces what Foot calls ‘all-things-considered reasons’513 – it takes input
from all of the relevant virtues in order to guide us in any given scenario. In the mind of the
phronimos, mercy can curb justice, kindness can encourage honesty, and courage can promote
generosity. The virtues thus collectively render their possessor appropriately responsive to
moral considerations in a way that no virtue could do alone.
Care can be plugged into a notion of reciprocity like this one to generate judgements like
those the cardinalist hopes to offer without running up against the concerns raised in Section
6.1. Take, for instance, courage. It seems reasonable to suppose that care and courage overlap
– meeting needs sometimes requires us to face our fears and put ourselves at risk. Consider
Huckleberry Finn’s refusal to return Jim to Miss Watson. Towards the end of The Adventures
of Huckleberry Finn, Huck finds himself faced with an apparent moral dilemma. He can either
turn his friend (Jim) in and see Jim returned to Miss Watson (Jim’s owner), or he can continue
to help Jim on his way to the free states. Huck believes that siding with Jim amounts to a kind
of theft which is severe enough to condemn him to hell, but after a great deal of internal conflict
he musters the courage to accept this (“all right, then, I'll go to hell,” he says defiantly).514 This
is an unusual case, to be sure, but the point generalises – courage will often be relevant where
care is concerned. And if the virtues are reciprocal in the way outlined above, then we can
explain such judgements; both virtues provide essential inputs for phronesis. Huck could not
have cared well for Jim if he did not possess a measure of courage.
Reciprocity theses also offer us a set of mechanisms with which to dissolve aspects of the
care-justice debate. If care and justice are virtues, then we can expect that the virtue of care will
often curb the virtue of justice, so that punishments are meted out, for instance, with an eye to
their impact on an individual’s or community’s wellbeing, and that justice will sometimes curb
the virtue of care, such that those holding public office, for example, are not nepotistic (in such
cases, justice might incline us to say that it is not really caring to show partiality in this particular
context) and so forth. The reciprocity theses may thus help to resolve debates at the normative
level over whether justice or care take precedence by providing a means of showing that
See Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics for Aristotle’s theory of phronesis.
Natural Goodness, Ch. 4.
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conflicts between them are merely apparent. Temperance too seems to be intertwined with care
as a matter of common sense, especially since self-care has seen significant uptake amongst
care ethicists as a subcategory of care.515 So there is no shortage of virtues with which we want
care to reciprocate. It seems, then, that analogical approaches can share in at least one feature
which care ethicists have found attractive about cardinalism.

7.

Conclusion

It is useful, once again, to pause and take stock. This chapter began by detailing what I have
called the virtue theses about care. Following this, I tendered a taxonomy of the ways in which
care can and has appeared in or been incorporated into virtue ethics. We then saw to some
foreseeable objections to the virtue thesis, and following that I offered reasons to think that the
analogical approach is its most promising variant. Given our conclusions from Section 2
regarding the potential analogues for care, it seems that the most promising virtue thesis at this
point is one which treats care as analogous to charity or benevolence. Insofar as these
arguments are convincing, they allow the virtue ethicist to respond to Held’s claim that virtue
ethics does not possess an account of care. Contrary to Held’s claims, virtue ethics does seem
to possess at least one moral concept which satisfies Held’s and Engster’s minimal conditions
for an account of care. However, these minimal conditions do not necessarily yield a complete
or satisfying account of care. As we saw in Chapter 2, care ethicists typically build more into
their concept of care than Held’s and Engster’s minimal criteria. So an additional question now
arises: does the virtue thesis offer a full account of care, or is there yet more to be included in
a complete account of care? This is the question I answer in the remaining chapters of this
thesis.
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VI
Caring Actions and Caring Practices
Many care ethicists will at this point accuse us of abstracting away from care ethics’ roots in
the lived experiences of caregivers and care-recipients.516 To care is first and foremost to
engage in some type of work, activity or practice. Thus, an attempt to define it as a character
trait makes a category mistake and loses sight of care theory’s origins in practice. As Berges
puts it:
to become a carer one needs an actual living person to care for. To care is to do
something: change a nappy, prepare a meal, administer a cure. As far as care
ethicists are concerned, virtue ethics, being too focused on the character of the
agent, fails to consider the activity of caring itself.517
A reader familiar with Aristotle’s work may also complain at this point that we have overlooked
just such an account of care – not as philia or under the guise of some (other) virtue, but as
care – in Aristotle. While translators of Aristotle’s ethical, political, and scientific writings
have not always done so, more recent translations have begun to translate Aristotle’s epimeleia
as “care.”518 Yet in contrast to the positions examined in the preceding chapter, Aristotle’s
epimeleia is a sort of praxis, an activity or a practice. An interlocutor with Aristotelian
predilections regarding care is therefore likely to mount a different argument for the same
conclusion: to ignore care’s practical aspects is to present at best a piecemeal account.519 Care
is, to Aristotle and the archetypal care ethicist, and indeed as everyday vernacular would have
us believe, a multifaceted concept which denotes a class of actions or practices as much as
(perhaps more than) it denotes a state of character, a disposition, or a mental event.
Of course, if it is true that care involves either a response or a responsiveness, then the
taxonomy we have provided in the preceding chapter ought to be sufficient to show that Held’s
claim that virtue ethics lacks an account of care is misguided. But though I am still in part
rebutting Held’s argument, that is not the primary aim of this chapter. Here my foremost goal
516
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is to flesh out the Aristotelian concept of care by providing an analysis of caring actions and
practices – to contribute to a satisfying account of care rather than one which merely satisfies
Held’s minimal standard. This is perhaps an unusual project, since contemporary virtue ethics
has moved away somewhat from the philosophy of action. But the claim that care denotes a
sort of action or practice is an intuitive one, and I do not think that virtue ethicists need argue
that the caring character traits (whatever those ultimately are) exhaust or adequately capture
the breadth of the term. Indeed, it seems to me rather that the above criticism of attempts to
construe care as a virtue or set of virtues raises an important point about the state of the virtue
ethical literature more generally. As their normative theory has taken root, virtue ethicists have
explored a diverse range of virtues, many of which have attracted heated and ongoing debate.
Yet in doing so, virtue ethicists have frequently neglected other topics relevant to the study of
virtue and the development of a comprehensive moral philosophy. One of these is action.
Contemporary virtue ethicists very often list particular actions for the purposes of illustration,
but with notable exceptions like abortion and euthanasia have seldom made efforts to establish
a robust philosophy of action and of particular kinds of action or to fit particular actions into
that schema.520 This is, of course, a significant break from tradition. Aristotle, Aquinas, and
Anscombe all developed their own theories of action, and those theories figured conspicuously
in their respective ethics.
My aims in this chapter are to show that virtue ethics can make sense of caring actions
and practices, and to contribute to the development of a theory thereof. If virtue ethicists can
make sense of care as a type of action, then they can meet the objection that they have
overlooked care’s fundamental practicality and produce a more nuanced and plausible account
of what it means to care. This chapter begins by laying out an Anscombean theory of action
and some care ethical theories of practices, and I argue, in short, that the two (sets of) theories
are consistent with one another and indeed mesh well. In Section 2, I lay out a theory of caring
actions. I suggest that both care and virtue ethicists conceive of caring actions as those which
intend to meet needs. I argue, however, that we ought to reconceive needs as those things
without which we cannot flourish. This eudaimonistic theory of needs both brings the account
into closer alignment with Aristotelian ethics and, in my view, offers a more comprehensive
account of caring actions. In Section 3, I discuss caring practices. I suggest that caring practices
are a subcategory of caring actions and, without defending a specific account thereof, argue
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that it is informative to consider care as a practice and that we ought not to jettison such
concepts. Section 4 attempts to fit this theory of caring actions into our ethical framework. I
maintain that introducing an account of care as an act-type to a virtue ethical theory of care has
two distinct advantages. The first is that it allows us to make certain sorts of moral judgements
about whether one has cared successfully or not. Care ethicists have sometimes espoused a
success criterion for caring actions, and I argue that dividing care into subtypes enables us to
make better sense of that criterion. I also argue that our distinction between caring actions and
caring characters maps onto a distinction commonly drawn by care ethicists between ‘caring
for’ and ‘caring about,’ suggesting that these concepts overlap in two interesting and important
ways on the virtue ethical account. I thus argue that this view of care yields an attractive account
of the interaction between caring actions and the caring virtues.

1.

Actions and Practices

In this section, I develop accounts of care as a sort of practice and a sort of action, beginning
with a study of actions, practices, and the distinction between the two. These are not, of course,
the only concepts in play in either care or virtue ethical philosophy of action. Care ethicists
habitually speak of care as work or labour in an attempt to emphasise certain aspects of caring
practices.521 Nor are these meanings of care mutually exclusive. One may choose to treat care
as a practice, and then go on to define labour or work as a certain sort of practice. One may
also choose to treat labour and work as ontologically distinct from practices, but maintain that
there is no inconsistency in regarding them all as sorts of care. Here I shall focus on care as an
activity and a practice because (a) as we shall see, these concepts lie at the heart of many of the
most influential accounts of care, (b) as we shall also see, those accounts typically see actions

In “When Caring is Just and Justice is Caring,” Kittay tells us that “Care is a multifaceted term. It is a labor,
an attitude, and a virtue. As labor, it is the work of maintaining ourselves and others when we are in a condition
of need” (at 259). In Care, Autonomy, and Justice, at 56, Clement lists two paradigmatic examples of care work:
nursing and parenting and offers three features typical of care work:
first, care work typically takes place in the context of a personal relationship between caregiver and
recipient. Second, the caregiver acts to promote the well-being of others. Finally, the care worker is
typically motivated in her work by a feeling of concern for the recipients of care (even if other
motives, such as money, lead one to do the work in the first place.
Clement also offers, at 54, two reasons why care should be recognized as work:
First, the differences between caregiving and other kinds of work have been exaggerated, and
second, managing our emotions requires a kind of work that we usually fail to recognize. But […]
the underlying reason we should recognize care as work is that doing so reflects an explicit
recognition of its social importance.
In Clement’s view, the more features met by some kind of work, the more it qualifies as care work, so care work
is a scalar concept.
521
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and practices as intimately connected concepts, (c) work and labour have professional
connotations which complicate the picture in ways which cannot be dealt with in sufficient
detail here,522 and (d) it is at least possible, and indeed very likely, that the concepts of action
and practice are more basic or fundamental than those of work or labour. 523 So I shall limit
myself here to these two kinds of care.
1.1. Anscombe’s Philosophy of Action
What then do we mean by ‘action’ and ‘practice?’ Unfortunately, care ethicists have not offered
a fully developed philosophy of action to draw on here, nor do they obviously lean on any
particular tradition therein. So there is no discernible philosophy of action for virtue ethicists
to borrow or rebut. But there are numerous theories of action to which we can appeal for
support. Anscombe’s approach, spelled out in her seminal monograph Intention, has been
immensely popular since it was first published and remains a widely discussed approach
amongst philosophers of action.524 Anscombe’s philosophy of action is rich, and much more
has been written on it than can possibly be surveyed here, so our discussion will inevitably be
fragmentary, but Anscombe’s understanding of action – and particularly of act-types – is both
an obvious candidate and, as I shall argue, an apparently good fit, for a theory of caring actions.
In “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Anscombe argues that we ought to suspend moral
philosophizing until we produce an adequate philosophy of psychology. Anscombe sees the
philosophy of action as part of that undertaking. One of the most pressing issues in Anscombe’s
eyes, to which she devotes much of “Modern Moral Philosophy” and Intention, is what is
sometimes known as the ‘problem of relevant descriptions.’ It is foundational to Anscombe’s
view, O’Neill tells us, that:
action is propositional. Acts fall under many descriptions; act-descriptions may
have many instances. Although individual acts—act tokens—are events in the
world, we both think about action and act under certain descriptions. We consent
to action as described in certain ways, but not others.525
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But this gives rise to problems in ethics. Anscombe argues that Kant’s “rule about
universalizable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant
description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it,”526 and like Kant, Mill
“fails to realize the necessity for stipulation of relevant descriptions, if his theory is to have
content.”527 Both Kant’s and Mill’s accounts therefore succumb to what Anscombe regards as
a fatal flaw:
Any act-token will fall under many true descriptions, hence also under many
possible principles of action. Absent a proper philosophy of psychology, how can
we tell which act description is relevant for moral assessment?528
Anscombe grapples with this problem in both “Modern Moral Philosophy” and Intention, going
on to develop a means by which act-types can be individuated. As Candace Vogler summarises
it, on Anscombe’s account:
an act-type is just any isolable, determinately describable aspect of an exterior act
done on purpose, such that the agent can answer a question about what he’s doing
couched in terms of that description.529
Swinging one’s arm can be a token of numerous act-types, depending on whether one is
hacking wood, dancing, gesturing, or bowling a ball. Each description is isolable, able to be
disentangled from other actions of which it might be an element or with which it might form a
sequence (or one complex action). Each description also makes for an intelligible response to
the question “what are you doing?” And of course, each of these descriptions represents an
aspect of an exterior act which is performed on purpose (unlike a reflex) and is determinately
describable, such that it can be explained in detail. In the case of care, we might say that if one
were to ask a pedestrian picking up litter what they were doing, “taking care of the
environment” would be a perfectly intelligible response, as would “recycling cans” or
“impressing a love interest,” all of which can be coreferential.
A subset of act-types are intentional. Anscombe tells us that intentional actions “are the
actions to which a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is given application; the sense is of
course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting.” 530 Anscombe then
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spends a large part of Intention describing what exactly is going on when one asks “why?” and
what is going on when one answers it, but offers the following summary of her conclusions:
The answer may (a) simply mention past history, (b) give an interpretation of the
action, (c) mention something future. In cases (b) and (c) the answer is already
characterised as a reason for acting, i.e. as an answer to the question ‘Why?’ in the
requisite sense; and in case (a) it is an answer to that question if the ideas of good
or harm are involved in its meaning as an answer; or again if further enquiry elicits
that it is connected with ‘interpretative’ motive, or intention with which.531
To say that an action is intentional is thus to make a kind of explanatory judgment about the
reasons or the motivations with which it was performed. Anscombe is conscious of the variety
of reasons we can offer to explain an intentional action, and she deliberately leaves room for
this.
Anscombe does not think that applicable descriptions of particular actions are isolated
from one another. Rather, she suggests that intentional actions can be described with increasing
abstraction or remoteness in what she calls an “A-B-C-D order.” Anscombe famously writes
that a man:
moving his arm up and down with his finger round the pump handle is, in these
circumstances, operating the pump; and, in these circumstances, it is replenishing
the house water-supply; and, in these circumstances, it is poisoning the
household.532
In performing each of these actions, Anscombe’s man also performs the next – Anscombe is
making an identity claim about these distinct act-types.533 B, C, and D also give some
explanation of why I am A-ing. So it makes sense, on an Anscombean view, to say both that S
bandages a wound in order to heal a patient, and that in bandaging the wound she is healing
the patient. Anscombe also does not think that in order for an action to qualify as a particular
act-type one must succeed in bringing about its intended consequences. 534 On Anscombe’s
view, I A by B-ing whether or not I succeed at A-ing or B-ing –Anscombe’s man can be
described as poisoning the household even if, unbeknownst to him, some filtration mechanism
had purified the water before it could be pumped into the house’s cistern (and Anscombe
discusses similar cases when she discusses the doctrine of double effect).
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1.2. Care Ethical Philosophies of Action

Care ethicists are not committed to this account of action, but here I wish to argue that
Anscombe’s theory of action provides one suitable conceptual scaffold for an account of care
which many virtue and care ethicists will find attractive. Establishing consistency is not a
straightforward comparative project, however, since care ethicists have not spent much time
on this particular question in the philosophy of action. Though care ethicists like Petr Urban
have addressed questions in this area, arguing for instance that care ethicists ought to borrow
from ‘enactivism,’ an “alternative to the conceptions of mind and agency in mainstream
cognitive science in the early 1990s,”535 which “asks and attempts to answer questions such as:
what is an agent, what is autonomy, why does anything matter to someone,”536 definitions of
action and subsequent attempts to slot care into those definitions are noticeably absent. But it
remains possible to establish consistency nevertheless. While they have not yet advanced a
comprehensive theory of action, care ethicists have, in the course of developing their theory of
practice, offered several means of distinguishing actions/activities from practices and care
from other subtypes thereof, and in doing so have made some contributions to an account of
caring action.
Held, for instance, maintains that practices are one species in a broader class, activity,
into which care falls. For the most part, Held does not hint at a general theory of action, but
rather submits a theory of practices understood as a set of actions which satisfy additional
criteria. In The Ethics of Care, she writes that:
An activity must be purposive to count as work or labor, but it need not incorporate
any values, even efficiency, in the doing of it. Chopping at a tree, however clumsily,
to fell it, could be work. But when it does incorporate such values as doing so
effectively, it becomes the practice of woodcutting. So we do better to focus on
practices of care rather than merely on the work involved.537
Though the two concepts may come apart, Held does not seem to distinguish between action
and activity. Here I take her to be treating the two as synonymous, in part because she draws
on examples similar to those drawn on by philosophers of action (and Anscombe specifically)
to illustrate the phenomenon she is describing. Held conceives of both labour and practices as
Urban, “Enacting Care,” 217.
“Enactivism and Care Ethics: Merging Perspectives,” Filozophia 70, no. 2 (2015): 121.
537
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subcategories of action. Furthermore, for Held, work and labour are purposive activities, and a
practice is a value-laden, purposive activity.538
Of course, there are major questions as to whether Held’s ‘purposiveness’ is synonymous
with Anscombe’s ‘intentional,’ and there is almost certainly not enough in Held’s corpus to
make an incontrovertible claim either way. But Held’s example of chopping at a tree with the
aim of felling it (to wit, with an answer to the question “why?”), and her subsequent definition
of practices as value-laden, are certainly not inconsistent with Anscombe’s theory of action.
And if we take purposiveness at face value, it seems reasonable to interpret it as a subcategory
of intentionality. To say that an action was performed purposively suggests (possibly even
entails) that there is some answer to the question “why?” because acting toward some purpose
seems essentially to involve acting for the sake of bringing about some desired or otherwise
sought-after end. What fragments we have of Held’s theory of action do not, consequently, rule
out Anscombe’s philosophy of action as a philosophical underpinning. Held’s claim then is
simply that whatever an action is, it must also be purposive in order to qualify as work or
labour and value-laden in order to qualify as a practice. Held’s theory of practices is not
inconsistent with a theory of action like Anscombe’s – indeed, it is waiting to be plugged into
such a theory.
Held is not the only care theorist to have made contributions to a theory of action. Tronto
also sees the practice of care as a set of activities coupled with a particular “habit of mind,”539
which I take to include both values and purposes, though with the additional caveat that those
activities are ongoing. Again, I see nothing in Tronto’s discussion of practices to suggest that
she is hostile towards an Anscombean philosophy of action. We have already seen how
Anscombe’s philosophy of action can accommodate purposiveness conditions. Later
philosophers of action, Davidson in particular, might take issue with Held’s and Tronto’s (in
both cases implicit) claim that some actions are not value-laden, however, since they have
insisted that actions necessarily involve a sort of ‘pro-attitude.’540 But this thought is subject to
well-known counterexamples,541 and in any case is not a problem for Anscombe’s theory of
action, since Anscombe makes a much more modest motivational point amounting only to the
claim that “the primitive sign of wanting is trying to get.”542 This, of course, need not entail a
This might in fact be overpermissive. Playing with one’s dog is perhaps value-laden in some sense, and it is
certainly purposive, but this does not seem like the sort of thing we usually call a practice.
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‘pro-attitude’ towards either the action or its intended consequence, and though it might
typically expose some sort of evaluative attitude towards the action or its consequence, it need
not. I might desire a cigarette or a tattoo, for instance, but it does not follow from this that I
value smoking a cigarette or getting a tattoo. So I take it that the care ethical claim that some
actions are not value-laden is not necessarily at odds with Anscombe’s claim that actions are
indicative of desires.
Ruddick is another care ethicist who has contributed to a care ethical theory of caring
actions. In Maternal Thinking, she writes that:
Practices are collective human activities distinguished by the aims that identify
them and by the consequent demands made on practitioners committed to those
aims. The aims or goals that define a practice are so central or “constitutive” that in
the absence of the goal you would not have that practice. I express this intrinsic
dependency when I say that to engage in a practice means to be committed to
meeting its demands. People more or less consciously create a practice as they
simultaneously pursue certain goals and make sense of their pursuit.543
Ruddick also views practices as a subcategory of activities – which, again, I take to be
synonymous with actions – characterized by collective undertaking and the pursuit of a certain
sort of aim or end. As I interpret it, Ruddick’s claim that “in the absence of the goal one would
not have that practice” is not a claim about how we delineate act-types, though it could
reasonably be read as a claim about proximate ends. Rather, Ruddick is suggesting that a
practice’s goals necessitate the practice. Thus, the practice of mothering is demanded by the
goal of raising a child – one could not hope to raise a child successfully if there was no practice
of mothering. So engaging in a practice “means to be committed to meeting its demands”
because the practice cannot be made sense of without the goals it promotes or achieves.
Mothering is only a practice because the goal of reproduction cannot be achieved without it,
nor can mothering be made sense of without the aim of raising children (it does not make sense
to engage in mothering practices if one is not attempting to raise a child).544 And this, of course,
is reminiscent of Anscombe’s claim that act-types are defined by their proximate ends. For that
reason I do not think that Ruddick is implying that actions or activities should not be defined
by their ends, such that one could be performing the same activity even if one’s goals changed.
543
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Ruddick’s (fragmentary) philosophy of action and Anscombe’s do not seem to be inconsistent
– indeed, the synergies suggest that the two would mesh well.
If, as I have argued, these care ethical accounts of action and practice are consistent with
Anscombe’s, then virtue theorists such as Foot and Hursthouse who have Anscombean leanings
are likely able to borrow them. And if that is the case, then there are concepts of caring
practices, and embryonic concepts of caring actions, ready to hand for the virtue ethicist
developing an account of caring actions. But equally, that consistency, coupled with my
argument that the two approaches to action complement one another (if it is persuasive), shows
that the virtue ethicist who uses Anscombe’s theory of action to construct an account of care
has markedly diminished reason to be concerned about inconsistencies and care ethical
objections from category mistakes stemming therefrom. Thus, an Anscombean account of
action seems to go a significant way towards answering the concern which motivated our
incursion into action theory in the first place. In treating care as an Anscombean act-type, I
shall assume that care ethicists will accept that this is a more or less correct approach to the
notion of action.

2.

Caring as an Act-type

Perhaps the most significant question here, however, is whether care ethicists are equivocating
when they use the terms ‘care’ or ‘caring’ to classify actions they take to be instances of care.545
There is no doubt that Anscombe has left room for the sorts of act-types that care ethicists
prescribe, but there is a separate question regarding whether those act-types all belong to a
unified genus. Are we justified in suggesting that the actions of nurses, parents, friends, and
Samaritans are all tokens of a single type, or do we equivocate when we describe all of these
actions as ‘caring?’ The problem here is not that these actions are in several ways
heterogeneous. The problem is that in treating this heterogeneous group of actions as caring,
care ethicists may be committed to the existence of a sortal pattern which does not exist. In this
section, I use the Anscombean theory of action laid out in Section 1 to develop a rudimentary
theory of caring actions as those whose proximate end is to meet a need. We noted earlier that
care ethicists have rarely gone into much detail about what they mean by ‘needs’ beyond
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offering a set of paradigmatic needs which a theory of care must admit, and in this section I
also mount an argument for a eudaimonistic understanding of those needs.
If care is to be a distinct and unified kind of action, then it must aim at some particular
end, which is to say that it has a particular intentional structure. That caring actions always
have some proximate end is uncontroversial amongst care ethicists. Caring actions are always,
on Held’s view, purposive, in the sense that they are performed to bring about particular states
of affairs. Consider also Engster’s definition of care as:
everything we do directly to help individuals to meet their vital
biological needs, develop or maintain their basic capabilities, and avoid
or alleviate unnecessary or unwanted pain and suffering, so that they
can survive, develop, and function in society.546
Here, Engster advances a definition which is characteristic in several respects. Care ethicists
typically define care in terms of particular aims or ends.547 Definitions almost always make use
of the preposition “to,” and mention specific motivations (goals, intentions, aims, etc.) to
indicate that care is purposive. Thus caring actions seem to be intentional by definition, such
that one can always answer the question “why?” by reference to some motivation or end.
What is it that unifies these caring actions so they are, in Vogler’s words, “isolable” and
“determinately describable?” Here we might well fall back on our discussion of needs in
Chapter 4 and claim that caring actions are actions which aim at meeting needs. As I argued
there, this is a standard view of care, and indeed a deeper reading of those accounts of care
uncovers further parallels with Anscombe’s work on action. Bubeck’s view of care in “Justice
and the Labor of Care” is one of these. Bubeck writes that “whether a particular activity counts
as care or as a service is not dependent on the activity itself, but on the function it has, that is,
on whether it meets a certain type of need.”548 According to Bubeck, actions are caring in part
because of their telos – they aim to meet a need. And of course such an understanding of care
is well-suited to a theory of action which individuates actions by reference to their ends.
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Collins advances a similar take on care. On her view, “all caring actions are intentional
under the description ‘trying to do what I believe is good for someone.’” 549 Collins’
understanding of intentionality is also reminiscent of Anscombe’s; on her account:
The carer need not consciously entertain their intention as ‘doing what I believe is
in the recipient’s interests’ and they need not have a full-blown concept of interests.
They just need a tacit belief that the action is good for the recipient in some way.550
Collins also rejects definitions which require anything more than ‘trying’ to meet a need,
offering a counterexample where a small child cares for a pet rock despite the pet rock not
having any discernible needs or interests.551 On her view, we naturally call this behaviour
caring. From this Collins derives the following definition of caring actions:
an action is caring if and only if it is performed under the (perhaps tacit) intention
of fulfilling (or going some way to fulfilling) interest(s) that the agent perceives
some perceived moral person (the recipient) to have.552
Of course, interests are not necessarily identical to needs (though it may always be in someone’s
interests to meet their needs), and I shall address this in Section 2.1. But for now, it is worth
noting that Collins understands intentionality in a way similar to Anscombe.
Sarah Clark Miller offers one account of care according to which caring actions meet
“fundamental needs,” defined as “needs that threaten agency in the sense that if they are not
met, the serious harm of compromised agency will result.”553 Fundamental needs, in other
words, “must be met in order to establish, maintain, or restore agency.”554 Clark Miller does
not explicitly distinguish between actions which actually meet needs and those which aim to
meet needs, but she leans on Bubeck’s (and, to a lesser extent, Tronto’s) account to such an
extent that the remarks above likely apply here too. Clark Miller has a relatively permissive
understanding of agency, moreover, which includes not only the familiar set of needs such as
freedom from certain sorts of interference or coercion, but also certain emotional and relational
needs. This set of needs is thus more expansive than lists like those we saw in Chapter 4, and
Clark Miller’s account of needs yields one elegant solution to the problem of care’s
heterogeneity because it expands care to cover most of the paradigmatic cases of care. So it
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seems that there is already some momentum behind the thought that care essentially intends to
meet needs.555
Drawing on Anscombe’s philosophy to develop a theory of caring actions in this way has
the advantage of allowing those actions, and their proximate ends, to be nested. On this view
of care, it makes sense to say that S is bandaging a wound, and that she is thereby caring for her
patient. If she were bandaging a wound for fun, then she would not be caring; caring actions,
we have said, must involve specifically an intent to meet a need. And caring actions can then
be nested within a variety of other actions. It makes sense, in this case, to say that S is bandaging
a wound, and in doing so caring for her patient, and that in turn is part of a wider activity of
doing one’s job. But it is equally possible to say that S’s bandaging the wound is an element of
a wider activity which is mothering (indeed, on Anscombe’s view, the two are identical –
bandaging the wound is mothering). The proximate end defines S’s bandaging as care regardless
of whether S is nursing or mothering. And this seems to be the sort of claim we wish to make
about care.556 Caring for others takes place in a variety of contexts, and we want our definition
of care to be malleable.
To say that caring actions are intentional is also, in this case, to leave adequate conceptual
space for the variety of cases in which we see caring actions, because though it posits the
meeting of eudaimonistic needs as a determinate end, it does not take a stance on why those
needs are regarded as things to be met. I take it as obvious that there is no one reason why we
care. Indeed, we often appeal to all of the explanations Anscombe suggests in explaining why
we care. We cite past history when we explain that we have performed a caring action because
“last time she was hurt” or “she didn’t do anything to deserve this.” We reinterpret the action
when we explain that “it’s my job” or “that’s what grandparents do.” And we cite the future
when we explain, for example, that we have cared because “she’ll get sick.” Each of these
explanations appeals to a different answer to the question “why?” which satisfies Anscombe’s
conditions on intentionality. So it seems that Anscombe’s theory of action is flexible enough to
explain a whole host of markedly different cases where we say that an action was caring.
There may be some temptation, upon considering Held’s claim that caring practices are
value-laden, to go beyond this and claim that caring actions must involve a particular sort of
It is a separate question whether those needs must be met in a specific way – one can imagine situations akin
to Gettier examples, where I act with the aim of meeting a need, and succeed in doing so, but not in the way I
think I have. This is a difficult question, one which I cannot address satisfactorily here, but it will have to be
reconciled by a complete theory of caring actions.
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motivational underpinning. This is not an implausible claim. Care seems always to involve
disvaluing states of need, or valuing states where needs are either met or do not exist in the first
place. Indeed, one could argue that caregivers cannot care without making such valuejudgements.557 In meeting her child’s need for food, a mother must first ascribe a certain sort
of disvalue to the state of hunger, such that she sees it as something to eliminate. If she thought
that such states were good, or perhaps unevaluable, then she would have no reason to meet her
child’s need. For that reason, at minimum, care as an act-type should probably be thought to
involve a value-judgement about a state of need. But this is not to say what sort of value or
disvalue caregivers ascribe. Care does not always issue from beneficence. An apathetic nurse
certainly sees her patients’ states of need as disvaluable, but only insofar as they threaten her
job if they go unmet. So one might wish to add that caring involves value judgements relating
specifically to how a state of need figures in the life of the needy (or perhaps that the state of
need is not merely instrumentally disvaluable). Lynch, for instance, proffers such a view in
Care: An Analysis, where she proposes that caring actions are performed for the care-recipient’s
sake.558 But this seems to veer too close to a theory of good care, and at this point we are
concerned with a theory of care simpliciter.559 As Sevenhuijsen puts it, “caring for others can
also stem from less noble motives, such as the urge to meddle or control others.”560 Care seems
to involve value judgements, but we ought not to be too specific about the nature of that value
– as Aristotle puts it, “our account will be adequate if its clarity is in line with the subjectmatter,”561 and instances of care seem so heterogenous as to require a fairly general and
unspecific motivational underpinning. In what remains of this thesis, I shall assume that this
Anscombean picture of care is a defensible one.

2.1. Caring for Needs, Desires, Interests: A Eudaimonistic Approach to Care

The account of care developed here seems vulnerable to a number of counterexamples,
however. Consider the following case:
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A is working late into the night. A is tired and would like nothing more than a slice
of her favourite cake, but of course, A cannot spare the time to go to the supermarket
and get one, and it does not matter all that much because A can get along perfectly
well without it. A’s partner, B sees that A is hard at work and realises that A would
appreciate a treat. So B goes and buys a slice of A’s favourite cake, returns home,
and gives it to A who continues working, feeling uplifted.
It is perhaps a little jarring to suggest that A needs the cake. A does not need the cake in any
straightforward sense, since she can complete her work without it. It is much less odd to say
that A desires it.562 But it still seems natural to describe B’s actions as caring. Consider also
another counterexample:
C is a high school student who is just about to graduate. C has decided to go to
college, and has begun submitting applications to schools of varying quality. Her
chosen career is one for which there is not much competition – the odds of
employment do not vary all that much between top-tier schools and upper-mid-tier
schools. C is almost certain to get into a respectable school on her own. But her
parents are confident that C can get into a top-tier university with their help. So they
sit down with C and help her write a terrific application. C is admitted to a top-tier
university as a result.
Once again, we have a case where it seems natural to describe an agent as a caregiver, and to
describe the actions they perform as caring. But the aid C’s parents give her does not seem to
count as meeting a need – C is perfectly capable of leading a rich and fulfilling life if she attends
a mid-tier school. Nevertheless, we seem to think that there is something caring about C’s
parents acting in her interests (that is, benefitting her or giving her some advantage even if it is
not needed).563
On the view I have just presented, care represents a distinct and unitary act-type because
its purpose/intention is to meet needs. But if either of the counterexamples above are
convincing, then the definition we have just offered, and theories such as Clark Miller’s which
are premised on those definitions, seem to run up against everyday locution. Care, as we use
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the term in ordinary language, also aims sometimes at satisfying desires or furthering interests,
and one could surely come up with cases where one cares by accommodating preferences. But
if this is the case, then we appear to have several distinct act-types, and we do indeed equivocate
in describing all of these actions as ‘caring.’ We might, in that case, simply bite the bullet and
accept that our account of care departs somewhat from ordinary language. In this section,
however, I should like to say something about the philosophy of need and its implications for
the scope of care as an act-type. On the view I espouse, the appropriate account of need is
Aristotelian in that needs are defined as those things without which one cannot flourish (what
Anscombe sometimes calls ‘Aristotelian necessity’564 – a term which Foot also adopts in
Natural Goodness).565
Philosophers of need have long argued over what exactly a need is, and why needs are
morally significant. Almost all commentators take the basic structure of ‘needs-claims’ to be
something like ‘A needs x for some purpose P,’ where A typically refers to some living thing.
Aristotle analyses necessity in the Metaphysics, where he tells us that all necessities share the
claim that “something cannot be” without them.566 Thinkers like Reader cite this approvingly,567
and from this it makes sense (but it is not necessary) to construe needs-statements as
conditionals of the form ‘if A’s need for x goes unmet, then P cannot obtain.’ At this level of
generality, x and P are substitutable with anything, regardless of the truth of the ensuing
statement, the attainability of the end, the availability of the means, and so forth. And, McLeod
points out, “whatever is needed can be lacked.”568 As Thomson notes in Needs,569 the verb
‘need’ can also have at this stage both normative and non-normative meaning. Statements such
as “Jane needs a pen to write” conform to this structure as well as “Arthur needs his partner’s
support” does. Furthermore, needs-claims do not entail lack.570 It makes sense to state that A
needs food to survive, whether or not A has any food in her possession. But needs-claims do
often imply that the needed item is absent, and derivatives of ‘need’ may entail lack (“the
needy”).
Here I should like to advance an Anscombean theory of need, which allows us to explain
the unity of caring actions despite the apparent heterogeneity of the items in care’s ambit. In
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“Modern Moral Philosophy,” Anscombe explains that “to say that [an organism] needs that
environment is not to say, e.g. that you want it to have that environment, but that it won’t
flourish unless it has it.”571 To say that A needs x is thus to say that she will not flourish unless
she has x. Many considerations picked out by care ethicists fit naturally into this schema.
Children cannot flourish unless they have a loving parent who takes care of them. The infirm
cannot flourish unless they have medical professionals like nurses and doctors to heal them.
Because human beings cannot flourish outside of loving relationships, and because they are
corporeal beings which can be injured or harmed, they need caregivers to help them grow and
to help them recover from injury. This is not to say that needs only make sense within this
eudaimonistic framework. There is no need here to suggest that a child’s claim to need a toy is
nonsensical, since they may well need it in order to maximally enjoy their afternoon. But
whether or not that need is morally compelling – that is, whether that needs-claim accurately
represents a morally significant source of disvalue – turns on whether the toy is necessary for
eudaimonia.572
Notice that this conception of need appears to broaden care’s scope significantly. In
particular, it is no longer clear that we equivocate when we suggest that care aims to satisfy
needs alongside desires, interests, and preferences.573 One could now argue, quite reasonably,
that the flourishing life involves at least some satisfaction of desires, some aid in the pursuit of
one’s interests, and some accommodation of one’s preferences. As Annas tells us, “a happy life
is one you enjoy, one you find pleasant, want to continue with, find sustaining.” 574 Aristotle
says of the temperate person that:
things that are pleasant and conducive to health or vigour he desires in a moderate
way, as is right, and other pleasant things as well, as long as they are not
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incompatible with health or vigour, contrary to what is noble, or beyond his
means.575
Thus, he tells us that temperance involves not total abstention from food, drink, and sex, but an
appropriate desire for these things. Though temperance aims to mediate bodily pleasures,
Aristotle, like Annas, thinks that the flourishing life will involve satisfaction of our desires for
those things at least some of the time. But notice also that because the approach here includes
desires only insofar as desire-satisfaction is an element of the flourishing life, only certain sorts
of desires are morally salient, and they ought only to be met in certain circumstances. Because
the claim is that meeting desires is only an aspect of care because desire-satisfaction is one
aspect of eudaimonia, one does not care if one satisfies vicious desires. Since the desire to
torture puppies would never feature in a virtuous life, and virtue is a necessary condition for
and element of eudaimonia, one does not care for another in enabling them to do so.
Yet this seems like a reasonable limitation on the claim that care involves desire
satisfaction. The sorts of desires we would hope to accommodate in allowing for desire
satisfaction include such things as the desire to catch up with an old friend, to make one’s
parents proud, and so forth. We are surely not going to admit that care can include satisfying
desires to exact revenge on a rival, to murder one’s elderly parents for the sake of an inheritance,
and so forth. Even good desires may not always need to be satisfied, however. To say that a life
is eudaimon is to make an evaluation of that life as a whole. Yet it is clear that particular desires,
even when they are such as a temperate, honourable, virtuous person would have, are not
typically serious enough to impact an evaluation of one’s life as a whole. If D wants a specific
book and never receives it, we do not think she is much worse off. But it does seem that the
assessment changes if we say that D is an avid reader and never receives any of the books she
dearly wants to read. Thus care may not require us to satisfy every good desire we encounter –
we do not fail to care if we do not satisfy every good desire we are confronted with – but it does
seem to require us to meet desires sometimes. So it seems that framing eudaimonia as care’s
end allows us to treat desire-satisfaction as an aspect of care without (a) equivocating, (b)
prescribing the satisfaction of all types of desires, or (c) claiming that good desires must always
be met.576
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We might nevertheless wonder whether the account here is overpermissive in other ways.
Recall that Bubeck draws a distinction between those needs which we can meet ourselves and
those needs which we need others to meet. In meeting the former, we provide only a ‘personal
service,’ not ‘care.’ Bubeck draws this distinction in part to exclude cases which we do not
ordinarily call care – car manufacturers meet a need in supplying their clients with cars, but this
is not typically regarded as care work.577 We might wonder whether the account here succumbs
to a similar concern. But though it is indeed true that many of us could not flourish without cars
in modern society, it does not follow from this that car manufacturers thereby become
caregivers in some counterintuitive way. Firstly, many of us require transportation, not cars.
Prior to the industrial revolution many people had similar locomotive needs but met them in
other ways, as indeed many of us meet our locomotive needs by public transportation or by
walking. Strictly speaking, the set of people who cannot meet their eudaimonistic needs without
cars is dramatically smaller than the set of people who cannot meet their eudaimonistic needs
without some form of transportation. Cars themselves are not ends, they are means to ends.
Second, this objection might understate the import of certain modes of transport for some. To
the able-bodied it might seem odd to regard cars as important or indispensable means to ends,
but this intuition will almost certainly not be shared by those of us with physical disabilities,
caregivers who work in emergency medicine, or rural workers who must travel long distances
on a regular basis to make ends meet. In these cases, car manufacturers remain suppliers of
means to ends, but they are not unimportant means to ends. I do not, therefore, think that
Bubeck’s concern is particularly worrisome for the account here.
Since my approach here is Aristotelian/virtue ethical, there is no immediate problem with
act-types which aim specifically at flourishing or certain elements thereof. There is already a
concept to hand, and no reason, as far as I can see, to think that meeting needs pertaining to
eudaimonia cannot function as an end characteristic of particular act-types. And as we have
already observed, care ethicists have also posited some account of flourishing as an aim of care
(e.g. Lynch, Petterson, and Mayseless), so there does seem to be some grounding for this
position in both camps. In what follows, I shall assume the defensibility of this picture of caring
actions.
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3.

Caring as a Practice

To many care ethicists, this account will not be completely satisfactory, because the concept of
action, even when coupled with the concept of virtue, still cannot encapsulate care. This, after
all, is why care many care ethicists focus on concepts of practice over concepts of action – such
concepts seem to better highlight important features of care which concepts of action and acttypes do not. But the account I have sketched here is intended in part to form the bedrock for
such conceptions of care as a practice (and as work/labour). Whether and how care qualifies as
a practice depends, however, on which account of practice one buys into. Consider, for instance,
MacIntyre’s influential understanding of a practice. As he defines it, a practice is:
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of
trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are
systematically extended.578
This is a far higher standard, of course, than Held’s, Tronto’s, or Ruddick’s, and MacIntyre has
thereby excluded a number of activities which we intuitively call practices.579 But rather than
attempting to show that care qualifies as a sort of practice using one particular theory of
practices or another, it is perhaps better simply to note that whether care qualifies as a practice
depends entirely on how one defines each concept,580 and to argue instead that theories of
practice remain useful here by appealing to certain widely endorsed elements of a practice.
Practice’s social dimensions are one of the more interesting of these. Caring actions take
place in the midst of various relations, including relations extraneous to the caregiver-recipient
relation. Care is observed, tracked, evaluated, aided, hindered, commandeered, and reallocated
by external forces. As Tronto points out, care’s social nature introduces power dynamics to
caring relations.581 These power dynamics may, as she says, exist between the caregiver and
the care recipient, but one thought underpinning Tronto’s Caring Democracy is that caring
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relations are subject to powers extraneous to the caregiver-recipient relation. Caring relations
are caught up in the power dynamics of the wider family, society, profession, state, and even
the international community. This is not mysterious – it is common knowledge that family
members can meddle in caring relations, that professional caregivers are held to their particular
profession’s standards, and so forth. Tronto also points out that Democracy is itself a process
of allocating care responsibilities and then distributing (or withholding) support for
caregivers.582 Care is organised and institutionalised.583 Because of this some are able to foist
care upon others and ignore the needs of those who require care – what Tronto calls in Moral
Boundaries “privileged irresponsibility.”584 MacIntyre’s approach to practices reminds of these
dynamics also. As MacIntyre points out, in taking on social dimensions, practices of care are
subjected to communal norms or standards of excellence (which themselves represent an
exercise of power).585 One need not think that all caring practices are social in this way.
Practices associated with self-care often are not social in any obvious way (indeed, many of
them are unsocial).586 But the fact that care often is social adds several layers of complexity to
the account.
This is not to say that care’s immersion in a complex web of power relations is always to
its detriment either. We expect nurses and teachers to be held to certain professional standards,
and we want children to be protected to some extent by institutional standards for their
caregivers’ conduct. Indeed, it seems to be the case that structuring care will often make it
easier. In subjecting certain caring practices to sets of norms, we afford caregivers certain
epistemic shortcuts by making certain sorts of decisions for them and by pointing them in
particular deliberative directions. Professional codes of conduct enshrine certain prohibitions
which enable smoother decision-making for those occupying the role of caregiver in morally
thorny situations. Thus, when these issues are dealt with well, doctors do not have to shoulder
the burden of moral decisions about confidentiality or about patient autonomy – in such cases
the imposition of norms by entities external to the caring relation prove beneficial. The point
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here is therefore not that external norms and standards of excellence are morally impermissible
or harmful to the caring relation, but simply that regarding care as a practice rather than an acttype sensitises us to these sorts of power dynamics.
MacIntyre’s understanding of internal goods also seems informative. MacIntyre
distinguishes goods internal to a practice from those external to a practice. Internal goods are
internal to a practice in the sense that they cannot be obtained except by participating in that
practice or one sufficiently similar, nor can they be specified except in that particular practice’s
terms.587 These goods can only be identified, moreover, by one who has participated in that
practice, since these goods come to be known only through experience.588 As an example,
MacIntyre offers a story about a child learning to play chess. Though the child shows no interest
in chess at first, MacIntyre offers him candy if he plays, and more candy if he wins. Eventually,
MacIntyre tells us:
there will come a time when the child will find in those goods specific to chess, in
the achievement of a certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, strategic
imagination and competitive intensity, a new set of reasons, reasons now not just
for winning on a particular occasion, but for trying to excel in whatever way the
game of chess demands.589
There are some parallels here with what care ethicists have said about practices. Bubeck
suggests that care ethics draws on a “system of concepts, values, and ideas, arising from the
practice of care as an organic part of this practice and responding to its material requirements,
notably the meeting of needs.”590 Like MacIntyre, Bubeck thinks that the practice of care
engenders, or ought to engender, in us a particular set of attitudes about the practices of caring
itself. And though Noddings came under fire for overoptimism on this point,591 care ethicists
have often written of the internal goods which arise in the course of caring. Ruddick, for
example, writes that “maternal practices begin in love, a love which for most mothers is as
intense, confusing, ambivalent, and poignantly sweet as any they will experience.”592
Comments such as these suggest that there is something like a phenomenology of caring
practice, or possibly even a phenomenology of good care – some such thing as ‘what it is like
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to engage in caring practices as one ought to.’ So treating care as a practice may open up space
for a fuller phenomenology than the (sparse and elementary) one I offered in Section 2.
Internal goods do not just benefit the practitioner, however. It is also interesting to note
that practices are often thought to involve benefitting one’s community in some sense.
MacIntyre’s understanding of communal benefits is restricted to that community of
practitioners. Building on his discussion of internal goods, MacIntyre writes that:
Internal goods are indeed the outcome of competition to excel, but it is characteristic
of them that their achievement is a good for the whole community who participate
in the practice. So when Turner transformed the seascape in painting or W. G. Grace
advanced the art of batting in cricket in a quite new way their achievement enriched
the whole relevant community.593
Similar examples can be thought of in caring contexts. Florence Nightingale excelled in her
field and as a result revolutionised nursing, enriching the medical profession and the lives of
those dependent upon it. Indeed, Nightingale’s example will be interesting also to those who
think that practices contribute not only to the good of the community of practitioners, but also
to the good of their wider society too. The competition to excel described by MacIntyre
advances the practice in part by driving innovation and pushing frontiers. A practice of care
would be unusual, however, because, unlike some of MacIntyre’s practices (chess, for
example), we depend upon it both for our own lives and for the proper functioning of society.
Excellent care, as we see in Nightingale’s case, can be a major contribution to one’s society as
a whole, as can excellence in fields like teaching or parenting.594
I take it, then, that there is some value in the study of caring practices qua a kind of action
or activity. Treating practices as a subcategory of action does not lead us to abandon the concept
of practice, because that concept remains analytically useful. It may well be the case that a less
basic or general understanding of practices will raise other interesting and important points too.
Further specifying the subcategories of action enhances our understanding of care as it appears
at the coalface. So the greater specificity we allow for at the conceptual level, the better our
account reflects the various forms care takes in our lives. I want now to explore some of the
moral implications of the theory of caring actions we have just laid out.
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4.

Care and Good Care

The account presented above may not appear to be of any special interest to ethicists
whatsoever. In laying out our theory of caring actions, I have argued that an action which is
caring is not, eo ipso, morally good or right. I have also suggested that caring actions do not
always involve morally good value judgements or motivations. If this is the case, however,
then it seems that the account here is wholly detached from the virtues studied in the previous
chapter, and indeed from ethics more broadly. But the account of caring actions defended here
is not detached entirely from ethics. Indeed, this account of caring actions is fairly standard
amongst virtue ethicists, who, as we say in Chapter 3, are equally noncommittal about the moral
status of most other actions barring those which are ‘conceptually verdictive.’ And as such,
much that has been written about topics like euthanasia, abortion, and prostitution can be
applied here.595 But the account of care defended here has some interesting implications for
ethics which are grounded in or seek to incorporate care. Perhaps the most obvious of these is
that if care is to be both a character trait or collection thereof and a kind of practice or activity,
then it seems reasonable to ask also whether there is any relationship between the two kinds of
care. I have already defended the claim that care is not governed by any one virtue, but rather
by an array of virtues whose precincts all include (eudaimonistic) needs. So caring actions are
the province of a whole host of virtues, including but not limited to charity or whichever other
analogue proves most suitable.
Here I should like to explore two more implications of this account for care theory. In
Section 4.1. I note that our definition of care is inconsistent with some care ethicists’
requirement that caring actions meet needs successfully. I suggest that there is something to this
thought, but that the Anscombean account outperforms the alternative by highlighting the
important and underexplored distinction between care and good care. In Section 4.2., I note that
meeting eudaimonistic needs well requires in at least some cases that one have a particular sort
of character, thereby tying excellence in one field to excellence in the other, and this chapter to
the preceding one. There is not sufficient scope here to address all of the ethical implications
of our theory of caring actions, but I hope to give some sense of the deep connections between
an Anscombean theory of caring actions and our broader virtue ethical framework.
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4.1. Consequences and Good Care
Noddings once provocatively claimed that “care theory is consequentialist.”596 In doing so, she
did not intend to bring care into line with thinkers like Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick. Rather,
she meant there to emphasise the import of caring successfully. For Noddings, care ethics
“demands to know whether relations of care have in fact been established, maintained, or
enhanced, and by extension it counsels us to consider effects on the whole web or network of
care.”597 Thus:
We cannot reasonably leave the description of caring at the purely
phenomenological level. We want some sort of positive result for the cared-for,
perhaps growth, as Mayeroff suggests, or happiness and reasonable comfort, as
Butler suggests, or at least freedom from unnecessary suffering.598
Care is not care, to Noddings, unless it actually meets needs. And Noddings is not alone in
defending a view like this. Kittay too sees care as necessarily successful, writing that:
I may intend to care for a parched plant by watering it, but if unbeknownst to me,
the glass of clear liquid I pour in the plant contains vinegar, not water, most would
agree that, despite my good intentions, I have failed to care for it.599
These statements about the nature of care sit in opposition to the Anscombean theory of care
we have laid out in the preceding sections (and, notably, in opposition to the theory of care
espoused by care ethicists like Collins). According to the view we have defended, actions are
caring if their proximate end is to meet eudaimonistic needs. This, we have said, does not entail
anything about whether or not that action succeeds in bringing about its end. A nurse cares for
a patient by administering medication whether or not that patient recovers; a parent cares for a
child by helping her with her homework whether or not that child learns.600 What is not in
doubt, however, is that care theorists, like other ethicists, must make sense of consequences.
As Rawls notes in A Theory of Justice, “all ethical doctrines worth our attention take
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consequences into account in judging rightness. One that did not would simply be irrational,
crazy.”601 So the motivation for endorsing a success criterion is a reasonable one.
But these success criteria are open to counterexamples such as those offered by Collins in
The Core of Care Ethics. Collins invites us to consider the following example:
Imagine that you and I each separately stumble upon injured dogs. We each put the
dog that we find into the back of our cars and attempt to drive them to the nearest
vet. While your dog reaches the vet in good time and is healed, I get caught in traffic
and arrive at the vet five minutes too late. It seems odd, one might think, to say that
your action is more valuable than mine. Your action does a lot more good for your
animal than my action does for mine. But we might think that this should not affect
the moral assessment of the action.602
Here Collins draws attention to a problem which stems from the conflation of descriptive and
normative senses of care. If, as is the case in Noddings’ work, the distinction is unclear or
missing entirely, then that lack of a distinction between caring actions and successful caring
actions gives rise to counterintuitive assessments in cases of moral luck like the one above. But
care ethicists who do not make this conflation seem to face a similar worry, since it does seem
odd to describe one scenario’s actions as caring and the other’s as non-caring (or perhaps
uncaring) given that they are identical except for the contributions of moral luck.
Implementing a success criterion for caring action is not the only way to factor the
intuitive import of outcomes into a theory of care, however. Another is to subdivide care into
different categories, and apply that criterion to something like ‘good’ or ‘ideal’ care. It is
possible, on such accounts, for an action to be marred by misfortune or poor decision-making
and yet still be caring.603 And once we introduce a distinction like this, moral concepts take
center stage. Success-criterial care discards care which is not successful and thereby loses sight
of the moral failings which non-ideal care sometimes stems from. Jettisoning failures from our
central concept or set of concepts obscures other important moral concepts such as, for
instance, wrongdoing, innocence, culpability, and blameworthiness (and it is telling, perhaps,
that Kittay considers neither of these in unpacking her example above). Retaining the
distinction between successful and unsuccessful care brings moral concepts like these squarely
into view. Of course, we will want to retain a distinction also between non-culpable and
601
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culpable failures to meet needs too.604 So we might think, say, that successful care is a feature
of ‘ideal’ care but not necessarily a feature of ‘good’ care, since the latter only predicates
goodness of the caregiver’s own actions. But the point here is just that there is good reason to
maintain a distinction between success and failure within our concept of care, instead of
exporting failure to some other moral concept which sees less traffic – not necessarily for the
sake of assigning blame or meting out punishment, but for the sake of caring successfully.
Speaking of successful care, and considering success an element of ideal but perhaps not
good care, highlights one other important and hitherto underexplored category of care: wise
care. We have already seen that practical wisdom is a pillar of Aristotelian theories of virtue,
and I will not rehash those points here, but we can see how a carer who excels at means-ends
reasoning will be better able to care well. A practically wise caregiver in Kittay’s scenario will
be cognizant, for example, of the fact that she was cooking with vinegar earlier, and left a glass
of it on the table near the plant. She may think first to smell or taste the liquid in the glass to
see whether it is indeed water. A less wise caregiver may not be so thoughtful or perceptive,
and thus be more responsible for the same failure to meet needs. Of course, there may be no
reason to be suspicious of the glass of vinegar, and in those cases neither the wise caregiver
nor the unwise caregiver will be at fault.605 But Kittay fails to ask such questions, and in doing
so, neglects to ask whether there is anything the caregiver could have done better next time.
This, I take it, is a question which care ethicists want to consider seriously. Whether or not we
take the provision of a theory of right action to be a central ethical undertaking, taking
successful care as an end requires in part that we dissect cases of unsuccessful care. And
retaining a concept of care which is suboptimal or fails entirely encourages just this. Therefore,
an Anscombean account seems to afford consequences a more fitting place in the framework,
but also to underscore important avenues for discussion which have received insufficient
attention from care theorists.

4.2. Caring For and Caring About

The distinction between care and good care also raises other interesting points about the
separability of caring actions and a caring character. A reader familiar with care ethics will by
this point have noticed the similarities between the distinction I have drawn between caring
Noddings is not unaware of this – she acknowledges it in Educating Moral People, at 57.
And these are cases which virtue ethics can also explain well, since neo-Aristotelianism places significant
emphasis on moral luck.
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actions and a caring character and the distinction some care ethicists draw between what are
sometimes called ‘caring about’ and ‘caring for.’606 There is no widespread agreement over the
nature of these concepts or what exactly the distinction between them is, but a distinction in
this family is being made here. On the view I take here, if I care for someone (that is, act with
the aim of meeting her eudaimonistic needs), I do not necessarily care about her (that is, feel
some sort of goodwill or benevolence towards her, or take some interest in her flourishing for
her own sake).607 In most paradigmatic cases, the two overlap; I care for another person because
I care about them. And it is sometimes acknowledged that these cases are paradigmatic not
only in the sense that they are our closest caring relations, but also in the sense that they are the
contexts in which particular needs are most reliably met.608 It is hardly implausible to suggest
that we dependably meet the needs of those closest to us because we are so deeply invested in
their wellbeing. But though the distinction between concepts akin to caring for and caring about
is relatively common, the relation between these concepts is largely terra nova.
One noteworthy point here is that it is difficult, indeed sometimes impossible, to meet
some needs without first caring about whomever is in need. And we can distinguish between
at least two sources or kinds of difficulty. The first will be familiar to readers acquainted with
the literature on friendship. The sort of familiarity and understanding we find in paradigmatic
caring relations expands the set of needs to which we can and ought to respond. 609 It is our
friends and family who can and ought to comfort us when we are grieving, ask us if anything
is wrong when something seems amiss, or share in our triumphs. The knowledge that another
cares about us allows us to let our guard down, to seek out and accept offers of help for a range
of problems we do not want or trust strangers and acquaintances to help with. So it seems that
there are certain sorts of needs which cannot be met unless I believe that the would-be caregiver
also cares about me. This kind of argument for a connection between caring actions and caring
character traits is, however, problematic, for the satiability of those needs requires only that I
believe that I am cared about, not that I am actually cared about. Examples of this abound in
fiction and myth,610 but they are also familiar in fields such as education, where it is easy to
see how one might pretend to care and thereby meet needs which one could not meet
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otherwise.611 In such cases, one can (and must) act as though one cares, even though one might
not.
But this is not the only connection to be drawn between caring actions and the caring
character traits. A stronger connection is to be found in virtue ethical accounts of moral
deliberation. Because possessing the virtues involves knowledge of (and commitment to) the
human good, the virtuous agent understands what eudaimonistic needs are and what they might
require of caregivers, which is just to say that the virtuous agent understands what good/ideal
care aims at in some given situation.612 This grasp of the human good informs their actions,
which, since they are also the outcome of excellent practical deliberation, are the benchmark
for right action. The virtuous agent is not going to misunderstand the role of autonomy in the
flourishing life, for instance, nor will they make blameworthy mistakes in allowing for that
autonomy, so they will not be overbearing in caring for their child, but neither will their
supervision be too lax. Thus, if I hope to care well, I should nurture the caring character traits,
since possessing those traits involves a correct understanding of what care aims to achieve. It
is possible to overstate this argument, of course. Just how often virtuous agents will have sole
epistemic access to what eudaimonistic needs consist in turns on one’s favoured standard for
virtue, and how much epistemic access one believes non-virtuous agents have to the human
good. It is surely implausible to suggest that those of us who are non-virtuous care with no
sense of the human good whatsoever. But it is markedly less implausible to suggest that there
are some goods whose place in human life are known only to moral exemplars. Thornier cases,
where what a particular care recipient needs in order to flourish is less clear, will be cases where
phronimoi outperform others.
This is not, of course, to say that virtuous agents act paternalistically in trying to meet
needs or without concern for the intended beneficiary’s own views. Feminist philosophers in
general have been especially adamant that minorities and marginalised groups ought not to
have their needs determined for them. Nancy Fraser complains of “struggles over the who and
how of need interpretation, struggles to empower women to interpret their own needs and to
challenge the anti-participatory, monological practices of the welfare system,”613 and though
she aims to critique systemic hurdles for feminism, her concerns are equally applicable to the
actions of particular virtuous agents. Though I have suggested that virtuous agents have special
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insights into the human good, it does not follow that they are omniscient, as though they could
perform perfectly caring actions without ever consulting those for whom they care. The
virtuous agent’s special insights must be accompanied by the kinds of attentiveness and
willingness to listen and learn which care ethicists have stressed. Virtuous caregivers, like any
other caregivers, must treat their care-recipients as particular individuals with special epistemic
access to their own needs.614
In light of these discussions, it seems reasonable to suppose that the account of caring
actions defended here has a number of interesting and significant links to moral philosophy.
Not only does it tie in nicely with intuitions about the moral import of caring successfully, it
also opens a discussion about the interplay between caring about and caring for – an interplay
which, I have suggested, has several exciting and underexplored dimensions.

5.

Conclusion

The overarching aim of this chapter has been to expound upon an Aristotelian theory of caring
actions. We began by noting that Chapter 4’s account of care was reflective neither of what
many care ethicists have had to say about care, nor of what Aristotle himself had to say about
it. We followed with a brief survey of Anscombe’s influential philosophy of action, and
demonstrated how that theory meshed well with care ethical theories of action and practice.
We then developed an understanding of caring actions as those which meet eudaimonistic
needs, and though we did not defend any particular account of practices, we noted that some
of the more commonly held elements of a practice remain informative despite our endorsing a
kind of reductionism. Section 4 then explored some moral dimensions of this account of caring
actions, showing that it yields an account of consequences, and of the distinction between
caring about and caring for, which are both defensible and philosophically interesting.
As has been noted, care can be other things besides an activity, practice, and virtue. Care
can be a profession, an emotion, a techne, and so on. We have, moreover, barely scratched the
surface of what is to be said on the topics we have been discussing. So I have not attempted to
provide a complete philosophy of caring actions here. But it seems necessary to me to develop
concepts of care like this in addition to concepts of care as a virtue, because a multifaceted
account of care seems to better represent the moral landscape. Thus, I take the primary
contribution of this chapter to the literature to be its theory of caring actions and practices. But
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an additional contribution, discussed at the outset of this chapter, is to help reinvigorate the
study of the philosophy of action in contemporary virtue ethics. As I have argued, virtue
ethicists writing today do not always engage very deeply with this particular branch of
philosophy of action. The discussion of care stands to benefit greatly from this engagement,
however, and insofar as this chapter makes a step in that direction, I take it to have made another
contribution to the discourse.
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VII
Caring Relations and the Politics of Dependency
Notions of care as a virtue and as an act-type/practice will be amongst the most important
concepts in a virtue ethical theory of care. A third kind of care, which together with the two
kinds we have just developed seems to make up the conceptual core of care, is the caring
relation. We have already devoted much of Chapter 2 to caring relations, but in Chapter 2 my
concern was to trace the contours of the care ethical approach to caring relations, and for that
reason the account was relatively broad, fairly shallow, and not obviously relevant to virtue
ethicists. Here, I wish to delve more deeply into the concept of caring relations in continuance
of our project of developing a satisfying theory of care.
I begin with an account of caring relations which draws on themes developed in Chapters
2 and 3. I also tease apart three kinds of caring relation which a virtue ethical theory of care
ought to be sensitive to, namely non-ideal, ideal, and good caring relations. Section 2 offers
some thoughts on caring relations as reasons for action, defending the claim that ideal caring
relations both supply and strengthen good reasons for action. Section 3 uses the distinctions
drawn in Section 1 to highlight the indispensability of institutional arrangements which are
conducive to the care-recipient’s flourishing. I argue that caregivers who take their carerecipient’s eudaimonia as their end ought both to be watchful for institutional failures to meet
eudaimonistic needs, and to be disposed to alter them. Section 4 focuses on caring actions in
the context of caring relations, with particular emphasis on caregivers who lack political
capital. I survey some of the options available to these caregivers, and suggest that
incorporating care into our theory of virtue allows us to add something novel to recent work in
feminist virtue ethics. This chapter thus serves several purposes. One of these is to round off
an Aristotelian theory of care, another is to show how the concepts we have been developing
thus far hang together, the third is to demonstrate that these concepts raise interesting discursive
avenues, and the fourth is to show that they are analytically helpful when it comes to particular
problems in applied ethics.
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1.

Caring Relations

In this section I further unpack caring relations. My approach deviates once again from the
preceding chapters. There are, recall, several different treatments of caring relations already in
play, and I do not have space here to adjudicate between all of them. Nor indeed is there a clear
need to do so, since it may well be the case that we can consistently entertain several useful
means of cashing out the concept. Here I shall look more deeply into just one account of caring
relations which the Aristotelian virtue ethicist might find useful. Much of that account can,
however, be borrowed from care ethics, as scholars like MacIntyre have already deemed
necessary.615 So I shall not devote this entire chapter to either defending one account’s
superiority, to explicating it in full, or to laying the foundations for a novel account of care. My
aim in this section is simply to sketch one plausible and serviceable account of caring relations,
which can then be added to the understandings of care which we have already discussed to
form the core of a virtue ethical theory of care. I begin by briefly rehashing the connection
between dependency relations and caring relations. Section 1.1. adds a distinction between
good, ideal, and non-ideal caring relations. This distinction raises a number of important points,
but perhaps most interestingly, it highlights just how often the quality of our caring relations
comes down to external factors. Section 1.2. then discusses the role caring relations play in
moral deliberation. I suggest that we conceive of caring relations both as sources of reasons for
action, and as considerations which alter the relative weights of reasons for action. This lays
the groundwork for our discussion of virtue politics in Section 2.
It might, to begin with, be pertinent to say something in defence of the claim that virtue
ethicists do not hold an inconsistent or competing account of caring relations. Though they
often discuss relation, and particular kinds thereof, virtue ethicists have not advanced anything
like a theory of caring relations. Friendly, romantic, and parental relations are not, after all, the
only sorts of caring relations. Indeed, as Annas notes, it is not even clear that the parental
relation qualifies as philia.616 And even on the more expansive definitions of philia defended
by the ancients, the relation I enter into when I donate to a child in the Third World does not
seem to qualify, nor do other instances of Samaritanism. As I argued in Chapter 5, some caring
relations also do not seem to involve anything like mutual eunoia, nor do we think that a caring
relation requires this. There is no discernible goodwill on an infant’s part, nor is there obviously
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mutual goodwill in a conflictual relation between a nurse and her upset patient, or between a
parent and her disgruntled teenager. Like any care theorist who treats (at least one of) these
relations as paradigmatic, my inclination in such cases is not to say that no caring relation exists
in these cases, but rather that whatever relation obtains between philoi is not coextensive with
care. Theorising about any particular kind of caring relation does not present us with an account
of the caring relation itself – caring relations, whatever they consist in, seem to be more
ontologically basic than these categories of relation. So I do not take philia to be inconsistent
or in competition with care as we have defined and shall define it. I take it that an account of
caring relations can be added to virtue ethics without generating internal inconsistencies with
its most obvious potential analogue.
Recall that according to one prominent view, caring relations arise from dependency
relations.617 Dependency relations are typically thought to obtain when one person or entity
depends on another to meet a particular need or set thereof. So, to use a classic example, a
dependency relation obtains between a child and her parent because she depends on her mother
to provide her with food and shelter. Dependency relations need not induce a response,
however. I can depend on another to meet a need without their ever coming to my aid. In fact,
they may never even know that I am dependent upon them – they may fail to notice a need
entirely, as Mrs. Jellyby does through much of Bleak House, or they might not recognise a need
for what it is, as climate sceptics do. Caring relations are not like this; paradigmatic caring
relations all involve the performance of caring actions – that is, an agent acting with the aim of
meeting eudaimonistic needs. A dependency relation intuitively obtains when I encounter a
need, but it seems more apt to say that I ought to enter into a caring relation when I encounter
such a need than to say that just encountering the need establishes one. We encounter needs
constantly, after all, and we do not usually think that merely coming across a need is sufficient
also to initiate a caring relation as if we entered into multiple new caring relations every day,
though it is natural enough to say that it initiates a dependency relation. Nor, for that matter,
do acknowledgement or emotional engagement seem to suffice here. I may acknowledge or
engage emotionally with reports of suffering in the Middle East, but that is not ordinarily
regarded as the commencement of a caring relation (though if I respond to that emotional
engagement by sending food or medical supplies, this certainly seems to qualify). A
dependency relation transitions into a caring relation when I perform a caring action in
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response to an encountered need. In other words, it is the performance of an act-type of the sort
outlined in Chapter 6 which initiates a caring relation.
This is not, as we saw in Chapter 2, an entirely novel account of caring relations – it is a
view of care advanced also by Collins in The Core of Care Ethics, who tells us that “the action
‘care’ always entails a relation between a carer and an object,”618 and defended by Held who,
as we saw in Chapter 4, takes aim at Slote’s account for missing:
the centrality of caring relations for an ethic of care […] To be a caring person
requires more than the right motives or dispositions. It requires the ability to engage
in the practice of care, and the exercise of this ability.619
Like Collins, Held thinks that a caring relation requires one to act caringly, otherwise the
relation does not obtain. And Noddings defends a similar claim, maintaining that:
care only takes place in relationships of care. Attempting to analyse the concept of
care in abstraction from the caring relation in which it is necessarily expressed is,
therefore, ‘mistaken’ because it is not possible.620
Collins and Noddings may have overstated the claim, however; it could well be possible to
perform a caring action without occasioning a caring relation, since we can imagine cases where
I act with the intention of meeting a eudaimonistic need but am mistaken in thinking that a
dependency relation exists. While a child might perform a caring action for a toy, the toy does
not depend on the child and, therefore, a caring relation between the two is precluded. 621 In
contrast to Collins’ and Noddings’ view, on my account a caring action performed in response
to a dependent’s actual need is both a necessary and sufficient condition for a caring relation.622

1.1. Ideal and Non-Ideal Caring Relations
A caring relation, as we said in Chapter 2, is also sometimes defined – perhaps somewhat
counterintuitively – as an ideal dependency relation; one in which a caregiver actually meets
the eudaimonistic needs of the care-recipient, and thereby discharges their moral
responsibilities.623 Here, however, I wish to distinguish mere caring relations from good caring
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relations, and both of these from ideal caring relations, a division which is intended not only
to map onto evaluations of caring relations, but also to emphasise the import of moral luck, and
thereby to set the scene for the following sections of this chapter.
A mere caring relation, as I define it here, involves the performance of a caring action
but can be either good or bad along several axes. Though a mere caring relation will always
begin with a caring action, that caring action is not necessarily the right action for the caregiver
to perform in that particular context. I may, as Mrs. Jellyby does, spend all of my time on
philanthropy and neglect my own children’s needs. Though in other circumstances such charity
might be morally praiseworthy or right, it is clear, in this case, that Mrs. Jellyby fails to perform
the right action (and this is certainly how Dickens intends to portray her in Bleak House).
Nevertheless, on the account here Mrs. Jellyby’s actions do qualify as caring actions and do
meet an authentic need, and she therefore does participate in a caring relation. Second, mere
caring relations do not necessarily involve the correct mental states and habits. In Chapter 6 I
argued that we ought not to restrict caring actions to those which stem from a particular
motivational structure. Mere caring relations can be entered into for any reason, and for that
reason our apathetic nurse does participate in genuine caring relations. Finally, mere caring
relations do not necessarily involve successful caring actions. Even relations where a
caregiver’s efforts seem always to fall short (as, for example, Juliet’s nurse’s do in Romeo and
Juliet) qualify as mere caring relations.
Good caring relations are also a kind of non-ideal caring relation, but they are unlike
mere caring relations in that the caregiver responds as they ought to – in other words, a caring
action performed in the context of a good caring relation will also be the right action and it will
be performed with the right motivational underpinnings. What mere and good caring relations
have in common is that a good caring relation remains subject to moral luck. This
understanding of caring relations thus makes use of success criteria similar to those we rejected
in discussing caring actions. A caregiver might care as they ought to, but fail nevertheless to
meet a need because of some factor which they could not have foreseen or which is beyond
their control. As was the case for our theory of caring actions, the theory of good caring
relations advanced here does not require that one succeeds in meeting a need in order for the
relation to obtain. A theory of caring relations ought, in my view, to leave conceptual space for
caring relations where actually meeting needs is impossible. Surely some sort of caring relation
obtains between a loving mother and her child, even if some circumstance – say, a congenital
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defect – prevents one from meeting the other’s needs.624 It does not seem particularly jarring
to suggest that despite such circumstances a caring relation exists or can come into existence.
Nor does it seem odd to suggest that a caring relation obtains between a benefactor who
attempts but fails to care for another from a distance. Suppose I enter into a scheme where I
donate a certain amount of money to pay for a particular child’s education in a remote part of
the world. Even if, for some reason, the funds do not reach their destination, it is not unnatural
to call the relation between the benefactor and the child a caring one. Nor for that matter do we
have any trouble calling relations between nurses and their patients caring, even if, despite her
best efforts, the nurse in question fails to meet some patient’s survival needs. It does not seem
a misnomer, then, to suggest that a relation is caring even if it does not ultimately meet
particular eudaimonistic needs.
An ideal caring relation, by contrast, is one in which such factors never conspire against
the caregiver to ruin their efforts – the caregiver cares as they ought to, and thereby meets the
care-recipient’s need(s) successfully.625 There is, I think, a philosophically significant
difference between caring relations in which the caregiver discharges their moral
responsibilities or cares as she ought to and one in which the care-recipient’s needs are actually
met by a caring agent who fully discharges her responsibilities or cares as she ought to. And
ideal caring relations are for that reason the caring relations we ought to hope for and
approximate as best we can. We may never be so fortunate as to participate in an ideal relation,
but qua an ideal, these kinds of relation are the kinds we ought to aspire to, and the benchmark
against which we ought to evaluate caring actions and character traits in the contexts of
dependency relations.
This tripartite approach to caring relations is not without its problems. It does, admittedly,
regard any relational shortcomings stemming from the cared-for’s actions as bad luck. And this
is indeed an awkward way of speaking about relations whose troubles stem from deliberate
actions, performed with an intent to hinder or not,626 on the part of those for whom we care.
Recall here the case of Billie Jo in Hesse’s Out of the Dust. It seems to me that such relations ought to be
acknowledged as caring even if they succumb to rotten luck.
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Even if we examine the relation solely from the perspective of the caregiver, this sort of
distinction can matter greatly. So we might wish to further distinguish other sorts of good but
not ideal caring relations. But though I think they will be indispensable for any account of
caring relations, the set of distinctions I have just presented is not intended to be exhaustive.
Other distinctions can be drawn in this area without threatening the account. My intent here is,
additionally, in part to ask what these three concepts look like in the virtuous caregiver’s life,
so it is fitting that we focus on the caregiver’s own moral standing. What’s more, carerecipients can respond in countless ways to caring relations and particular attempts to care,
running the gamut from downright viciousness to perfect virtuousness. The virtuous
caregiver’s own character and actions are thus worth studying per se not only because it is the
virtuous caregiver who actually performs the caring action (though they will also, no doubt, be
care-recipients), but also since their caring actions are more determinate because a variable,
their character, is ascertained.
The distinctions above are not, moreover, out of step with care ethical subdivisions of
caring relations. We noted earlier that there is some inconsistency in the literature on the use
of care as a relational ideal. Several care ethicists distinguish between care and good care and
use both, whereas other accounts distinguish these notions from one another but deploy only
one. Other accounts fail entirely to distinguish good or ideal care from deficient or non-ideal
care. But there is room for divergent accounts, depending on the uses these concepts are to be
put to. Lexicographical projects will undoubtedly need to advance broader definitions, but
idealistic projects need not be so permissive or varied.627
An idealist theory of caring relations like the one presented here will therefore emphasise
the virtues. Both good and ideal caring relations, on my account, will include a caregiver with
a particular set of motivations, values, attitudes, and other mental states and habits namely
those outlined in Chapter 5. As I argued there, charity meets a minimal standard for care, and
the neo-Aristotelian concept of charity typically regards investment or attachment in others’
good as an essential feature. So on the concepts of good and ideal care espoused here, the
caregiver is one possessed of the virtue of charity – they perform caring actions because they
value the care-recipient’s good. In both good and ideal caring relations, the caregiver desires
that the care-recipient’s needs be met – they are glad, satisfied, overjoyed, or elated when they
succeed in caring, saddened, upset, distraught, or heartbroken when they do not. This is what
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it means, after all, to be as Foot put it, “attached to the good of others.” Even in less intimate
relations, such as those between nurses and their patients or teachers and their students, we
think it morally praiseworthy or virtuous to be invested in a care-recipient’s wellbeing to some
extent, such that even where one’s job keeps one on one’s feet, one takes some (not necessarily
great) joy in their patients’ or students’ triumphs and recoveries and feels at least some small
pang of sorrow at their struggles and suffering. It is also reasonable, I think, to understand
attachment as involving a kind of commitment to meeting needs. Annas suggests in “The Good
Life and the Good Lives of Others” that ancient theories of philia are all, at bottom, about
commitment.628 And this does seem to pick up on something significant about entering into a
caring relation, since we typically think that participating in a (close) caring relation affords us
some insight into how agents will behave in future.629 Insofar as we think that participation in
a caring relation enables us to predict responses in counterfactual scenarios, the notion of
commitment seems useful here too.
This raises an additional point. An ideal caring relation is not boundless in scope, of
course, and there is no reason to think that caregivers must take a care-recipient’s eudaimonia,
in its entirety, as their end. This, I take it, is the thought behind the distinction Blustein draws
between care and commitment, a distinction he justifies with an example:
I might, for example, save a person's life because I care about that person for his or
her own sake. However, if the person is only a distant stranger, there are quickly
reached limits to how far I am willing to go on his or her behalf. Thus, I cannot
properly be said to be committed to the person or his or her well-being.630
Blustein is correct – in meeting a stranger’s needs I cannot reasonably be thought to commit to
promoting their eudaimonia in general. We want to retain the capacity to distinguish between
caring relations on the basis of their scope. We do not expect or predict doctors to care for their
patients in the same way their friends do – a doctor certainly does not need to offer comfort to
a patient by taking them out for dinner, or offer them a couch to sleep on when they hit rock
bottom, in the way a friend might. A healthcare professional’s relation with their patient is not
faulty if it does not include their meeting every eudaimonistic need the patient faces – not only
is this overdemanding of professional caregivers, it also treats caring relations as monolithic
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and blurs distinctions between different sorts of caring relations which ought to be retained.631
But there is nothing in the theory of caring relations being laid out here which stipulates that
eudaimonistic needs cannot be further specified according to the specific relation between a
caregiver and their recipient.632 My focus here will be on close caregivers, typically friends and
family members, but potentially also on professional caregivers who are in amicable or
otherwise beneficent relations with their care-recipients (as, for example, in some sorts of
disability care, where the care work partially consists in keeping the care-recipient company,
or in cases where teachers or doctors form a kind of semi-professional, ersatz friendship with
their students/patients). In those cases, it is reasonable to assume that a much wider set of
eudaimonistic needs, possibly all of them, ought at least to register in the caregiver’s moral
deliberations.

2.

Caring Relations and Reasons for Action

I have already argued that caring relations, particularly ideal ones, are components of human
flourishing and are therefore of value. But this is not necessarily to take a stance on the role
they (ought to) play in moral deliberation or justification. That relations do somehow figure in
good moral deliberation seems uncontroversial enough. But exactly what difference does
participation in a caring relation make in the mind of the virtuous caregiver? And what
difference does participation in a caring relation make to the practice of moral justification?
Here I shall expound on a relatively modest account of relational ethics, according to which
caring relations yield some reasons for action and amplify others.
Reasons in favour of particular actions can be sorted into a variety of categories, and I
want, in particular, to distance the account here from those which provide obliging reasons –
that is, overriding reasons for action which are automatically prescriptive of right action. On
the account defended here, caring relations merely supply/strengthen salient reasons for
action.633 Some of the needs we encounter do not supply us with reasons for action unless they
are encountered within a particular relational context. A child’s need for comfort after a fall is
not necessarily morally significant to passers-by, but it becomes so when I am her parent and
631
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my relation to her involves a commitment to meeting emotional needs. Some needs, survival
needs in particular, are morally salient whether or not they are encountered within a relational
context, but their weight is partially determined by the relation existing between the individual
in need and the individual encountering their need. In making a related point, Nagel notes that
“there’s a reason for one to be given morphine which is independent of the fact that the pain is
mine – namely that it is awful.”634 Kraut does take issue with this in What is Good and Why?,635
but Kraut’s issue is not with the reason-giving nature of pain. Rather, Kraut argues against the
notion that pain can be bad without being bad for someone, a point which fits into the account
well. My reason for giving morphine is surely weightier if whomever is in pain is a co-worker,
and weightier still if she is a dear friend or family member. What is in dispute is not the thought
that pain is always an evil regardless of my relation with the individual suffering it, but the
thought that pain is an evil independently of its belonging to someone.
Furthermore, when confronted by two identical states of need, a caring relation with one
of the needy supplies a reason to tend to their needs first.636 Caring relations supply us with
reasons to be partial. Envisioning himself defending a decision to give life-saving drugs to a
friend instead of five strangers, Taurek explains that:
I do not say to the five strangers that I give all of my drug to my friend because it
is a better thing in itself that he should survive than that they should. I do not believe
any such thing. Rather, I simply explain that David is my friend. His survival is
more important to me than theirs. I would expect them to understand this, provided
they were members of a moral community acceptable to me.637
Taurek’s language raises interesting and important questions for this account – does friendship
in this case introduce an additional reason for action, or does it strengthen an existing one? I
do not wish to commit to any particular stance on that question here. It suffices that virtue
ethicists are receptive to this general line of thought (and Foot, in particular, thinks highly of
Taurek’s argument).638 It is easy to see why, furthermore, if we bear in mind the claim that
caring relations derive value from eudaimonia. To say that something is valuable to someone
is, surely, to present a reason for her to pursue it. It is not an unassailable line of thought, as
we have seen in our discussions of partialism, but objections are likely to come from
634
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impartialist philosophers outside the virtue ethical tradition.639 So though it does have its
detractors, the debate over this point raises deeper issues for virtue ethicists as a whole which
lie well beyond the scope of this chapter.
The primary questions facing such an account are when particular needs provide reasons
for action and how compelling those reasons are. In answer to some of these questions, we can
defer to the needs theorists we drew on in Chapter 6. Needs theorists are cognizant of the
varying extents to which needs can demand responses, and have developed finely detailed and
complex accounts of the differences between needs and how these serve to strengthen or
weaken the derivative set of moral responsibilities. The strength of these reasons scales with
variables like urgency, delibility, intimacy, and history, so when it comes to nonurgent, delible
needs in shallow, nonintimate caring relations, the responsibilities to care can be relatively
limited and weak. Thus, Brock and Reader begin their theory of moral obligation as follows:
An agent has an obligation to help a person in need, if the following conditions all
hold, ceteris paribus. For the needy person, severe harm is likely and imminent. He
is unable to help himself. He is in his position through causes beyond his control,
and it is not the case that he has an informed, voluntary, and enduring desire not to
be helped. The agent knows about the needy person’s position, knows what is
required to help avert the harm, is in a position to help such that the cost of helping
is not significant, and her assistance has some good likelihood of being effective.
Under such conditions, we can be reasonably clear that the agent would be morally
required to help the needy person.640
On Brock and Reader’s view, needs are only morally demanding in the context of moral
relationships, where there is “something between” two people,641 but whatever that is, it cannot
just be shared properties, shared beliefs, shared feelings, shared context (i.e. a group), or having
“complementary needs, skills, or goods.”642
The mark of obligation-constituting features of real relationships is that they are not
merely properties that the relata happen to share. Rather, they are properties which
literally connect, constituting the relationship.643
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It is, therefore, the biological and historical relationship between children and parents which
obliges them, not the fact that they share a surname or that they are all members of the same
community. What’s more, the fuller the relationship, the stronger the moral demandingness of
needs.644 Needs theorists do not always consider relations of the sorts we are discussing here,
or the differences they make to the reason-giving force of needs, but the nature of the relation
does seem to bear upon the moral demandingness of given needs. One would not expect a
doctor to loan money to a patient, for instance, even if that patient is in financial need, because
the nature of professional caring relations typically does not involve the sorts of familiarity and
intimacy which make financial needs like these morally compelling. 645 A reason for a doctor
to aid someone in such need might still exist, of course, especially if one thinks, as I do, that
virtue ethics does not have room for supererogation.646 But if so, the reasons generated by such
financial needs upon doctors cannot for the most part be decisive. Some of the concepts in play
here may also be difficult to apply. Delibility in particular is a difficult dimension to assess,
since it is not clear how delible some kinds of needs are. How delible are emotional needs, for
example?647 But the fact that there are cases where it is difficult to measure a particular variable
is not in itself reason to reject the framework. Caring for others is not supposed to be
algorithmic in this way.
There is substantial room, even amongst virtue ethicists, for disagreement over why these
claims about caring relations hold true for the virtuous agent. If we think that entering into a
caring relation – or at least an ideal one – involves a sort of commitment to meeting needs, or
to the good of the care-recipient, then we might regard these thoughts as matters of loyalty,
honesty, or integrity. From this an argument flows naturally for the thought that reasons for
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action are supplied or strengthened in caring contexts. One might also explain this set of claims
by reference to the caregiver’s own eudaimonia. Those with whom we share relations are, in
general, those whose wellbeing has the greatest impact on our own wellbeing. To enter into a
caring relation is to give another person’s wellbeing much greater bearing on our own lives’
evaluations. So we might think that eudaimonistic needs are more morally compelling in caring
relations because they have a greater impact on our own wellbeing (and, as noted in earlier,
this does not necessarily run up against the obvious objection from egoism, since right-making
considerations and moral motivations can come apart). In any case, I take the relative modesty
and consistency with which this account is endorsed (at least amongst virtue ethicists) to be
sufficient reason to assume it here.
Most reasons of this sort seem to be prima facie reasons which are defeasible. Needs
theorists point to a number of defeaters which are applicable here. All commentators
acknowledge both that the language of needs can be misused, and that our assessments of need
can be mistaken. It is thus possible to falsify (moral) needs-claims. In Needs, Thomson
identifies two means of doing so: (1) show the non-necessity of x (though x may still be
necessary for the efficient achievement of some goal), and; (2) show that x is unimportant.648
To show that x is not necessary will typically involve showing that some other item can meet
the need as well. One does not need rice to satisfy one’s need for food if one also has a loaf of
bread to hand. Touching on a similar idea, Wiggins has stressed at several points that
“overspecificity in a ‘needs’ sentence makes it false.”649 Thus a claim that someone needs soda
water in order to satisfy a need for water is false, because that need can be satisfied by coffee,
tea, tap water, and so forth. Wiggins observes that overspecified needs tend to be dismissed by
pointing out that someone can get by with something else. Reader quotes this passage
approvingly in Needs and Moral Necessity,650 and adds that “overgenerality, universality and
particularity in any part of a statement about need can have the same effect. We see this in a
claim like ‘Human beings need milk’, which is overgeneral.”651 It is human infants who need
milk, not human beings per se. Showing that x is unimportant involves showing that the end
one needs the item for is not an important (i.e. good) end. It may be true that one needs a lighter
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to start a forest fire, but starting a forest fire is neither important nor good, and therefore one
does not need a lighter in the relevant sense.
Reasons for action stemming from caring relations are also subject to unique defeaters.
Reasons to meet needs can also be defeated by the existence of other caregivers who can
reasonably be expected to meet that particular need, or to do so better than I might myself. As
care ethicists have stressed, we are nodes in a web of caring relations, and our needs can thus
impose responsibilities on many individuals at once. Both parents have a responsibility to
provide help to a child who is struggling at school, for instance, and multiple medical
professionals have a responsibility to tend to a patient, despite the fact that in many cases the
need can be met by a set of individuals smaller than the set of agents in whose mind the need
ought to register as a reason for action. And if one parent or medical professional sets out to
meet a need, that diminishes our own reason to meet that need. If another caregiver is already
acting to alleviate a need and I have no reason to think that I can expedite the process or be of
any other use, then I have no reason to provide care for the person in need – there is nothing
more I can do. Conversely, knowledge that there are no other caregivers who can/will meet a
need can strengthen a responsibility. I might have first aid training, and for that reason be the
most capable person of meeting a need, and in such cases it is natural to think that I have more
reason than other passers-by to give first aid after an accident. If I know that someone who has
set out to meet a need is incapable of doing so, my reason for meeting that need is not
diminished. In such cases, this potential defeater either does not crop up or does not pan out.
The strength of a reason to meet a eudaimonistic need of someone with whom we share a caring
relation is thus sensitive to agential traits like experience, skill, or talent relative to those of
other prospective caregivers.

2.1. Reasons for Wicked Actions

I have said that caring relations strengthen or supply reasons for action, but is this true also of
reasons for bad actions?652 Since we are primarily concerned with good and ideal relations, and
this entails that whatever actions are performed are morally good actions, this question is not
urgent. Nevertheless, cases where a reason to perform an evil action emerges in the context of
a caring relation are puzzling. We will likely want to say in response that one does one’s

652

Note that this is not equivalent to asking whether they supply bad reasons for action, since one might think that
there are bad reasons for good actions, and perhaps more oddly, good reasons for wicked actions.

184

charges no good by acting on reasons for wicked actions, even where this offers some
undefined short-term benefit. The fact that Bonnie and Clyde shared in a caring relation did
not supply or amplify extant reasons for aiding and abetting one another’s criminal activities.
If anything, it presented reasons for each to temper the other’s criminal tendencies. But this is
a complex matter, touching on one of the oldest questions in moral philosophy, namely whether
those of us who perform wicked actions see them as wrong or evil. I do not have space to enter
into that debate, and it is one which an account like the one presented here will have to resolve
at some point, but it is, as I have said, one which is not especially salient for this chapter’s
analysis.
These remarks are not intended to exposit a full account of caring relations or their place
in moral theory. I leave open such questions as whether or not caring relations only supply or
amplify reasons for caring actions, or whether they can supply/amplify reasons for other sorts
of actions. What’s more, very few of these arguments need actually cross the virtuous
caregiver’s mind when they are confronted with a particular need. There is, as we have already
noted, no reason to think that the right-making features of an action are processed by virtuous
agents each time they act, and the standard formulation of reason-giving in virtue ethics is not
that reasons for action are all evaluated at the time of action but merely that the virtuous agent’s
actions can be explained by reference to good reasons.653 As Williams phrases it, an agent who
is faced with a choice between rescuing his wife and rescuing a stranger has “one thought too
many”654 if he pauses to consider whether he is permitted to give special consideration to his
wife. A great deal of the virtuous agent’s justificatory work can and should only be done after
the fact.

3.

The Politics of Eudaimonistic Needs

If these claims are convincing, then the core of a virtue ethical theory of care has begun to take
shape. Insofar as this theory challenges patriarchal or sexist approaches to moral philosophy
and incorporates feminine insights into virtue ethics, it is already a decidedly feminist ethic.
But care ethics is also feminist in a variety of other ways. As Tong puts it:
Feminist approaches to ethics are distinctive because they, far more than their
feminine and/or maternal counterparts, are political […] a feminist approach to
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ethics asks questions about power – that is, about domination and subordination –
even before it asks questions about good and evil, care and justice, or mothers and
fathers […] feminists are interested, to be sure, in a very specific dyad of oppression
– namely, the relationships that has historically existed between dominant men and
submissive women. Committed to the destruction of those patriarchal structures that
maintain gender asymmetry, feminists systematically challenge traditional ethics
for its contribution to women’s oppression.655
Among the most important functions of feminist moral philosophy is the analysis of power and
oppression in the political sphere. One of care ethics’ most attractive features is the readiness
with which it makes recommendations in traditionally political fields such as law enforcement,
economics, and international relations.
I have already mounted a short argument for the thought that virtue ethics is also capable
of such analysis in Chapter 4, and virtue ethicists like Tessman and Nussbaum have done a
great deal of work in this area by this point. Tessman adopts the following condition of
adequacy for feminist virtue ethics:
Any adequate moral theory must promote human flourishing. An adequate feminist
moral theory will pay particular attention to systemic barriers to human flourishing
that have been created by conditions of oppression (including, but not limited to,
the oppression of women).656
And she goes on to proffer a theory of virtue which meets this standard. In what remains of this
thesis, I continue Tessman’s project of addressing systemic barriers to human flourishing, and
in doing so take the account of care defended here in a different (and complementary) direction.
I aim also, in the process to show how the theory of care outlined in this thesis hangs together.
I argue in this section that one of the external factors to which our account of caring relations
draws attention is the specific institutional contexts in which care-recipients find themselves,
noting in particular the harms institutional oppression does to care-recipients. I then explore
some of the options available to caregivers who find that their care-recipient’s prospects for
eudaimonia are severely curtailed by their institutional relations.

655
656

Tong, Feminine and Feminist Ethics, 160 (original emphasis).
Burdened Virtues, 23.

186

3.1. Institutionally Met Needs

Those with whom we share relations have many needs met directly, and many more needs met
indirectly, by institutions. Care ethicists have often noted that the bulk of paradigmatic care
work has historically taken place in the household, and this after all is a kind of institution.
Here, however, I wish to focus on institutions beyond the household. Much care work is now
performed professionally in the workplace. As Tronto rightly points out, “throughout the
twentieth century, with the growth of more professional ways to understand human
development, care has become more professionalized and left the household behind.” 657 And
political institutions have come not only to facilitate caregiving by means of norms, policy, and
legislation, but also, also to actively supply certain conditions necessary for flourishing in the
form of redistribution, guaranteeing certain property rights, healthcare, and so forth. Here I
wish to include all of these cases, and any other cases where institutions either supply the
conditions necessary for care or directly meet eudaimonistic needs themselves, though my
primary interest is in states and the institutions directly underneath them, such as legal
institutions and law enforcement, medical institutions, and educational institutions.
The import of these institutionally determined conditions can hardly be overestimated –
it is in these contexts that we develop the cognitive, emotional, and physical capacities we need
to flourish. Inadequate institutional provisions for healthcare and education threaten to harm
the populace in a host of ways, ranging from withholding access to essential
treatment/medication, to failing to provide adequate civic education and thereby failing to
provide the epistemic tools necessary for fully informed civic participation, to inflicting the
various sorts of moral damage discussed by philosophers like Tessman. This is, I take it, one
of Aristotle’s more important insights. Nussbaum rightly reminds us that:
because Aristotle understood human vulnerability, he saw that government needed
to address issues such as the purity of a water supply and the quality of air, as well
as education. Vulnerability cannot be removed altogether, of course, but Aristotle
did lay emphasis on the way in which some cities supported human weakness better
than others.658
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The most conspicuous harms done by institutional failures to meet needs only scratch the
surface – institutions have non-negligible impacts on a host of different dimensions of
wellbeing.
Some institutional needs are also derivative of others. It is not particularly surprising that
some needs gives rise to others. A baby’s need for food generates a need for a caregiver, a
diabetic’s need for insulin generates a need for an adequate healthcare system, which itself
generates a need for particular legislative arrangements. Braybrooke identifies two sorts of
derived needs: needs derived from “conceptual connections,” and needs derived from
“scientific laws and empirical generalizations.”659 He offers illustrative examples in lieu of
definitions:
A derivation resting on a conceptual connection runs from the need to preserve the
body intact to the need to keep one’s arm unbroken. A derivation resting on a
scientific law runs from the need for food to the need for vitamin C as an essential
ingredient of the diet. If we add the law that sauerkraut is […] a good source of
vitamin C, and the empirical generalization […] that sauerkraut is the only source
available, a need for sauerkraut might be derived, too.
These two sorts of derivation may arrive at the same need – Braybrooke notes that a need for
medical care might be arrived at in either way.660 He also claims that scientific laws and
empirical generalizations include “convention” and “social arrangement,” by which he means
two different things.661 Braybrooke uses “convention” broadly, to include “formal rules” like
statutes, as well as informal or unwritten rules, widely accepted schemes of coordination (like
road rules), and ‘approximations’ of these, such as passing food clockwise around the dinner
table. So needs can be derived from a wide variety of sources, including the institutional settings
governing those in need.
What’s more, in some cases, institutions are the only entities which can meet
eudaimonistic needs. It is difficult to see how any institution other than the state could provide
the same sorts of enforceable legal protections of minimum wages or environmental standards,
for example (though, of course, anarchists have not left this possibility unexplored).662 In these
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cases, if institutions fail to meet those needs, then those needs go unmet. In other cases, other
institutions or entities can intervene to ensure that needs are met. Non-governmental
organisations often do this, relying on charitable donations to supply food, clothing, housing
materials, and other basic necessities to those for whom the state has not provided proper
care.663 Other governments also provide aid when states fall victim to disasters which they are
unequipped for. And individuals can also meet needs when institutions fail to. Individuals can
give of their own resources, offering such things as food and shelter to others in need, or they
can band together to form an institution and thereby meet needs on a larger scale. The aid
provided in such cases is not to be understated, and indeed it supplies us with many of our most
inspiring moral exemplars.664
But though non-governmental organisations and individuals have prevented much harm
by stepping in to compensate for institutional failures to meet eudaimonistic needs, there are at
least two reasons why we might not to accept their intervention as the new status quo. First, it
is at least arguable that governments, which possess much greater pools of resources, can do
more good, and do it more efficiently. Second, many cases where non-governmental
organisations and individuals pick up the slack seem to be cases of injustice, either intrinsically
(it is unjust that some entity other than the state performs this work) or extrinsically (it is not
unjust that another entity performs this work, but in performing this work, this entity brings
about injustices – such as, say, relying exclusively or disproportionately on the poor and
underprivileged).665 So there are at least two arguments for the thought that even where an
institution’s failure to meet needs is mitigated by the intervention of some other entity,
something ought to be done to rehabilitate its capacity to meet needs, or to ensure that it does
so if it is capable. Both of these arguments rest on hotly contested premises, and I want to be
forthcoming about their difficulties, but the argument does not rest on their universal truth – it
is, once again, sufficient that one or the other holds sometimes.
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3.2. Institutional Failures to Meet Needs

Institutions do fail to meet needs, of course. Many fail, for example, to adequately protect
various rights, and many succumb to misinformation, greed, cronyism, nepotism,
demagoguery, and other faults and failures which interfere with caregivers’ efforts to care. Care
work carried out by nurses, teachers, and other professional caregivers is a quintessential
example of many institutions’ failure to either meet their citizens’ eudaimonistic needs, or to
provide the conditions in which those needs can be met by others. As care ethicists have often
pointed out, care work of these kinds is subject to a variety of different sorts of exploitation,
including unlivable wages, inadequate protections for caregivers, and stigmas around – or
outright hostility towards – the intervention of unions and the use of protests and other
disruptive tactics in order to secure adequate institutional support.666 And we might even think
that some institutions will inevitably fail to meet some of the needs they ought to. “All law is
universal,” Aristotle points out in the Nicomachean Ethics, “and there are some things about
which one cannot speak correctly in universal terms.”667 The law is bound, in Aristotle’s view,
to mishandle some cases, and this is why he deems it necessary to develop an account of equity
which sets aright judgments which the law gets wrong in the first instance. An institutional
arrangement is to be measured, in part, by how it protects care work from these troubles. Kraut
is especially firm on this point, insisting that “social rules, when they are not mere taboos or
instruments of oppression, are promoters of the good of all members of the community.”668 But
measurement against this yardstick proves damning for many states and communities, if not
for the very notions of statehood, institutionality, and community themselves.
In the worst cases, institutions will actively work to oppress members of a society, or
perhaps more precisely, be used by those in positions of power as tools of oppression. There
is, of course, disagreement over the nature of oppression, and particular cases might also be
contentious,669 but that institutions sometimes oppress is not contentious, and this is sufficient
Kittay writes in “When Caring is Just and Justice is Caring,” at 561, that:
as a worker […] the caregiver is vulnerable to exploitation. But because of the special demands of
caregiving and because of the traditional assignment of this work to women or servants, dependency
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relatively powerless within the society at large and who occupy a status lower than that of their
charge.
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for the argument at hand. How exactly we wrong oppressed communities is also a matter of
debate. Even if we limit ourselves to eudaimonistic needs, we can see how oppression might
wrong others in a whole host of ways – say, by violating their autonomy or
infantilizing/dehumanizing them, by symbolizing a sort of disgust or disrespect, by permitting,
legitimating, or even encouraging others to mistreat the oppressed, or by preventing others
from caring for them.670 bell hooks writes that:
today small boys and young men are daily inundated with a poisonous pedagogy
that supports male violence and male domination, that teaches boys that unchecked
violence is acceptable, that teaches them to disrespect and hate women.671
And this is the sort of pervasive and systematic harm oppressive institutions engage in. The
precise nature of the harms oppressive institutions inflict is not, however, a debate we need
enter into. It is enough that one of the wrongs committed by oppressors is that they actively
undermine the eudaimonia of the oppressed in at least one way, and this does not seem a
particularly bold assumption to make.
Given these considerations, good and ideal caring relations are to a large extent outwardlooking. We are born not only into a web of personal relations, but also into a web of
institutional relations, and the vast majority of us (perhaps with the odd exception of cases like
Victor of Aveyron’s) remain entangled in those relations until we die. Those of us who take an
interest in the wellbeing of those for whom we care must, for that reason, be equally conscious
of those relations’ impact on our loved ones’ wellbeing. Their set of dependency relations will
include also their relations with governments and government departments, schools, police
departments, hospitals and aged care facilities, and so forth. So because I am invested in their
wellbeing, and their wellbeing is to a large extent determined by how those institutional
relations fare, I am invested also in the wellbeing of those institutional relations. I desire that
they are treated fairly by the institutions to which they are subject, and that those institutions
fulfil their duties completely and in good time, so that my loved ones’ eudaimonistic needs are
met when they are occurrent and minimally concerning when they are dispositional.672 To a
large extent, then, caring about someone involves redirecting our attention away from our
interpersonal relation with them, and towards their relations with the relevant institutions.
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Our attention to unmet needs cannot, moreover, be blinkered. Though caregivers might
find that an institution fails to meet just one particular need, or just one need in which they are
interested, needs are not always so easily separable, and indeed must sometimes be considered
en masse if they are to be met adequately. One of the key insights of recent feminist scholarship
is that oppression is multidimensional in such a way that different needs become intertwined.
Crenshaw, at the vanguard of this scholarship, exhorts feminists to broaden their horizons and
challenge not just sexism and patriarchy:
When feminism does not explicitly oppose racism, and when anti-racism does not
incorporate opposition to patriarchy, race and gender politics often end up being
antagonistic to each other, and both interests lose.673
Needs, in other words, overlap. To properly attend to the needs of oppressed gender, racial, and
sexual minorities, one must attend to the needs of all of these minorities. As hooks puts it:
White women and black men have it both ways. They can act as oppressor or be
oppressed. Black men may be victimized by racism, but sexism allows them to act
as exploiters and oppressors of women. White women may be victimized by
sexism, but racism enables them to act as exploiters and oppressors of black people.
Both groups have led liberation movements that favor their interests and support
the continued oppression of other groups. Black male sexism has undermined
struggles to eradicate racism just as white female racism undermines feminist
struggle.674
Needs are not always isolable. In order for caregivers to ensure that an institution meets needs
as it ought to, they must often have a grasp of wider social issues which tether needs to one
another.

4.

The Long March Through the Institutions

In the preceding sections, we defined caring relations and noted that many of the eudaimonistic
needs caregivers are interested in seeing met are only met within particular institutional
settings. But what, if anything, are caregivers to make of all this? Like consequentialism and
deontology, virtue ethics is agent-centered in the sense that it asks first and foremost what a
particular individual ought to be like and do. And the obvious answer, in light of this, is to look
Kimberlé Crenshaw “Whose Story is it, Anyway? Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of Anita Hill,” in
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to (a) a theory of justice which offers us some means of allocating individual and institutional
responsibilities, and (b) institutional processes for the means by which we as individual
caregivers might seek to rectify whatever needs to be rectified. Theories of justice are, of
course, partly aimed at establishing an institutional arrangement which meets the needs of its
people. And though caring for another will involve looking outward, this does not amount to
passive reception of data – I am not merely a spectator to the relation between an individual I
care about and particular institutions, hoping that my loved one is cared for by the institutions
they are governed by. I am also, often, able to directly or indirectly alter the behavior of those
institutions. So we might think that there are ready solutions available to caregivers who are
concerned about institutional failures to meet needs, and that caring consists partly in their
pursuit.
What’s more, if they possess the caring character traits, we can rely on our virtuous
caregiver to treat extant needs as forceful reasons to take steps to alter institutional behaviours.
Virtuous agents who care as they ought to will, insofar as they are able, take an interest in
politics broadly understood, and make efforts to restructure their society in ways beneficial to
those for whom they care, including both their compatriots and more distant others. None of
this ought to be particularly striking, since these thoughts cohere well with the usual set of
candidates for virtue. Many of our moral exemplars emerge (often reluctantly) in contexts of
political dissatisfaction, injustice, upheaval, and revolution. The civil rights movement birthed
such figures as Martin Luther King Jr. and Rosa Parks, the contest for women’s suffrage figures
such as Kate Sheppard. With remarkable consistency, these figures cite as their aims the
meeting of what I have called eudaimonistic needs, or the pursuit of a well-lived life, as a
motive for their activism.675 So it seems that this understanding of care is an intuitive one.
But two problems immediately present themselves. The first, which I shall set to one
side, is the ongoing attack upon theories of justice levelled by feminist ethicists, itself just one
set of battles in a larger war spanning much of modern political philosophy. 676 Philosophers
might have no qualms about these ongoing debates, but it is far from obvious what those outside
of the ivory tower, whose needs cannot be shelved until an adequate political philosophy is
settled upon, ought to make of these debates when their practical implications are so
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discordant.677 Second, as Nussbaum points out, “activists have all too little influence in the
corridors of power.”678 The preceding discussion has focused on institutional barriers to
flourishing, and the obvious solution is to alter the institutions to remove the barriers. But as
we have seen, care ethicists have repeatedly (and convincingly) argued that caregivers are
systematically disenfranchised and downtrodden. Held enjoins us to “seek an ordering of
society along cooperative lines that foster mutual trust and caring”679 and this is certainly an
end worth pursuing, but how can we expect some of society’s most underappreciated,
overworked, and vulnerable members to initiate institutional changes of the sort we are
discussing here?
I do not mean to suggest that caregivers are all in a state of political inertia, unable to
make any changes for being so suppressed. There are many caregivers who can make important
institutional changes to better address needs, and many means for them to do so. The most
obvious route for caregivers who aim to rectify institutional failures to meet needs is to engage
in whatever participatory means are available. In democracies, this might simply involve
participation in electoral politics. Many (though certainly not all) caregivers are able to vote,
and those who cannot are able to write letters to politicians, and in dire cases, to engage in
activism and resistance.680 But what is a caregiver to do when institutional reform is a
pipedream? It is no accident that Tessman refers to poor institutional arrangements as “bad
luck”681 or, following Williams, “constitutive luck”682 and Card treats oppression as one
element of the “unnatural lottery,”683 since such arrangements are usually either born into or
imposed upon the oppressed with little to no consultation.684 The ability to alter one’s
institutional structure is itself a kind of luck. And an emphasis on needs highlights not only the
direct institutional efforts to meet those needs and the indirect means by which institutions
create an environment conducive to meeting those needs, it also underscores the fact that a lack
677
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of institutional processes for rectification of failures is itself a failure to meet eudaimonistic
needs. Where states fail to offer means by which needs can be expressed and changes can be
made, they fail to be sufficiently responsive to the needs of the individuals in their precinct.
Furthermore, while many states do have such procedures in place, caregivers often find
themselves unable to engage in those processes. Some institutions have no processes to allow
for responsiveness either because no processes are in place or because extant processes are
mere tokenisms, but others might possess the necessary institutional machinery and yet not
allow or not afford opportunities for everybody to make use of them.685
In such cases, the best some caregivers can do may simply be to give voice to their
troubles in the hopes that speaking truth to power might by some miracle effect change. This
is the situation marginalized groups have sometimes found themselves in in the past, and it is
one which both philosophers of need and care ethicists ought to attend more closely to, given
their respective emphases on political needs and dialogical caregiving.686 They have not failed
to notice, of course, that needs can only be ascertained by listening. McLeod, for instance,
offers the following remarks in passing: “the normal sources of both first-person and thirdperson knowledge of need are testimony and inference. It is in the nature of needing that this
be so.”687 But these insights are not typically applied to cases of moral protest. Furthermore,
voicing concerns has also proven to be an effective strategy in the past. 688 As Tessman
summarises it, one of King’s guiding thoughts was that:
effectiveness in achieving liberatory ends was dependent on bringing the oppressor
to be ashamed of his injustices, and he maintained that through the resisters’
displaying great moral integrity, white supremacists could be shamed into
developing a moral conscience and consequently accepting the demands of the
movement.689
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This thought reappears not only in the literature on social justice and nonviolence, but also,
interestingly, in recent feminist scholarship on the politics of negative emotions. One of the
most noticeable changes in recent feminist philosophy of emotion is the emergence of a number
of different defences of the negative emotions, including anger, contempt, and bitterness.
Among the reasons for this is the contributions these emotions make to moral protest and the
voicing of injustices. Lynne McFall and Sue Campbell, defending bitterness, accept that
bitterness might be unhealthy but argue that it can nonetheless be a justified and impactful
emotion because it expresses uncomfortable truths which might otherwise be swept under the
rug, and because through its expression, others gain access to the mental states of marginalized
groups.690 When we express our bitterness, others become aware of our emotional state and are
reminded and encouraged to consider perspectives they would not otherwise have considered.
So there is no reason to assume without argument that even a lack of institutional processes is
reason for hopelessness.
Failing this, there may be no option other than to leave. In the direst cases, where
institutions fail catastrophically to meet needs and there is no genuine prospect for institutional
reform, caregivers might reasonably give up hope and seek out other institutional arrangements
for their charges.691 There is a long history of forced migration and displacement in such
circumstances, notable instances of which include the underground railroads used by AfricanAmericans in the United States to reach the free states, and efforts to smuggle Jews out of Nazioccupied territories in Europe during the Second World War. Both are by now well-studied
phenomena, but they are, I think, illuminating nevertheless. Harriet Tubman, who came to be
the face of the underground railroad, was a complex character but cites as one of her reasons
for aiding escaped slaves that “most of those coming from the mainland are very destitute,
almost naked. I am trying to find places for those able to work, and provide for them as best I
can.”692 Tubman is far from an outlier in treating needs as reasons for action. James Miller
McKim is another abolitionist who aided fleeing slaves, of whom William Still writes:
As a helper and friend of the fleeing bondman, in numberless instances the writer
has marked well his kind and benevolent spirit, before and after the formation of
the late Vigilance Committee. At all times when the funds were inadequate, his aid
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could be counted upon for sure relief. He never failed the fugitive in the hour of
need. Whether on the Underground Rail Road bound for Canada, or before a United
States commissioner trying a fugitive case, the slave found no truer friend than Mr.
McKim.693
In many cases, those aiding escapees were former escapees themselves, and written accounts
of these helpers are often tales of self-care as much as care for others, but many of them seem
nonetheless to be genuine cases of care, where conductors of the underground railroad were
moved by needs which any contemporary account of eudaimonism will regard as indispensable
to help those in their care find better lives elsewhere.
Interviews with rescuers of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe reveal that meeting needs was
also a primary intent for rescuers there. Nechama Tec finds, in a vast and highly regarded study
of Poles, Jews, and their rescuers, that rescuers’ ability to look past all traits “except those that
expressed extreme suffering and need”694 is a recurring motif. Subsequent research bears this
out. “You help people because you are human and you see that there is a need,” says one
interviewee in another study who aided Jews in their escape of Nazi-occupied Europe, “there
are things in this life you have to do and you do it.”695 In both cases, then, responses to the
needs we would consider essential for eudaimonia proves thematic. Responsiveness of this sort
need not always feature in accounts of the reasoning behind such actions, but the consistency
with which needs are cited as the reasons for aiding escapees indicates that much of what we
take to be morally exemplary about these cases can be construed as caring actions performed
in response to dependency – that is, the initiation of a caring relation by the performance of
caring action which is motivated by reasons similar to those we would expect a caring person
to cite. The aid rescuers offered seems, in fact, to be a paradigmatic instance of Samaritanism
and of care, in response of course to the failures of secessionist states and Nazi leadership to
show concern for even the most basic of human needs. I take it, then, that historical examples
such as these approximate more or less the concept of ideal care discussed above, but they also
show how that care ties in with moral character, reason-responsiveness, and the Anscombean
theory laid out in Chapter 6. The thought that care sometimes involves aiding the escape of the
marginalized and oppressed is borne out by at least two historical movements.
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The analytical usefulness of these concepts is not, moreover, limited to historical
examples. Migration, particularly of Middle Easterners and Central/South Americans, has also
come to be in the eyes of the western world one of the defining issues of this century. Migrants
continue to flee from Central- and South-American states, moving upwards towards the
southern United States and from the Middle East towards Europe, the Americas, and
Australasia. These migrants move for a variety of reasons, but the most urgent and commonly
cited reasons include reasons associated with eudaimonistic needs. The United Nations reports
that:
Women from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala [speak] of pervasive and
systemic levels of violence, connected to increasing territorial influence of criminal
armed groups from which it was nearly impossible to find reprieve. Women from
certain parts of Mexico reported similar issues. In fact, 136 of the 160 women
interviewed (from all four countries) stated that they lived in neighborhoods
controlled by criminal armed groups.696
For many of these migrants, abandoning the state is a direct response to threats to basic survival
needs. And this, as we have seen, counts as a kind of caring action, whether its aim be to meet
the migrant’s own need, or the needs of those in their care (and, of course, it may well be both).
Migrants seek security, a good education, proper medical care, and other essential components
of eudaimonia for those in their care.697 And it is for this reason, I want to suggest, that
migration is of the same sort as more familiar responses to institutional shortcomings like
rallies or unionization, but also relevantly similar to historical cases where care involved aiding
the needy in the pursuit of a better life under better institutional conditions. In such cases, the
metaphorical march through the institutions becomes a literal one, where victims of poor
institutional arrangements must move and/or be moved across vast distances with the aim of
securing a better life (that is, must perform caring actions in the context of caring relations).
Tessman’s account overlooks this sort of care, I think, because her focus is on “the moral
state of selves.”698 Like many virtue ethicists writing in this area, Tessman is primarily
concerned with the damage oppression does to character. In contrast, taking concepts of care
as our foremost moral concept has refocused our attention towards the more general category
of eudaimonistic needs, and thus not only towards moral damage, which encourages us to
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notice features of the moral landscape which accounts like Tessman’s overlook. It also allows
us to explain why responses to those needs are morally exemplary, as we often think they are.
The theory laid out here enables us to clarify, in fairly detailed terms, why we think the
Samaritans who conducted the underground railroad and aided Jews in escaping Nazism acted
well in the face of catastrophic institutional failure. They responded as virtuous caregivers do
when they were confronted with dependency and willingly entered into caring relations by
undertaking to meet those needs, sometimes at great personal risk. They acted as the
caring/charitable person would by responding rightly to compelling reasons for action.
The account here also has several implications for modern problems in applied ethics.
These must be dealt with in more detail than can be offered here, but there are at least two
discursive avenues worth mentioning here. The first is that the account presented here allows
us to reconceptualize migrants as caregivers, and in doing so brings to light an interesting
tension between two different moral judgements.699 Though our views of both phenomena are
increasingly complex, I take it that many of the accounts of Samaritanism we inherit from the
underground railroad and Nazi-occupied Europe are widely regarded as exemplary instances
of care. Yet many commentators on the migration of Central- and South-Americans are less
sympathetic to those caregivers than they are likely to be when it comes to the historical
caregivers we have studied.700 If, as much of the empirical work being done on the matter seems
to suggest, the primary reason for fleeing to the southern United States is simply to seek out an
institutional setting in which eudaimonistic needs can be met (as opposed, say, to terrorism,
drug trafficking, or some other morally problematic activity), then it is unclear why we ought
to praise historical caregivers and denounce Central- and South-American ones.701 This is not
a tension we can fully resolve here, but I regard it as a strength of the account of care presented
here if it enables us to notice this tension by underscoring the numerous similarities between
699
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the two groups of caregivers, one of which is widely praised and the other of which is frowned
upon and feared in some circles.
This perspectival shift is not limited, moreover, to cases of displacement and migration.
Incorporating care into the virtue ethicist’s conceptual repertoire enables virtue ethicists to
conduct similar comparative projects about other problems facing caregivers around the globe.
The perspectival shift which seems to emerge here is one which may well be useful in analyses
of, say, detention centers in Australia, or Rohingya Muslims fleeing Myanmar. This is not to
say that all such cases are identical, of course, nor is it to take any particular stance on how
states ought to handle sudden influxes of entire communities. It does, however, encourage us
to rethink our attitudes towards migrants in search of institutional environments where they
and their care-recipients have better odds of living well. The similarities between caregiving
done in the past, and the tensions between the approbation we offer those caregivers and the
disapproval we often express towards caregivers in our own time who face similar situations,
ought to give us pause. For these reasons, I shall assume that the concepts of care both mesh
fairly well and can be useful to virtue ethicists working on specific moral problems.

4.1. Parochialism Again

At this point it is worth revisiting an issue we discussed briefly in Chapter 2, namely
parochialism. I have suggested that caring actions consist in the meeting of needs of particular
individuals. But this does not necessarily equate to meeting the needs of the whole group to
which that individual belongs. In some cases the two come together, since individuals can be
victimized because of their membership in a particular group, and in many cases the best means
of rooting out impediments to flourishing will be to eradicate whatever discrimination the entire
group faces. But there are also cases in which the two come apart – it might be the case that
some alternative is available which does nothing to eliminate discrimination against the group
as a whole, but which shields a particular individual from its effects. Take, for instance, James
Barry, a renowned English doctor in the 19th century who was revealed upon his death to be “a
perfect female.”702 Whatever one makes of other elements of the story, it is clear that Barry
was able to circumvent the barriers faced by women in England at the time by exploiting, and
would not have had access to the educational and employment opportunities had she not
exploited, gender norms of the time. Such cases are salient here because they illustrate the
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divergence of caring by meeting individuals’ needs and toppling the institutional barriers to
meeting those needs. Why, if I am interested in a particular individual’s needs, should I aim to
remedy institutional failures rather than find some other means by which this particular
individual’s needs can be met? After all, we have argued in Section 2 that it is my relation to a
particular individual which, other things equal, exerts the greatest normative pull on me, not
the discrimination faced by members of the group with whom I share no caring relation.
There are several responses available here. The first is just that we often care for multiple
members of a group. Though I might be able to aid someone in Barry’s predicament by, say,
giving her men’s clothing or keeping her secret once I have discovered it, this does nothing for
the other women in whose flourishing I am invested. The same might be said of a person of
colour who is able to pass for Caucasian, or a queer person who is able to pass for a heterosexual
– their ability to pass may make their lives much easier in a number of respects, and it may
indeed be morally right for me not to interfere or to aid them in some way, but their passing
has no immediate implications for the discrimination faced by the other people of colour or
members of the LGBTQ community. Insofar as my other relations are with members of the
same oppressed group, I seem to have strong reasons to attempt to address systemic issues
rather than to circumvent (or perhaps in addition to circumventing) them. Another reason is
that virtue involves goodwill towards others generally. Since we have taken the caring agent to
be one who possesses the virtues, and virtues like charity attach us not only to the good of
individuals but to the goods of others generally, it seems plausible to suggest that a virtuous
caregiver is one who aims at the good of many others, not just a select few friends and family.
And if this is the case, then a caregiver’s inclination to care for specific others includes an
inclination to aid oppressed groups as a whole – I might care for this member of a minority
specifically, but I care also for others, and for that reason also aim to address institutional
failures directly. Finally, one might think that virtuous agents care about groups themselves. In
examining the lives of our moral exemplars we find with noteworthy regularity not the claim
that their attempts to rectify institutional flaws are for the sake of individuals, but rather the
claim that they act for the sake of the oppressed community itself. 703 So it seems equally
plausible to claim that virtuous caregivers care about and aim to care for groups themselves in
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addition to caring about and for particular members of that community. Parochialism,
therefore, does not seem to be a particularly threatening issue for the account I am presenting
here.

5.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have set out to make two more contributions to the discussion taking place at
the intersection of our two theories. The first of these has been the development of a theory of
caring relations, based largely on the work care ethicists, virtue ethicists, and philosophers of
need have done on the concepts of dependency, care, and moral reasons for action. I have
suggested that virtue ethicists can and should lean on the work on caring relations done by care
theorists, offered what I take to be a philosophically useful set of distinctions between ideal,
non-ideal, and good caring relations, and developed what I take to be a plausible understanding
of the role caring relations play ought to play in moral reasoning. The second has been to apply
the concepts developed over the last three chapters to cases of institutional failure to meet
needs. The different understandings of care allow us to approach familiar moral issues with a
fresh perspective – one which, I have argued, opens up new, interesting, and significant
avenues for discussion. This chapter has, in transitioning from normative to applied ethics,
made more argumentative leaps than the others have, but if the case is persuasive, then we have
rounded off our theory of caring relations and defended its place in neo-Aristotelian virtue
ethics.
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VII
Conclusion
The intersection between virtue and feminist ethics is one of the most fertile and exciting in
moral philosophy, and neo-Aristotelians have yet to address several topics in that field.
Comparative arguments like the one I have made over Chapters 2 and 3 are, I think, a useful
starting point for many of those discussions. Over the course of these two chapters I mounted
an argument for greater similarity between care and virtue ethics than has usually been
acknowledged by proponents of either ethic. Though I took these chapters to form a fairly novel
contribution in their own right, their primary aim was to set the stage for the chapters to come.
In light of these similarities, it made sense to ask what, if anything, differentiated our two
ethical theories. In answering that question, Chapter 4 made what I take to be the second major
contribution of this thesis to the literature. I argued that several apparent differences did not in
fact withstand scrutiny, and identified two which did, namely that virtue ethics lacks an account
of care ethics’ central moral concept and that care ethics and virtue ethics organise their moral
concepts differently.
Over Chapters 5, 6, and 7 I attempted to flesh out an account of care in response to the
first of these discrepancies. In Chapter 5 I identified several means of framing care as a virtue,
and defended what I called the ‘virtue thesis’ from some objections. It suggested that the best
way to construe care as a virtue is analogical, and offered a short defence of charity for that
purpose. Chapter 6 then presented an account of caring actions/practices. I argued that what
care ethicists have offered of a care ethical philosophy of action ought to be plugged into
Anscombe’s broader philosophy of action, and that we ought to reconceptualise the needs to
which caring actions respond as what Anscombe calls ‘Aristotelian necessities.’ Finally,
Chapter 7 proffered some elements of a virtue ethical account of caring relations, and delved
into a discussion of politics with the aim of showing how these concepts fit together and
defending the account’s usefulness. I hope thereby to have made several inroads into a virtue
ethical theory of care – not the first, perhaps, but as far as I am aware one of the deepest.
True to its heritage, this dissertation has likely raised more questions than it has answered.
Three avenues for further research stand out in my mind as particularly interesting. First, there
is fascinating work to be done on virtue in the context of receiving care. Most of the discussion
here has presupposed that the virtuous agent assumes the role of caregiver, but as will be
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obvious from the preceding discussion, this is only one side of the story. Virtuous agents are
as vulnerable as the rest of us, and there are interesting questions about what it means to be a
care-recipient and how one ought to respond when one is on the receiving end of care. These
discussions will touch on a wide range of topics which have not been discussed in great depth
here, including work on virtues such as humility, selflessness, forgivingness, and temperance.
Another discussion to be had will address other sorts of care. I have repeatedly emphasised that
my account here is not intended to be exhaustive. The concepts developed here are, in my view,
the most urgent, but there are other kinds of care which will need to be addressed if
Aristotelians are to possess a complete account of care. What, for instance, are we to make of
caring emotions, labour, or techne? Can and should we endorse the accounts of caring emotions
put forward by philosophers like Noddings and Slote? And, following on from our discussion
in Chapter 6, is care work/labour meaningfully different from caring actions or practices? If
everyday vernacular is anything to go by, care will splinter into a whole host of subcategories,
each warranting philosophical exploration. A third and final avenue I wish to draw attention to
is applied. I have, in the final chapter, suggested that the concepts we have developed in this
thesis have significant implications for inquiries into the ethics of migration, and if that is the
case then I see no reason why that ought not to hold true for many other issues virtue ethicists
have yet to address in full. As new topics in fields like medical ethics, the ethics of artificial
intelligence, and intergenerational ethics continue to crop up, these concepts may prove useful
or indeed essential for virtue ethicists.
As care ethics continues to garner adherents, and in light of the urgency with which issues
of care must be addressed, we have ever greater reason to suspect that this thesis sits at the
vanguard of a much more substantial forthcoming dialogue between virtue and care ethicists.
I hope in this thesis to have laid solid foundations for an Aristotelian theory of care, and in
doing so to have tilled the soil for some of these future discussions.
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